Wednesday, October 15, 2014

"So rudely forced, tereu...."

Jonathan Chait says:

For various reasons, including the long stalemate in Washington, the movement to confront campus rape has shot up the list of liberal priorities. One can detect in this movement an impatience with balancing risk against liberty that, in other contexts, would be readily recognizable as a tone of creeping illiberalism.
Or it could be that rape has been a topic of political discourse for the last couple of years, including trying to redefine rape as "forcible rape", and declare that pregnancy after rape (a medieval canard, literally) is impossible (proving, by the way, that the rape is "legitimate," because, well, you know how women are)?

I stirred a strong discussion when I posted an entry about the complexities of consent, the central legal issue in a charge of rape (and pretty much the central social issue, too).  I have, in the recent past, used a textbook that included an essay on the question of how consent is defined in rape cases.  The essay presented examples from "stranger rape" (assault by a stranger, the kind we all think of as "definitely rape") to a case where a college student, drunk, slept with her close friend (male, and also drunk), and a day or two later decided it was a bad idea and the fault was his,  She condemned him on campus as a rapist, largely because she decided, as much as 72 hours later, that she had withdrawn her consent to the sexual intercourse.

Rape turns on this question of consent.  The stranger in the bushes seems a clear case of non-consensual sex.  Regrets the morning after, or the morning after the morning after, seems far less clear.  But when can consent be withdrawn?

California's affirmative consent law apparently tries to address this issue, although only in the context of sex on college campuses; it is not an alteration to California criminal law.  I don't know how effective this law should be, or even if it is a sound idea (the devil is in the details, and I haven't studied the details).  But it's the return to the question of consent that intrigues me.

Chait thinks this new law redefines most sex as rape.  The law, he says:

...requires all sexual activity among college students to obtain “affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement” and requires such consent be “ongoing throughout a sexual activity.”
Okay, and the problem is?

Sex, as I recall from my college years, is a delicate minefield of negotiations and desires.  I'm not sure "affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement" is too high a standard to set for an act that can involve identity, disease transmission, morality, intimacy, and self-consciousness (did I mention identity?).  And why shouldn't the consent be "ongoing throughout a sexual activity"?  Because once the train leaves the station, it ain't gonna stop 'til it reaches its destination?  I understand small animals can't control their bodily functions as readily as adults (pick up a housecat peeing in the wrong place and watch the stream continue unabated), but are we saying once she lets him in, it's too late to change her mind?  Isn't Chait's argument still aimed at making the male experience of sex normative, and the woman at some point just has to give up some agency in order to prevent unwanted outcomes (like a male college student being accused of rape)?

Is it "illiberal" to not want to turn off the issue of consent once penetration has occurred?  Or even before the clothes come off?  Isn't it more liberal to recognize there are two persons involved here, and both have equal agency in the event, and that agency doesn't come crashing to a halt at some event horizon beyond which the law cannot peer?

Besides, how does Mr. Chait think the culture of racist attitudes in this country began to change?  Because of Dr. King's inspiring speeches? Or because of changes in the law?

Tuesday, October 14, 2014

I just gotta say

Look carefully; you'll see her hand is out, and his hand isn't.  On such matters do elections turn.

Yes, tout le monde is upset that Wendy Davis put a wheelchair in a campaign ad, because Greg Abbott (her political opponent) is in a wheelchair following an accident that Charlie Pierce tells me made Mr. Abbott a very rich man (it happens, though usually payments are for medical expenses and pain and suffering; perhaps punitive damages added to that high total Mr. Pierce records.  Anyway....).

That bothers me not a bean.  Texas politics is routinely ignored unless there is a reason to pay attention to it, and then it is routinely distorted.  Rick Perry has won re-election constantly, so he is the Great White Hope of the GOP until...."Oops."  Wendy Davis has gone "too far, TOO FAR, I say!" by including a wheelchair in a campaign ad about how tort liability is good for Greg Abbot, but not for other people.  Whatever; because this is what bugs me:

Davis has been less of a candidate than people thought she would be, and remains likely to lose the election.
Davis was never likely to win this election.  The fact people are still paying attention to her candidacy, that Greg Abbott is on FoxNews trying to milk this "controversy" for some mileage, should speak volumes.  But it doesn't, because no one understands the peculiar political culture of Texas.

When I was a child, Texas was a one-party state, and that party was the Democrats; the party of the Civil War, of the non-Reconstruction government of Washington, D.C.  The party not the party of Lincoln.  If the GOP has changed in the last few decades (as Mr. Pierce says they have), the Democratic Party changed with the ascension of LBJ to the White House.

You cannot overstate the power of one-party.  In Texas, no one voted for Republicans, because they were anathema.  The first non-Democratic governor elected in Texas since Reconstruction was elected in 1978.  You do the math.  Before that, Texas had some of the most nondescript men in the state as governor.  Texas Monthly even ran a memorable photo spread showing Dolph Briscoe (yes, that was his name) sitting in the Governor's office, smiling at the camera.  Reading from left to right, Mr. Briscoe slowly faded from view until there was just the empty chair, a metaphor for his governorship, according to the magazine.  It is a perfect illustration of the campaigning Democrats had to do, that a non-entity like Briscoe could be Governor of the state.  They weren't all picturesque figures like John Connolly.  Most of them were worse candidates  than Bill White, who ran four years ago.  Despite having been Mayor of Houston (a city that loves business), White couldn't get elected State Dogcatcher (if we had such an office, it would be an elected position), because he ran as a Democrat.  He ran a campaign so low-key, by the way, it makes the Davis campaign look like a Hollywood version of a "barn-burner."

Wendy Davis faces the same uphill battle.

But, you will say, Ann Richards charmed her way into the Governor's Mansion.  As a fluke, I will respond.  She was the last Democrat to sit in the Governor's office, and she lost in her second run to George W. Bush, as the state shifted allegiance from one party to the other.  She only won the first time because her opponent, Clayton Williams, refused to shake her hand at a debate, and the TV cameras captured that moment for posterity.

And this was a man who compared rape to the weather:  "There's nothing you can do about it, so just lie back and enjoy it."  Anybody want to call him less of a candidate than Wendy Davis?  But he probably would have won, if he'd shaken Ms. Ann's hand.  We're political neanderthals here, but we know how to treat a lady.

Will Davis lose?  Probably; but only because she never had a chance to begin with.  Although she has a GOTV effort working that hasn't been seen in this state since I was born.  I've been called, I've even been approached in my own front lawn, by Davis supporters.  I've literally never had that experience before.  Will it make a difference?  Time will tell.  Texas is a notoriously low-voter turnout state; perhaps she can change that.

But in the meantime, please stop telling me what a poor candidate Wendy Davis is.  She mopped the floor with Abbott in their one debate (on public broadcasting stations, who the only people who saw it were in major urban areas; and the rural vote swamps the "urban liberal" vote every time).  Her ads are sharp and pointed and good, even the "wheelchair" ad.  Can she win?  Only if she can turn out the vote.

And then the best thing she can do is replace as many Perry appointees as she can get her hands on in the next four years.  The Lege doesn't really listen to the governor, and it's gonna be in GOP hands for the foreseeable future.  But that's another thing the pundits who aren't from Texas don't understand.....

Monday, October 13, 2014

Airing out the welcome mat

I had one similar to this outside my dorm room in college.  Could it be we Christians who have acted as if this was our sentiment de facto, if not de jure, might start throwing our personal mats away?

I haven't much to say about the pronouncement coming out of the synod in Rome just now, except to note there's another week to go and let's wait and see what else is said (will the other shoe drop, in other words).  I'm sure Fr. Martin is right, and "This is a stunning change in the way the Catholic church speaks of gay people."  I hope he's also right, and it means "The Synod is clearly listening to the complex, real-life experiences of Catholics around the world, and seeking to address them with mercy, as Jesus did."

That's the interpretation going around, and it's a very hopeful one.  This Pope is making a pastoral effort in the church, at a time when pastoral efforts are needed in the world.  So I am hopeful.

I'm also interested, because the statement from the Synod:

"Homosexuals have gifts and qualities to offer the Christian community: are we capable of welcoming these people, guaranteeing to them a further space in our communities? Often they wish to encounter a Church that offers them a welcoming home," said the document, known by its Latin name "relate".

