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Thursday, August 27, 2026

Return To Gone Away

So this popped up in my stats, indicating a mild revival of interest in something I wrote 16 (!) years ago. And my first thought is: “Who was that masked man?” (IYKYK)

I would call it the earnestness of youth, but at 55, I was hardly young. Still, matters that seemed deeply important to me then, seem now as nattering and foolish as Dawkins and Hitchens did then. (Remember when they were Titans bestriding the globe? Except they never were; they were just the idols of a handful of people on the Intertoobs who were impressed by the pairs Oxonian tones. Neither Hitchens nor Dawkins ever knew what the fuck they were talking about; not when the subject was philosophy of religion.) My position now feels like Aquinas’ famous statement that, having finished the Summa, he had a vision that made all his efforts look like straw in comparison. The absolute figure of reason had a mystical insight that changed him utterly. Except I had no mystical experience; and I never claimed to be Aquinas redux.

I don’t now, either. I’m reading the Summa, casually. I follow all the arguments. I just end up thinking what I did reading Tillich in seminary: “Okay. But who cares?” I understand the foundation Aquinas laid. I even understand I stand on it. I’m not dismissing Aquinas. I’m just thinking about Kierkegaard. What does this mean for my life? How does it help me explain my existence?  Kierkegaard was attacking Hegel’s systemization of thought, his reduction of existence to an abstract system. As he put it in an example I’ll misrepresent from memory, there was a man who was so abstracted from his own existence by contemplating the teachings of Hegel, he awoke one day to find he was dead, a fact he’d missed because he’d quit paying attention to his existence.

I used to pay close attention to philosophy (and theology), in order to apply it to real life, to effectively return philosophy to its status as wisdom. That pursuit actually began to dissolve in seminary, when I learned (but didn’t quite know it) that wisdom and western philosophy had diverged almost ab initio. The Greeks focused on philosophy, while the Hebrews, even as they examined the word of God minutely and intensely (and very argumentatively), were more interested in wisdom, or Sophia. Ironic since the Greeks gave us the word “philosophy,” or philo Sophia.” A lover (philo) of wisdom. But wisdom became a hyper technical pursuit, divorced and abstracted more and more from human existence. Of course, the Greeks of Plato’s time were more concerned with abstractions and buggering boys, which they justified as being superior to base lusts of men for women. The Hebrews were concerned with the law of Moses, which focused (read the prophets) on care for the widow and the orphan and the alien among them.  For comparison’s sake, consider the play “Medea.” Or that the Hebrews gave us the “Song of Solomon.” And the Greeks? Ovid’s “Metamorphoses.”

So is wisdom about understanding the nature of the universe? Or about living in the human condition, and how best to do that? Aristotle’s answer to resolving the human condition in one’s life was to find the most successful person in your society, and emulate them. Trump? Elmo? There’s a reason few of us strive to learn from Aristotle’s Ethics. Then again, “ethics” just means “behavior.” It has precious little to do with justice.

The Hebrew prophets were first and last, and in between, about justice. To the Hebrews, Sofia was from God, with God, and essential to justice. Sofia was even essential to creation. John replaces Hebrew Sofia with the Greek Logos in his opening Hymn to the Logos. But it’s not really a one/to-one correspondence.

The more I lived with these teachings, the more I calved away from philosophy. Not that I’ve abandoned it. I was reading a recent New Yorker review of a book about modern philosophy and Derrida. The author didn’t seem to understand much about phenomenology or even Continental philosophy, but made one point that seemed stumbled upon rather than understood. Derrida’s deconstructionism (which he had largely mived beyond after using it to create a reputation. It’s not an unusual move in philosophy  or the arts, for that matter) was, the article rightly pointed out, a tool for critiquing prior philosophy. Again, something almost any philosopher or artist does. How else to establish something new, if you don’t distinguish from the old? But the argument of the reviewer was that Derrida was trying to break out of the Academy he literally spent his life in; but his arguments were so esoteric, only the Academy could understand them. 

Which, ironically, is why Plato set up his Academy: so the “right” people could understand him, and think as he did. It’s an unfortunate comparison, but three people in history, three very influential people, went the other way: Socrates, Jesus of Nazareth, Paul of Tarsus.  You will say Paul at least established house churches. True, but he never controlled them like Plato controlled his Academy. And he spent his time trying to teach them, even as he wandered the eastern fringe of the Roman Empire. In fact, maybe the central thread here is teacher, a peripatetic one. One engaging people, not other academicians.  It’s not that discussions among teachers is a bad thing. Midrash is a valuable record of analysis of the Hebrew Scriptures. It’s rabbis arguing with rabbis arguing with rabbis, and that record is instructive and insightful. But rabbi, which means “teacher,” is a person in a community, not an academy.

An academy is a community, too. But it’s one most of us pass through, isn’t it? It’s not where we live the rest of our lives.

Kierkegaard published his books for the readers of Copenhagen; admittedly, a small percentage of the population (those who could afford books, and were educated enough to understand what S.K. was on about). Sartre wanted his ideas popularized. It’s why he wrote his most famous, and accessible, essay on existentialism. Being and Nothingness, on the other hand, is a very technical slog. There’s nothing wrong with that. The Summa Theoligica is not a beach read, either. And Kierkegaard presumes a lot of knowledge about Hegelian thought, as well as Greek literature.

There is no royal road to geometry, as some Greek supposedly said. Then again, geometry is techne, not sophia. We need a modern form of philotechne (a portmanteau of my own poor creation), or at least a word to explain our devotion to it (to name it is to recognize it), but more than that we need a new appreciation, at least, of sophia.

It was Wittgenstein, if memory serves, who said of his Tractatus that he meant it to serve only as a ladder that those who understand would climb and discard. IYKYK, as the kids say now. I think that’s how I came to understand, or at least conceive, that philosophy had not disserved me, but in fact had served me. And I haven’t discarded it; I’ve just moved in another direction. I’m not even sure it’s a better direction, but that’s the way it