"Are our communities capable of proving that, accepting and valuing their sexual orientation, without compromising Catholic doctrine on the family and matrimony?" it asked.
Echoes my own concerns in theology as a pastoral effort; the centrality of the idea of hospitality. No, I'm not congratulating myself.  I'm intrigued that this idea is becoming a focal point of institutional pastoral interest by the church.  When I was in seminary the focus was on "community," so my attention to hospitality not a credit to me, but to my teachers.  As I read this statement from the Synod, I'm fully in accord with it.  As they clarify their position over the next week, I'll pay attention.

But it is clear to me, in this day and age at least, hospitality is the key to Christian community,  Christian life, and the Christian gospel.  This new language, inasmuch as it at least marks a change in emphasis, is a good thing.  It could also be interesting.

Wednesday, October 08, 2014

The Gift of Death(?)

I heard about this on BBC World Service yesterday, where the author of the study was interviewed at some length.

It was something I'd thought about before, having taught Tolstoy's "The Death of Ivan Ilyich," and asked my students to ponder what "death" means since we say someone is dead, has died, perhaps even is dying; but when we mention "death" we always mean the transitional moment (or seconds, or parts of seconds) between being alive and being dead.  And why did Tolstoy name his story "The Death....", when death only occurs in the last sentence (though Ilyich is dying for much of the story).  What, I wondered with my class, did Tolstoy mean about death, to title his story that way (If you haven't read it, or don't remember it, it opens with Ilyich's funeral, then jumps back to his birth (mentioned only in connection with his parents) and childhood, quickly through marriage, fatherhood, and his legal career, until he injures his hip in hanging a curtain in his new (and final) home, and slowly descends toward the end of the story, which creates the story's beginning.)

So now it seems death is not a moment, a sudden transition, but must be understood as a process, as something "smeared," perhaps, over time, like the cat in Schrodinger's diabolical box.  Well, not quite like that, because that thought experiment presumes death is an event, not a process.

But still, the interesting issue here is not that science has perhaps "discovered" life after death; it is that perhaps we need to redefine death.  It is an issue that plagued the 19th century (Poe got a great deal of mileage out of "premature burials," and it was a cottage industry in an age that suffered comas but didn't understand them medically); and now it seems it is with us, in another guise, again.

So what is death?  When are we dead?  Is this a brave new world?  Or just another scholastic diversion?

Tuesday, October 07, 2014

All too....something


Combing my hair.  Why do you ask?

I decided I should read some Nietzsche again, just to test myself against a "real" atheist (v. the ones I keep obsessively reading at Salon; not in the articles, in the comments.  Is there a "Comments Anonymous" group I could join?  I don't have a problem, I can quit whenever I want to.....).  The results were not what I expected.

What I found was the same material I see at Salon, only with a 19th century European/Romantic edge to them.  I mean, this stuff was flat out laughable  Here's just one, from Human, All Too Human (it's worth pausing here to note Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are the two great writers of psychological insight in the 19th century, a direct outgrowth of Wordsworth's insistence on his own childhood as template for humanity.  Freud and the Vienna school would make us all think we are psychologists and taught us the vocabulary of psychotherapy came by the end of the century.  It was something in the air....  I mention this because Walter Kaufmann points out the title of this text refers to Nietzsche's "concern[...] with human psychology."):

Christianity as antiquity.  When we hear the ancient bells growling on a Sunday morning, we ask ourselves:  Is it really possible!  this, for a Jew, crucified two thousand years ago, who said he was God's son.  the proof of such a thing is lacking.  Certainly the Christian religion is an antiquity projected into our times from remote prehistory; and the fact that  claim is believed--whereas one is otherwise so strict in examining positions--is perhaps the most ancient piece of this heritage.  A god who begets children with a mortal woman; a sage who bids men work no more, have no more courts, but look for the signs of the impending end of the world; a justice that accepts the innocent as a vicarious sacrifice; someone who orders his disciples to drink his blood; prayers for miraculous interventions, sins perpetrated against a god, atoned for by a god; fear of a beyond in which death is the portal; the form of the cross as a symbol in a time that no longer knows the function and ignominy of the cross--how ghoulishly all this touches us, as if from the tomb of a primeval past!  Can one believe that such things are still believed?

Friedrich Nietzsche, from Human, All Too Human, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin 1976, pp. 52-53.

100 years later, what seems revealed there is more about the writer's psyche than the human psyche in general.  A more poetic version of it comes from Wallace Stevens early in the 20th century.  I admire Stevens' poetry, but his argument is no sounder than Nietzsche's.

I'm not going to spend time debating the points of that argument.  I would rather, in response, simply quote Wittgenstein:

Christianity is not a doctrine, not, I mean, a theory about what has happened and will happen to the human soul, but a description of something that actually takes place in human life. For 'consciousness of sin' is a real event and so are despair and salvation through faith. Those who speak of such things (Bunyan for instance) are simply describing what has happened to them, whatever gloss anyone may want to put on it.
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Ethics, Life and Faith," The Wittgenstein Reader, ed. Anthony Kenny (Oxford, Blackwell Press 1994).

Nietzsche is experiencing Christianity from the outside, and describing only what he sees.  Christianity from the inside is very different issue, and the difference is not a failure of reason (especially since reason failed Nietzsche at length, though I don't think, with Chesterton, that Nietzsche's thought and his ultimate madness were causally related); it is a difference of experience.  To get at that difference I would turn to Dom Crossan's book, The Greatest Prayer.

Crossan explains, chapter by chapter, the words of the Our Father.  In chapter 3 he discusses the Genesis story, linking it to Leviticus 19 (and "Hallowed by thy name."  Read the book if you want to see how he goes from Halloween to the Jubilee.  It's pretty interesting.)

He points out that Genesis 1 and Leviticus 19 belong to the Priestly layer of the Torah (J, E, D, P, are the four schools discerned in the torah.  Jehovah, Elohim, Deuteronomist, and Priestly, if you were wondering.  Further affiant sayeth not.).  Crossan makes the fascinating observation that the Priestly school was writing a parable about creation in Genesis 1, not an eyewitness account. "The authors know exactly what they are doing.  They know they do not know how God created the world, but they are equally sure the know its purpose and meaning."(emphasis in original).  Crossan points out there are 8 actions of creation squeezed into six days, so all the actions needed will fit the schema of a seven day week.  It is the schema that is important here.

It is that compression of eight chunks into six days that clarifies the authors' intention and purpose.  Put negatively, we humans are no the crown of creation.  (We are the work of a late Friday afternoon. And maybe not even God's best work is done on a late Friday afternoon.)  Put positively, the crown of creation is the Sabbath day itself.

Creation is not the world of six days, as is often mistakenly said--and whether is said literally or metaphorically, historically or parabolically, it is still mistaken.  Creation is the work of seven days, and, as its climax, the Sabbath day is built into the very fabric of our world, the very creation of our earth.

John Dominic Crossan, The Greatest Prayer (New York:  HarperOne, 2010, p. 64.

Crossan goes on to argue that this rest, established for one day a week, and every seven years (Exod. 23: 10-11 and Leviticus 25:2-7), and then the jubilee every 50 years (Leviticus 25:8-10), is a rest from work as worship.  It is a ritual; an ordering of life that reminds the people of Israel whose people they are, and how their lives are to be lived in order to enjoy "life into the ages" (the biblical formula often translated as "eternal life").  And that is where my interest lies:  in the importance of ritual.

Christianity is condemned from the outside as a community where individuals are told what to think, herded through meaningless actions from medieval Europe, and taught mythologies of the Bronze and Iron Age.  Religion is disparaged as the redoubt of the frightened:  afraid of death, of mental independence, of the world they live in.  What religion brings to humanity, according to this broad school of criticism, is not only of no value, but is in fact a detriment.  And one of the worst things religion can bring to human existence is ritual.

Which is funny, really, since our secular calendar in America is based upon holidays, which once meant "holy days," days set apart for special activities.  The rituals are thoroughly secular, but their observance is as ingrained into our lives as sunrise and sunset.  No longer mindful of the seasons except as how we change our wardrobe to respond to the weather, we will follow the year based on a calendar that actually starts in August (not January or December, as the Christian calendar does).  That beginning is the First Day of School.

It gets mentioned on the news every year.  Texas has a "Tax Free Day" when sales tax is suspended on certain purchase meant to return children to school in new clothes and shoes (mostly).  Columbus Day pops up in October, but the real holiday is Halloween, an excuse for everyone, child to adult, to dress in costume and be seen in it in public.  Thanksgiving follows hard thereafter, gateway to the shopping season that is Christmas, a season that ends with New Year's Day.  The next holiday is Easter, whether celebrated at a church or with an easter egg hunt and another excuse for a feast (the last of the three feasts which began with Thanksgiving almost six months earlier).  Then, as with the Christian calendar, comes the long season until August, punctuated only with the 4th of July (Memorial Day is a day for shopping and expecting school to end).  Take away too many of these days and the rituals that surround them (shopping; handing out candy; eating turkey and watching football; exchanging gifts and eating again; drinking and eating on New Year's Eve; eating again at Easter, and the last time on the 4th), and the year becomes flat and listless.  It is our rituals that give the year it's shape as well as its order.

So ritual is not something priests do while an audience sits silent and has incomprehensible words muttered over it.  Crossan points out the sabbath day, year, and jubilee, all put into daily life the lesson that the world was God's and we just live in it:

The Priestly tradition was not interested in crop rotation, agricultural management, or responsible farming [all modern explanations of the Sabbath year concept].  It was intended as shock treatment, to make the hearers realize that God's land was a living thing and to make them ponder its right to have a rest like everything else in God's creation.

It is...not about agricultural wisdom, but about distributive justice--for the land itself, the inhabitants, the domestic animals, and the wild animals.  It applies, furthermore, across the great Mediterranean triad of grains, olives, and vines.
Crossan, pp. 68-69.

And what is the point of this?

The logic of all these Sabbath injunctions it an attempt to return once more to that beginning moment of Sabbath creation, when all the world as distributed fairly and equitably by God and was declared good and blessed in its inaugural glory.

Crossan, p. 69.

What is the purpose of Christmas?  To merchants, it is to balance the books before the calendar year ends.  What is the purpose of the first day of school?  To begin another year of education for students, teachers, and parents.  What is the purpose of Halloween?  To give us a holiday that, at least in the northern states, can still be observed out of doors before winter shuts us in.  What is the purpose of Thanksgiving except to reunite us with family, and Easter except to mark the beginning of spring, and the 4th of July except to break the monotony of summer with an occasion to rest from our labors?

None of those, mind, are the "official" purposes of those holidays, and most carry multiple purposes (candy sellers love Halloween in particular; turkey farmers count on Thanksgiving; etc.).  But there is great purpose to ritual, and great need for it.  Religion provides the ritual (except for July 4th all of those rituals are church related; even school for all began in England as "Sunday school," Sunday being the only day of the week the children of laborers could attend any educational opportunity, rather than be expected at work).   Ritual gives meaning, purpose, and order to life, even daily life:

Woke up, fell out of bed,
Dragged a comb across my head
Found my way downstairs and drank a cup,
And looking up I noticed I was late.

Found my coat and grabbed my hat
Made the bus in seconds flat
Found my way upstairs and had a smoke,
Somebody spoke and I went into a dream. 

Lennon and McCartney aren't describing a ritual there as much as a routine, but it is a routine familiar enough to make most of us recognize it, or at least the truth of it, and it seems familiar enough it anchors our sense of place in the world and in our time; which is what ritual does.  Ritual's root purpose is to provide order imbued with meaning.  Does that mean ritual cannot become rote, become:

Shape without form, shade without color,
Paralysed force, gesture without motion

Well, yes, it can be.  Everything loses meaning if we allow it to be lost; but the meaning can also be recovered.  Crossan's close reading of scripture (you have to read his work to see what I mean) is an attempt to recover from the text what time has buried.  Reading his analysis can be like watching a painting be restored step by step, as layers of varnish and dirt and the accumulations of age are stripped away, and the glory of the original is revealed.  Ritual itself can have that effect, if it restores us rather than becomes gesture without motion and shape without form.

Ritual that connects us to ideas like redistributive justice can be a powerful source for morality, and certainly a more effective expression of morality than a philosophical treatise.  To understand's Kantan ethics I must persevere in my understanding of the Categorical Imperative; but there is no ritual to refresh my appreciation for Kant's ethical imperatives.  Jean-Paul Sartre understood that an ethics without god puts the responsibility solely on the individual:  you choose what humankind is by what you think is right or wrong; so choose wisely.  It is such a terrible burden no one wants to undertake it, and what ritual would renew our sense of responsibility and purpose, so that we would carry on as Sartre advises us?  Re-reading his essay on existentialism as a humanism?  Beating ourselves with cords (and isn't that choosing what humankind is, too?  Yes; and heart, every ethic does that.  Now go forth and expand that ethic into a social norm.)?

Ritual gives meaning to life, but does not place meaning in life.  Our secular rituals remind us to buy turkeys in November, ham at Easter, hot dogs in July, and start shopping in September for the annual event in December.  Whether those actions give life any meaning, is another matter.  Ritual can imbue life with meaning, but ritual that only reminds us what foods to buy when, is certainly "shape without force, shade without color/Paralysed force, gesture without motion."  And what system of pure rationality, what philosophy, can imbue it with any other meaning?

Religion is not simply a set of ideas or doctrines.  It is not simply a set of practices and ordinations.  It is not merely a set of rules and regulations.  No more than worship is about adoration and heaping up praise.  Worship is about acknowledgment, and adjustment of the worshipper to right relationship with all of creation.  It is in line with what Kierkegaard said about prayer:  "The function of prayer is not to influence God, but to change the nature of the one who prays."

Just as is the function of religion, an end it achieves through ritual, and remembrance, and connection to others, inside and outside the community.

Gotta go drag a comb across my head....

Saturday, October 04, 2014

I'll be bald and nothing to show for it.....

Pascal might have a challenge for that; but we should point out, that may express an ethos,
but it doesn't exactly lead to a morality. 

Somewhere in the 19th century morality became linked to religion; perhaps as a redoubt against the onslaught of Darwinism and the rising success of science to explain it all to you (at least until Godel and others began to prove it couldn't).  I don't really know where it started, but it's hardly a felicitous connection.  The law of Moses became, somehow, both that which the Christ had set aside (how many Christians eat pork and shellfish, or cheeseburgers, for that matter) and at the same time fulfilled.  Christians went through the law with a broom, sweeping away inconvenient injunctions, and keeping the convenient ones (all 10 of them).

I speak too harshly.  The point is, at some point morality became tied to religion, and the argument became that only religion could truly make people moral.  I've never really agreed with that, and I don't now.

There is a case to be made, and Anthony at Thought Criminal makes it very well, that religion is a better motivator of social justice and even sociable behavior than non-religion, but I think that is a byproduct of religious faith, not something available only to the faithful.  That's a distinction worth holding onto.

CJ Werleman is now concerned about the moral posture of atheism.  He thinks atheists (or atheism; the distinction is important, apparently, but Werleman doesn't make it*), needs "to provide a moral narrative for the economic and social realities that ail your everyday American."  A moral narrative.  He doesn't explain what he means by that; apparently he thinks it is self-evident.  But it's an interesting declaration, well set out or not.

The best clue to what Werleman means by "moral narrative" is provided in this paragraph:

Google any combination of the following keywords — “atheists for the environment,” “atheists for economic equality,” “atheists for racial and gender equality,” “atheists for ending poverty,” “atheists for world peace,” “atheists against resource motivated wars,” etc. – and you come up with nothing. In other words, the some 2,000 atheist groups and organizations in this country are almost wholly silent on the moral issues that affect Americans the most.
I don't think of any of those as necessarily "moral" issues, because I think of morality as the problem of individual human behavior in society (you don't have to be moral if you are alone on a desert island).  So the minute I start talking about what is moral, I'm clearly not talking about what Werleman is talking about.  But it is interesting that most of the issues he mentions were taken up by, or promoted widely first by, religious groups.  Maybe that's why Werleman thinks they are "moral issues."

But he insists "that religion is no more moral than the absence of it," so it must just be coincidence, huh?

That is a pretty silly statement, actually.  Aristotle started us formally talking about "ethics" in the West.  In his original tongue "ethics" simply meant "behavior."  His ethics are wholly without what we call morality.  He simply advised finding the most successful person in your society, and doing as that person did.  That, said Aristotle, would make you ethical, because everyone would approve of your behavior.   For Aristotle behavior was guided by the telos of happiness, and happiness was attained by the most admired person in the community (so to this day we think the rich are "successful").  If that behavior included sex with young boys, well, that's fine; noble, even, to the Athenian Greeks at least. But would we today call that moral, or would we decry it as an abuse of power?  And why do we see the humanity of those young boys as significant?  The historical answer is:  because of religion; Christianity, specifically.

Not because Christianity is particularly superior to other religions, but because Christianity dominated and pervaded Western culture from the 4th century on.  The importance of the individual which finally became the cornerstone of Western thought with the Romantic movement, began with Christianity and the truly radical teachings of Paul of Tarsus (the ones we ignore today, and Paul-bashers erase entirely).  The importance of children began with at least the Gospels, and while it took until the Great Depression for a President of the United States to finally get child labor laws passed, the idea of children having any value as persons is rooted in religious morality.  Sadly our morality doesn't control us nearly as much as our economic and other selfish interests do, but whenever the topic of morality comes up people start to imagine all manner of imaginary controls over their behavior which make them anxious and unnerved.

Which is really funny, seeing as morality is more honored in the breach than in the keeping.

Yes, there are Christian pastors who decry and denounce immorality in others; but there is always someone ready to point out the splinter in your eye, which is but a reflection of the log in theirs (especially those virulently anti-gay pastors and anti-adultery pastors who were all found to have secret lovers).  And yes, theoretically, morality is perfectly possible without religion.  But in reality, it has never worked out that way.  All of our moral imperatives in Western culture are based in Christianity.  It may be possible to create a moral society, as we would define it today (no buggering young boys for pleasure and purity, thank you!) without religion, but in fact it has never been that way.  It is an odd thing that atheists who insist so much on empiricism and decry even philosophy as "faith-based," refuse to acknowledge this simple point.

What brought the tribes of Israel together and created their moral system was religious belief.  While the Greeks were telling tales of Zeus raping young maidens in various disguises, the children of Abraham were telling each others stories of justice and fairness to all.  While the Greeks were telling the tale of Medea, the children of Abraham were telling each other the story of Ruth and Elijah and the widow, of feeding the widow and caring for the orphan.  The Hebrews, again, were not morally superior to the Greeks, or even superior in any one way.  But while the Greeks were telling tales of superhuman beings behaving as we would expect superhuman beings to behave (and as Jesus behaves in the Infancy Gospel of Thomas and the Cherry Tree Carol), the Hebrews were telling stories of their history and the involvement of their God in their history.  The Greeks produced "Oedipus Rex" and (I think the more superior moral examination) Antigone.  The Hebrews produced "Job" and "Ecclesiastes."  One can say religion is supposed to be unimportant; but one has a hard time producing evidence that it is.  Medea is almost just in her revenge on the Greeks for treating her as a non-person; the prophets told Israel their problems with Babylon started when they stopped dealing justly with the widow and the orphan and the alien among them.  Their stories, from Abraham's visit by the three angels to Elijah and the widow to Sodom and Gomorrah, are about hospitality to the stranger (or the lack thereof).  Their stories are about living in this world, and the wisdom of God which they ignore as often as they adopt it.  They are much more powerful moral teachings than the Iliad or the Odyssey, or any of the Greek tragedies.

And pretty clearly, it has something to do with being rooted in religion.

So perhaps I am wrong, and the problem of the link between morality and religion isn't that it exists, but that we think it doesn't have to exist.  In theory it seems we could discard it.  In practice, however, it would not yield the world we live in today, and there is no reason, based solely on history, to believe such a separation would yield a better world tomorrow.

To draw on a concrete example, I understand the theory behind John Rawls' Theory of Justice (despite its assumption that utilitarianism must be accommodated rather than rejected), but the key problem "is to show how such principles would be universally adopted."  It is one thing to say "the right of each person to have the most extensive basic liberty compatible with the liberty of others" is of first importance, and further that "social and economic positions are to be (a) to everyone's advantage and (b) open to all."  It is quite a different thing, and yet the same telos, to say all are equal before a just and loving God, and the first of all should be last and servant of all, so that justice is truly done for everyone.  The latter is not necessarily more achievable, but it is certainly easier to show how is would be universally adopted; and besides, it's entirely in keeping with Isaiah's vision of the holy mountain (see Isaiah 11; Isaiah 56; and Isaiah 65.  It's such a powerful vision it appears for all three of the "Isaiahs.")  The purpose of Israel, according to the prophets, was to be a light to all nations, not that they should be converted (the covenant was with Israel, not humankind) but that all humankind should enjoy life into the ages, that they should, in other words, achieve the telos Aristotle set for his ethics.  But do so through a universal application, not an ethos that excluded barbarians who didn't speak Greek and were NOK.  Rawls asks us to give up our privileges in the abstract name of justice, which has to begin with the idea that we have privileges at all (most of us don't think so; it's the other guy who's privileged!).  Religion in Western culture, whether it is based on the vision of Isaiah or the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, compels us with concrete teachings that we are, in fact, our brother's keeper, and only in that keeping of each other are we all kept; only in justice for each other is there justice for all; only in treating everyone as God treats us, do we achieve life into the ages in this life.

Philosophical arguments like Rawls require us all to understand the entire philosophical principle behind them, and to consider the reasonableness of their application.  The concrete religious visions exemplified by Isaiah or the stories in the gospels, make the lesson both more immediate and far easier to grasp (though notably not any easier to follow).  They ask us simply to do good because it is good; because the humble will be invited to the head of the table, because all nations will stream to the glory that would be, could be, Israel.

There are other arguments to be made.  I'm sure, for example, the Niebuhrs made them, and I have only to consider the question and look to find their answers.  This is just off the top of my head, but it's a start.  And I do not end where I began, that's a good thing, too.  Like I said, this is a start....


*Commenters at Salon regularly make much of the disorganized nature of atheists.  They proclaim it the true hallmark of an atheist that the only agreement among them is to deny the reality of a deity.  It's not as much to agree on as they think, but they insist it is all "true" atheists have in common, so whether one can even speak of "atheism" can be up for debate.


And that, by contrast, does lead to a morality, as well as an ethos

Friday, October 03, 2014

More honored in the breach than in the keeping.....


Because Brown v. Board is still hailed as a high-water mark of Supreme Court jurisprudence, even though its central holding has been reduced to nothing more than an aspiration we think we still live up to just because the Court once said so.

As Charlie Pierce points out, according to the Fifth Circuit some Constitutionally protected actions are less protected than others because it just doesn't affect enough people:

The three-judge panel agreed with the state's lawyers that there was insufficient evidence that a "large fraction" of women seeking abortions would face an unconstitutional burden because of the surgical-center requirements and clinic closings. They wrote that the data provided by one of the plaintiffs' experts, Dr. Daniel Grossman, suggested that about one out of six Texas women seeking an abortion would live more than 150 miles from the nearest clinic if the surgical-center rules went into effect. "This is nowhere near a ‘large fraction,' " the panel wrote.
So if a law restricting speech or allowing soldiers to quarter in your home only affects about 15% of the populace, it's still constitutional.

As I've mentioned before, I used to work for Lee Yeakel.  We didn't agree on much when it came to politics, and he was no fan of Roe v. Wade.  But I never imagined I'd see the day when Lee was the champion of the people and could almost be called a liberal icon:

In an unusual move, the judge granted the abortion providers who sued the state broader relief than they had requested. Lawyers for abortion facilities had asked him to strike down the requirement as it applied to two clinics, in El Paso and McAllen. But Judge Yeakel ruled the admitting-privileges requirement and the surgical-center standards, operating together, put undue burdens on women statewide, and created "a brutally effective system of abortion regulation that reduces access to abortion clinics."

Strange days indeed.  I suppose if we reduce access to legal counsel in criminal cases by denying it to one in six defendants, that would be okay, too.

I'll retire to Bedlam.....

Everything old is unknown again....


Once I fall down a rabbit hole, I keep tripping over it even after I've climbed out.  I wasn't going to post this; then I was; then I wasn't; then I was.

What tipped me over?  A new article at Salon complaining about the rampant sexism promulgated by the public face of the New Atheists, Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins.  Aside from the usual defenses ("what you heard is not what he meant!"), there's a lot of screaming about how atheists aren't a "movement" or even a cohesive group so it's unfair to say Harris and Dawkins speak for them.  It isn't unfair, of course, to say all theists think alike, and the most absurd voices of believers speak for all theists; but leave that aside.  The really funny part about it is the defensiveness born of blank ignorance.  When you don't know what you don't believe in, you make all kinds of silly noises. Which brings me around to the reading I've been doing lately.

My favorite Philip K. Dick story revolves around a case of mistaken identity.  An ordinary man (this is like a Hitchcock story, but with an ending Hitchcock was never allowed) returns to earth from a vacation to Jupiter (it's science fiction; go with it).  He is immediately arrested by the authorities.  He escapes and spends the rest of the story trying to figure out why the police think he is a dangerous killer, when he is an ordinary person leading an ordinary life.  In the end the police finally capture him because he isn't secretly a professional assassin with mad skills at intrigue and escape.  They explain to him that he has become a pawn in the war between Earth and an alien race; that he was kidnapped on his trip to Jupiter, and replaced with an android.

He insists, of course, that this is impossible.  He knows who he is, he has memories contiguous from childhood to the present, and he's no android.  The police information is wrong.  No, they insist, they are right.  He was killed, and replaced by an android; moreover, an android with a bomb sufficient to destroy the entire earth.  The only problem is, they don't know how to disarm it, or what the trigger is for it.  The evidence the police present is so overwhelming the man is finally convinced he isn't who he thinks he is, and he says:  "If I'm not me, that means I must be an...."

The final sentence of the story, which is the only part I'm sure I remember correctly, is:  "The blast could be seen from as far away as Alpha Centauri."

It's a lovely, if gruesome, object lesson in what Johannes Climacus was getting at when he said we cannot prove Napoleon's existence, we can only prove that an individual can be identified as Napoleon.  The slippery concepts of existence and identity (two separate concepts, as separate as body and soul) become almost concrete in Dick's story:  the man no longer exists, but his identity does.  It's a separation almost impossible to understand except in the almost impossible scenario of the story; but once you see it, you begin to understand what Climacus meant, and how difficult it is indeed to prove the existence of any living being.

I mention this because the volume I referred to earlier includes a Philip K. Dick story, and it is about God.  In the story, Chinese communism has risen to conquer the world (this is 1967, remember).  The protagonist is a bureaucrat in the far-flung Chinese empire who comes to the attention of his superiors, that he might rise in the hierarchy.  He also comes to the attention of rebels, who convince him (to make a long story short) that the water supply is laced with hallucinogens.  They give him an anti-hallucinogen, and after taking it he sees the Absolute Leader as a mechanical construct making senseless noises on television, rather than as an old man exhorting the people with another long-winded speech.

The curious thing is, different people see different things that are not the Leader; there are twelve groups of such people:  each sees something completely different from the others.

Our hero is soon invited to a dinner with the Absolute Leader, where he takes the anti-hallucinogen and meets:  god.  Not the God of Abraham, but a creator god who is interested only in observing and partaking of the failures of all humanity.  It is a nightmare vision in which god is inescapable and implacable and from whom there is no appeal, and the vision renders life meaningless and horrible for our hero.  Lovecraft never envisioned anything as soul-destroying as this.

I bring it up because of the note Dick appends to the end of his story, with a quote that probably didn't mean to him what it does to me.  He quotes John Scotus Erasmus (accurately or not I have not determined):  "We do now know what God is.  God himself does not know what He is because He is not anything.  Literally God is not, because He transcends being."

That may be nothing more than a statement of apophatic theology, but it points up the true difficulty to discussing the nature of God.  It is a difficulty believers and theologians alike wrestle with.  But the New Atheists prefer to pretend it can't possibly be a struggle, because the idea of God is simply a childish illusion, and can't be any more than that.  Which is sort of like saying the idea of the cosmos can't be any more complicated than could be understood by the average 5 year old child.

The crux of Dick's story is our old friend theodicy:  more specifically, the problem of evil.  Dick's solution is not a novel one, though he may not have been aware of it.  His solution is a god who is a demi-urge:  a creator without power to create perfection, capable only of creating a mixed bag of good and bad, a lesser power with lesser abilities who is temporarily in charge of creation until replaced by a purer, better God.  It's an old heresy, one I should know the name of but can't call to mind at the moment (somebody in comments help me out here).  It's not a knock on Dick's story to point this out.  I'm on my way to explaining something.

Dick's story is some 45 years old; the heresy he stumbles upon is well over 1000 years old.  The quote from Erasmus, Dick dates to 840 C.E.  There is, in other words, nothing new in these ideas; but they strike me as utterly new and far beyond the capabilities of most "New Atheists" to begin to comprehend.

I've been thinking more and more about the "New Atheists," and what a pitiful group they are. Richard Dawkins is a zoologist who wrote a best-seller about genetics that made him famous, though I understand most of the genetics in that book has already been rejected by contemporary theories.  His second best-seller was simply a spew of ignorance, ignorance he proclaims gives him greater knowledge.  Sam Harris writes reams about the evils of religion, without the knowledge of the subject that someone like Martin Marty brought to his analysis of religious fundamentalism (and Marty is hardly a fundamentalist).  Over at Pharyngula religion is regularly skewered by someone with degrees in biology, but none in anthropology, sociology, psychology, philosophy, or theology.  Three of those five are sciences, by the way, but I know of no one trained in those sciences who have made careers out of diatribes against religion.  There are atheists like the late Richard Rorty or Jacques Derrida who understand the place of religion in the world, rather than treat it as a shibboleth.  But they never published best-sellers, so who needs them, amirite?

All this is known, of course:  same song, 100th verse, around here especially.  But it's interesting how everything old isn't even new again now:  it is, in fact, completely unknown.  It doesn't surprise me Dick would reach for an ancient heresy as the basis for an interesting story; it doesn't surprise me he would quote John Scotus Erasmus.  What does surprise me is the ignorance of the New Atheists, who have never heard of JSE (and so they continue to speak of an "Invisible Sky Daddy") or even know enough to bring up the old heresy about God being Creator but not all-powerful, and therefore generally malicious.  They don't know anything, and while the sources I speak of are over 1000 years old, the iteration of them I cite here is not yet 50 years old.

And yet everyone who shouts about religion and God and the church has been to college; they think themselves smart, largely because they make things go.

Good science fiction is often a good cautionary tale.  The story of the Pakleds is another good story to keep in mind.  I noted at that thread at Salon that the article ended with this sound advice:

....it’s up to living atheists to strive to be more than a bunch of people who simply don’t believe in God, but stand up to irrationality in all its forms, including sexism.
But self-reflection and self-criticism is hard, as hard as rationalism or religious faith; it requires humility and self-examination to live a life you proclaim to be worth living.  It's a lot easier to bash someone else for what you think they're doing wrong.  Just because you are smart does not mean that you are strong.  More commonly, believing the former means you are neither.  The real power is in powerlessness, the real strength is in weakness.  Better to ponder what you don't know in the face of all the knowledge you have worked to acquire, than to proclaim your ignorance to be your salvation.

Wednesday, October 01, 2014

Again, Dangerous Visions


I pulled a 50 year old book off my shelf (which sounds romantic:  dusty leather bound volumes of ancient wisdom.  Nope.  The one in the picture.  Paperback.  Science fiction.  1967, so I'm fudging a bit on the age, even.), something I do from time to time for night-time reading:  re-read something so old I've forgotten most of it.

And I had certainly forgotten this, in the author's note at the end of the story (I still love anthologies like that; too bad they are so few and far between).  The story is about a dystopian future which ends with a son killing his mother (who has run desperately from danger to home, where she will be safe) because his wife and children need to eat, and she is fresh meat.  The note isn't that long, and context matters, so:

Perhaps I wrote the story because sometimes that's the way the world seems, or perhaps I hope that when my daughter's generation grows up [which they have by now; it's been nearly 50 years, as I said] it won't need or want to run for its life, or perhaps because, in the seventeenth century, Jeremy Taylor wrote:  "...when it is enquired whether such a person be a good man or no, the meaning is not what does he believe or what does he hope, but what he loves."  Amen.

Or, as I've had occasion to put it before:

Ideas don't matter. Things don't matter. People matter.

Hope comes from such unexpected places; wisdom is often found hiding where you least expect it.

Friday, September 26, 2014

"...we seem to see..."


Part of the ugliness of the internet is that you see, not the "suffering humanity" of Goya's greatest scenes, but the grotesque inhumanity of individuals.

Case in point: this article at Salon, a very thoughtful and nuanced discussion of raising a child with trisomy 21 (after reading it, I don't even like to use the label "Down syndrome" anymore), couched in the context of the last Twitter firestorm Richard Dawkins set off (for which, as is pointed out here, he never really apologized.)  Most of the commentary argues that the world is better off without children born with trisomy 21, and that's why so many women are aborting fetuses where the syndrome is detected in utero.

I don't know that that is true, but I am skeptical of the claim.  Whether it is true or not is irrelevant, because it means most pregnant women are actually quite comfortable in Omelas, and would rather abort a child and replace it with another, than consider that child a unique human being.  The question of choosing abortion is not on the table here; the question is, why give birth to a child with a condition like trisomy 21?  And the bulk of the conclusions seems to be:  because it's damned inconvenient, which was Dawkins' argument.  The article at Salon provides a rejoinder to that assumption; but the ugliness is that the assumption is so deeply rooted few people commenting on the article take note of that.

They know what they know, and no facts are going to disturb their knowledge.

More telling, then, than the question of how one makes such a moral decision, is the question of what ethics one employs to make such a moral decision.  On that issue, no one wants to speak at all; except in this article at The Daily Beast.

The short version of the article is:  ethics is far more complicated than Dawkins imagines, and "logic" is not the stuff Mr. Spock uses to be unemotional and so reach a better conclusion than emotional humans.  For example:

In the apology Dawkins says, “Given a free choice of having an early abortion or deliberately bringing a Down child into the world, I think the moral and sensible choice would be to abort…I personally would go further and say that, if your morality is based, as mine is, on a desire to increase the sum of happiness and reduce suffering, the decision to deliberately give birth to a Down baby, when you have the choice to abort it early in the pregnancy, might actually be immoral from the point of view of the child’s own welfare….Having said that, the choice would be entirely yours and I would never dream of trying to impose my views on you or anyone else.”

Dawkins’ belief that we should maximize happiness and minimize suffering seems to be a moral theory known as “act-utilitarianism.” For an act-utilitarian, an action’s morality can, in theory, be demonstrated empirically. To discover if an act is moral or immoral, you simply measure the amount of happiness or suffering it causes. The more suffering an act causes, the more immoral it is; the more happiness an act causes, the more moral it is.
"Seems to be" is the telling phrase there, because Dawkins doesn't really have a coherent ethic here; rather like Potter Stewart's definition of pornography, Dawkins seems to know what's ethical when he sees it.  But the question of "amount of suffering" raises a critical point:  whose suffering are we considering?  The individual's?  The family's?  Society's?  The world?

Lest you think I exaggerate:
When you really try to understand what Dawkins is saying in his apology, however, you realize that his thoughts are not even fully coherent. He says that continuing the pregnancy is immoral because the child would better be off if she had never been born—but he provides no evidence for this, and it’s flat-out implausible that Down syndrome renders a life so wretched that it’s not worth living. Earlier in the same sentence Dawkins says he believes morality is based on increasing “the sum of happiness,” which presumably means the sum of everyone’s happiness. That is, an action is immoral when it makes the entire world worse off. If that’s true, and he has stated he thinks it’s immoral knowingly to give birth to someone with Down syndrome, does he think the mere presence of people with Down syndrome increases suffering in the world?
If you read the comments at Salon (and I don't advise it), you'll find that it is actually considered quite plausible that "Down syndrome renders a life so wretched that it's not worth living."  Which is precisely what the Salon article is countering, although to no avail with the crowd that knows what it knows and doesn't need to know anything else.  There, however, is Dawkins' argument in a nutshell:  the happiness of the world is diminished because of one child with trisomy 21, so it is immoral to give birth to such children.*

And apparently no small number of people are okay with that.  Which is kind of disgusting; not to mention wildly immature, since the first response to that kind of thinking is:  "The world doesn't revolve around you."

Dawkins, and a lot of the comments at Salon, justify the decision to abort a fetus with trisomy 21 on the grounds that everybody who is pro-choice (and so will have an abortion, if they choose) will decide to abort such a fetus.  Which is another monstrous display of self-centeredness:

It is...possible for someone to be pro-choice and think abortion is generally permissible, but not for certain reasons. He or she may think it immoral to terminate if the decision was based on the fact that a fetus was discovered to be gay, or predisposed to obesity, or dark-skinned, or female. Or disabled. Indeed, Dawkins is so far from the ordinary pro-choice stance that there is no major bioethicist or philosopher who would agree—without far more caveats than Dawkins provides—that the “moral and sensible” thing to do is abort if a fetus is diagnosed with Down syndrome.
I suppose Dawkins, or his supporters, would qualify the decision to abort based on genetic characteristics, to Down syndrome v. being gay, or female, or dark-skinned, on the grounds that the latter don't detract from the sum of the world's happiness, but trisomy 21 does.  Which, of course, is defensible:  if you have no ethics at all.

As for the misery of trisomy 21, perhaps we should ask the people involved:

Among 2,044 parents or guardians surveyed, 79 percent reported their outlook on life was more positive because of their child with Down syndrome…

Skotko also found that among siblings ages 12 and older, 97 percent expressed feelings of pride about their brother or sister with Down syndrome and 88 percent were convinced they were better people because of their sibling with Down syndrome. A third study evaluating how adults with Down syndrome felt about themselves reports 99 percent responded they were happy with their lives, 97 percent liked who they are, and 96 percent liked how they looked.
But they aren't increasing the sum of Richard Dawkins' imagined happiness, nor of his acolytes, so clearly they are wrong.  And regarding that reference to Mr. Spock earlier:

Among the people who, according to Dawkins, have misunderstood Dawkins, are “those who took offence because they know and love a person with Down Syndrome, and who thought I was saying that their loved one had no right to exist. I have sympathy for this emotional point, but it is an emotional one not a logical one.” Apparently, he thinks people who love someone with Down syndrome simply must be clouded by sentiment, and unable to see reason. But for an act-utilitarian, the emotions of those who know and love people with Down syndrome are not muddying the issue; on the contrary, they are crucial data points. These people are telling him what for some reason he does not seem to want to hear: that their happiness is increased with someone with Down syndrome in the world.
The gravest error in employing "logic" is in assuming logic invariably leads to truth, when logic itself makes no such claim.  Logic, properly employed, will eliminate error in reasoning; but it does not speak to the validity of the information employed.  The old syllogism that:  "All humans are mortal, Socrates is human, therefore Socrates is mortal" is a valid conclusion, but it is as valid as "1+1=2."  The numbers there are merely symbols, they are not statements of immutable fact (and are only valid in certain contexts.  In biology, 1+1=3, at a minimum, unless the female devours the male after copulation.  But in those cases 1+1 usually equals something in double or even triple digits.).  The syllogism doesn't prove that humans are mortal, or that Socrates is human; it simply establishes a valid conclusion from the words that might as well be symbols themselves (and in symbolic logic are merely symbols).  The reasoning may be sound, but is the outcome true?  Logic cannot speak to that.  And if emotions are crucial data points Dawkins simply wants to discard on the way to his conclusion, then what good is this intelligence Dawkins supposedly has?

And besides, Dawkins employs no such logic at all.  His ethics are incoherent and inconsistent.  He would undoubtedly argue that a female child does not subtract from the world's sum of happiness, but if that child is born into a culture which is barbaric to women, is the mother wrong to weep for the suffering she fears her daughter will undergo?  Would we consider that valid grounds for abortion in that culture?  Probably not, but are we any less barbaric because we consider children with trisomy 21 too much trouble to bother with?  Where, exactly, is the distinction in this ethical system Dawkins proposes?

None of this stops Dawkins' ardent supporters from saying he's right because, well, some people have no reason to live, and they know who they are.

Or something.  I dunno; it's all too depressing.....

*Conversely, if the misery of one child will make everyone else happy, Dawkins would be fine as mayor for life of Omelas.

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

Faith AND Reason. And Compassion.


I blame myself, first.  This seminar was held in Houston over the weekend, and I found out about it after it was over.*

I don't blame the organizers, because I know they didn't have money to spend on radio ads I wouldn't hear (I only listen to NPR) or TV ads I wouldn't see (most of the local TV I watch is spotted with ads for plaintiff's lawyers and help for seniors who fall down).  I do find it odd there was no mention of it on the local NPR station, no reference to it on the daily local NPR show that concerns itself with what's going on in town.  I did, for example, know that Reza Aslan was here on Thursday, to speak at Christ Church Cathedral about his book I didn't think much of.

I didn't know this list of luminaries was going to gather to address problems of poverty from a religious perspective.  Coincidentally (or not), I picked up Dom Crossan's latest work (AFAIK) about the "Our Father," and was reading the chapter on God as householder.  Crossan makes the point, using copious Biblical references and close readings of texts (his specialty), that God is presented in the prayer and in the tradition as the Householder of the world, and what householder (patriarch, if you prefer, but Crossan is more inclusive in his vision, as are the Scriptures) would allow some members of the house to starve while others have too much to eat?  Would let some members of the house live in luxury while others slept in dirt and filth?

It's a powerful image.  I wonder if he brought it up at this conference.  I'd like to think he did.  I like to think there was a great deal said about how they belong to us and we belong to them because, as Crossan might say, this is God's household, and we all live in it.

Well, I could rail about the disinterest of the local news groups who trumpet every cultural event and best-selling author, but ignore something as important as this.  Then again, if more of us thought it was important, or made it clear how important it is, these issues might get the attention they deserve.  And that may yet happen.

After I wrote the above and then shelved it for later, I came across this article at TPM, which ends on a rather optimistic note.  Rather than publish two interrelated posts that might seem repetitious, I decided to bang them together.  The TPM article is about changes being wrought, even in America, by Pope Francis on the Catholic church.  The tenor of the argument is captured in this optimistic conclusion:

This is all good news not only for Catholic progressives in the pews who have felt left out in the cold during several decades of conservative dominance in the church. A revitalized Catholic voice in public life just might also help jumpstart a better political debate in Washington.
The argument of the article is simple:  Francis emphasizes "humility, mercy and social justice [and] offer[s] a vivid contrast to a vocal minority of U.S. Christian leaders who only see dark clouds and battles to fight. Think of it as the joy of the Gospel v. culture war Christianity fight."  Notice how inclusive the argument is there.  Most of the references are to Catholic Bishops and positions on issues that will change as the new Pope replaces allies of John Paul II with new faces; but here the line is drawn between the new Pope and "U.S. Christian leaders."

I would only add that the "leaders" referred to in that phrase are a minority of U.S. Christians or U.S. Christian leaders.  Now that gay and lesbian bishops are no longer a front page issue in the Anglican Communion the woman who is the Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church can't get invited to a local news interview (she is, to my knowledge, a rare thing still in church circles:  a woman presiding over a mainline denomination).  When was the last time we saw the heads of the UCC, or the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the United Methodist Church, or the Presbyterian Church, either asked for an opinion by a reporter, or invited to a Sunday morning talk show?  Marc Driscoll headed up 15 churches, but he gets more attention than the head of the UCC, who represents over 5000 congregations (and is still one of the smallest of the "mainline" denominations).  Even the President of the Southern Baptist Convention doesn't get as much media attention as Rick Warren or Joel Osteen. Of course the latter haven't been involved in a church scandal or written a best-seller lately, so we don't hear much from them in the press, either.

Is there a bias there similar to the one that treats GOP positions as normative in political coverage?

Will the conversation in the Catholic church change, and will that change be felt in our political discourse?  Given my sympathies for social justice issues, I certainly hope so.  We can use all the help we can get.  We could especially use a bit more awareness that there are "U.S. Christian leaders" who are not right-wing Calvinist cranks or only interested in "dark clouds and battles to fight."  If Pope Francis can change that one of the public conversation, he will have done God's work indeed.

It seems there are reasons to say the kingdom of God is among us!

*And why Texas?  Second most populous state in the union, 1 in 6 Texans live in poverty.  I've seen first hand what the Southern Baptist churches can do when they put their minds to it; but this mostly Baptist state is doing nothing about this poverty problem.  Certainly nothing at the governmental level, anyway.

Monday, September 22, 2014

A Demon Haunted World


There is an interesting point here, though it never quite comes to fruition:

New generations will wonder at the immensity of our monstrous imaginations while many relish anew their dreams of an enchanted world. And so, thanks to the game and The Monster Manual, we have a moment to contemplate what it means to imagine monsters and what it means to imagine the future—for it turns out that to do the one is to do the other.

We wish for an enchanted world, and such a world is by its very nature monstrous. How then, if we hope to see the world reconfigured and made meaningful and transcendent, could we do so without welcoming back the demons and dragons in all their glory? Indeed, our popular culture is rich in zombies, vampires, and even a 50-meter radioactive lizard, all being reimagined, reinterpreted, and pressed into the service of each generation’s dreams.
We know, of course, that vampires are not real.  How long will it be before we decide Bram Stoker believed in them?  Will future generations think we thought they were real, because we devoted so much of our entertainment to so many forms of them?  We know Batman is a fiction.  But will future generations think we believed in superheroes and radioactive lizards because we used so many resources to bring them to life and make them widely available for our admiration?

Why not?  We're all convinced people in medieval Europe believed in ghosts and demons and spent their time cowering in fear of various superstitions.  That attitude, by the way, is most recently a product of the Protestant Reformation, and played a prominent part in the writings of American Puritans keen to separate themselves from Rome and the Church of England, which was just Rome lite (in their eyes).  But it began in the Renaissance which dubbed the predecessor era "the Dark Ages," the better to place themselves above it.  There is, indeed, nothing new under the sun.

The belittling of the past continues as a grotesque distortion which we apply to the period between the fall of Rome and the rise of the Renaissance; or to any period that doesn't include us.  Today the popular opinion is that the Puritans were as superstitious and demon-haunted as we imagine medieval Europe was, an opinion the Puritans would find marks us as the ignorant ones.  Does anyone reading the Wife of Bath's tale get the impression Chaucer's 14th century  pilgrims actually believed the magic that is a part of the story was any more real than we take the magic of Harry Potter to be?  And yet we are convinced, though there is no evidence of it anywhere in Chaucer's poem, that Chaucer and his characters lived in a world ridden and derided by superstition.

Does anyone think the beheading game of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight represented anything more than a fantasy like "Dungeons & Dragons," even to the original audience?  It may be people once believed the scop of Exile of the Sons of Uisliu could predict the life of Dierdre of the Sorrows before her birth, but is that any more foolish than our conviction that polls can predict the future?  We like to think previous generations were stupid and benighted, and that only we are wise and enlightened.  It's an arrogant posture made possible only by our refusal to think others are as human as we are.

We didn't start imagining monsters with "Dungeons & Dragons."  We never stopped doing it.  Bruno Bettelheim pointed out there is value in the uses for enchantment.  Carl Jung thought it was part of our human heritage.  I have an interesting essay by Richard Rorty which actually takes the claims of religion seriously, while his philosophy of religion puts them on non-metaphysical terms, and his atheism refuses to embrace them as valid for him.  His is a complex posture which can't be easily reduced to a soundbite or a diatribe, so it isn't widely known and Jung and Bettelheim are treated as if they were invisible or, in Jung's case, known but irrelevant.  There is more psychological insight in a poem by Yeats, a man who believed in automatic writing and spiritualism, than there is in the drivel attributed to Richard Dawkins.  It is the failing of our popular discourse, one that was supposed to raised by access to education, that every discussion can have only two sides, and those as thin and narrow as possible.  We argue by cliche and bumpersticker; every statement is a challenge, every assertion subject to mindless and petty challenge.  Rorty makes a nuanced argument for the place of religion in even philosophical discourse in even Anglo-American traditions (his pragmatism was the most American of Western philosophical traditions), but it is an argument that presumes knowledge not widely available or even sought out.

Of course a wish for a world where people think like us is just another form of wish for an enchanted world, a world where everyone agrees on the terms of existence.  Even Harry Potter finds that; the magical world is far simpler in construct than the Muggles world.  Disagreements are basic and fundamental and clean; what is agreed on is the primacy of magic.  Everything else is just commentary.  We want to live in a world like that, a world where everyone agrees on basic conditions.  But one of the lessons of post-modernism is that we don't all even reason in the same way.  There's a fundamental split between Anglo-American and Continental philosophies in the Western tradition.  Imagine what the difference is in traditions outside the Western one.

Every wish for order and coherence in the cosmos is a wish for an enchanted space where everything behaves according to rules we can learn to manipulate.  That's the modern definition of "magic:"  not access to powers in this world, the ability to influence those power and perhaps use them for human purposes:  but the absolute control over those powers.  Lev Grossman's Magicians trilogy faces that issue head on:  the magic performed there is more akin to nuclear physics:  powerful, dangerous, and the consequences of its use especially not fully under control.  His characters are the spoiled doyennes of a post-industrial society:  having conquered the means of material existence, they are bored and restless.  Magic works, but it also conjures demons, powers more akin to Lovecraft than to Tolkien.  The parallels to the fears of atomic warfare in the 50's and 60's are obvious; and today it is our technology, fueled by fossil fuels we can't give up and can't keep using, that scares us.  We prefer to think our magic is identifiable as fantasy; but we confuse our fantasies with reality probably more readily than did a medieval peasant.

 The peasant at least knew who the Master of the Universe was; we think it is us.

Time Considered as a Helix of Semi-Memorable Catchphrases


Polls have generally shown a decrease in the importance of religion in America. And with regard to evangelicalism in particular, The Pew Forum Religious Landscape Survey from 2008 “confirms that the United States is on the verge of becoming a minority Protestant country; the number of Americans who report that they are members of Protestant denominations now stands at barely 51%.” The Pew Forum also noted that in “the last five years alone, the unaffiliated have increased from just over 15% to just under 20% of all U.S. adults.” So the bigots we upbraid simply aren’t having the influence they’d like to have — and that we’re scared they might have.


 Furthermore, the religiously unaffiliated already say that “religious organizations are too concerned with money and power, too focused on rules and too involved in politics.” And things are even worse for Christians like Driscoll when it comes to the Millennial Generation, who see traditional evangelicalism as being too judgmental. To them, Christianity “feels stifling, fear-based and risk-averse.” And they see that “churches are afraid of the beliefs of other faiths” as well as unfriendly to those who doubt the faith. The important thing to note here is that their opinion of modern Christianity isn’t based on the vitriol of atheist bloggers or the disparaging posts of their Facebook friends. It’s based on their own experience of Christian culture. This has led millennials to simply view evangelical Christianity as “too political, too exclusive, old-fashioned, unconcerned with social justice and hostile to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people.”And this is why I think the APC can be successful. The work is already largely done for us. Religion literally speaks for itself, even in the mainstream media — and, increasingly, it’s not what people want to hear.

I post that because it comes from a fairly thoughtful article.  The Pew study may or may not point to fundamental changes in America.  It may well be that Protestantism, always supported largely by the culture it existed in, has reached the end of its thread.  The second paragraph of the quote tries to conflate and yet not conflate Protestantism with evangelical Protestantism; that's always a problem in these discussions.  But if you want a confirmation of Mencken's observations about the American "booboisie," a challenge to the idea that universal literacy and education will make us all wise and knowledgeable, you need only wade into the 1000+ comments at that article to be disabused of any optimism.

Flip Wilson was a wildly popular stand up comedian in his day.  He never had the controversies of a Dick Gregory or a Richard Pryor; he didn't challenge racism as overtly as Gregory, or have as flamboyant and troubled a life as Pryor.  He didn't branch out and establish the staying power of a Cosby, known for stand up and comedy shows and even dramas.  But for a time his jokes and catchphrases were common parlance, and probably his most famous line was:  "The Devil made me do it!"

It was a trenchant observation, a wise and wry one, on how we delude ourselves into thinking we are not responsible for the state of our lives or our failure to live up to our ideals, because we can always blame someone else when we do what we shouldn't do.  Geraldine, Wilson's character, bought an immodest dress.  Atheists, on-line and acolytes of Richard Dawkins anyway, declare they must hate Christianity (is there any other form of religion in America?  Not to them.) because Christians make them buy into hate as the only response to religion.

One comment at Salon (long buried) declared that atheists are treated like rapists in this country.  When I demurred (a reflex action) that atheism was not a felony in this country, I was rebuffed as a "Christianist" because someone somewhere has declared atheism should be a crime, and non-believers should be jailed, apparently for the good of society.  So atheists are as good as treated as rapists; or something.  I know of white supremacists who would gladly send all African Americans back to Africa, but I don't think that's going to happen anytime soon.  And the white supremacists would say the blame is not on them; it's the "blacks" who make them seem evil and racist.  Really, the races just weren't meant to mix, and the sooner everyone else understands that, the better.  See, white supremacists aren't haters; it's the non-white races that make them seem that way.

You get the idea.

It is the ultimate act of childishness, to blame what you oppose for making you sound bad, for making you, in fact, behave badly.  It's pathetic, really.  The most vociferous commenters at that thread have erected a bogey man to justify their most outrageous claims. and they blame that creature of their imagination for their fears and anxieties.  It's one way to create an identity and a group, I suppose; but it's the saddest and most immature way to do it I can imagine.  There is a direct line between these clowns and Richard Dawkins:  he opposes Christianity in all its forms because a few fundamentalists in the world oppose the reach of science into their spiritual and daily lives.  That is reason enough for Dawkins to write books and give lectures and generally expound on how the Christians are making him be an obnoxious atheist.

It's the Devil who made him do it.

Now, hold onto that Pew report on the decline of religion in America, and connect it to this:  it seems college students are attending fewer college football games.

The article notes that a broad approach to this issue may be misleading, since attendance at games varies from college to college.  It attributes the change to more comfortable locales to watch games, and the ability to watch on tablets and iPads and smart phones; and to the fact stadia don't provide WiFi access, or have enough jumbotrons, or something.

It may even be students are less and less interested in college football; but nobody dares say that.  They will hint at it, thought, because the fear is that students who don't bother to go to the stadium a few times a year (think about how many games are played in a football stadium in a year; there are usually more weekends in a month) will become alumni who don't see any reason to support football teams in the future.

So maybe they aren't going to bars to watch the game, or watching on their cell phones in the dorms; maybe they just don't care anymore.

At any rate, it's not the Devil making them do it.  Not yet, anyway.

I know I can connect nothing with nothing, but these two stories seem connected to me.  Not the raging atheism of children on the internet (emotionally and intellectually, I know high school kids who are more mature than most of the comments about religion I find on-line), but the decline in interest in the eternal verities.  Church has been a fabulous invalid since my childhood, but football is supposed to be going from strength to strength, enjoying a renaissance on college campuses especially that rivals the beginning of the sport when you had to be "a football hero."  I think there isa  connection between church and football, and the connection is television.

But not because more platforms are available to watch TV, or because TV's are now everywhere (there was no TV in the bar in Cheers; now a bar without a TV is unthinkable; or any public space, for that matter).  TV is destroying college football because college football exists now not for the students or the alumni, but for the TV markets.  Texas colleges used to play in the Southwest Conference, and the main rivalry was UT and Texas A&M.  Both schools left the SWC for conferences more attractive to TV schedulers, and more lucrative for the schools, and now neither play each other ever.  Those famous Thanksgiving games are just a memory.  Who is being served by college games now?  And what is the point of them, except to generate a TV audience?

Which is pretty much what happened to Christianity in America about 40 years ago.  TV evangelism was already in decline in the '80's, and by the time Bill Clinton was elected Jerry Falwell needed the Viagra of invented scandal to keep his name in the public eye.  TV evangelism made it seem all you had to do to worship, the ultimate corporate action of Christians, was to set your dial to the right channel at the right time.  That didn't last long, in the grand scheme of things (Joel Osteen's church owns a TV channel here in Houston, but I can't find him on any broadcast station at any hour, anymore.  Maybe he shows up on one I've blocked, but TV stations devoted to Christianity are a virtual ghetto now, a sort of digital version of the cable access channels of yore).  But the impact was pernicious.

What is football except a form of secular religion, a panem et circenses of our modern age?  If its appeal is already beginning to pall, if it seems more and more removed from daily life, the players gladiators and not our friends and family, the whole affair less and less democratic as the players become less and less human and more and more privileged in an era when we are beginning to realize the cost of privilege, then what surprise is it that Christianity is beginning to pall, too?

Pope Francis I seems to understand this better than any religious leader alive.  He has replaced an American bishop who was very concerned with abstractions like American government policy and which public figure should be excommunicated, with a bishop who seems likely to follow Francis' line and pay more attention to the poor and to the pastoral care all clergy should model. The Pope is drawing attention precisely because he cares about people, and not just about ideas.  The more one cares about ideas, the more likely one is to ignore the human equation and decide it is the ideas alone that matter.  Follow that line of reasoning very far, and pretty soon you are telling pregnant women to abort their fetuses and try again, just to avoid some abstract possibility of suffering which we know all flesh is heir to.

As the Church, Catholic or Protestant, liberal or conservative, returns to caring about people (who seem to have been the main concern of Jesus of Nazareth), it will recover the attention even of Millenials and younger generations.  Probably not to the degree it had the attention of their grandparents, but church attendance has been declining since that peak in the post-war years.  It was supposed to die from Boomer neglect, but that hasn't happened yet, either.  If younger age groups are turning away from even football (yes, the ratings are high for pro football, but consider the competition:  another CSI set somewhere else, another variation on "American Idol"; what else is on offer?), it may just mean the institutional verities need to change, too.  At long last.  Finally.

When I'm one of the youngest in the room in a church worship space, a radical change actually looks kind of welcome.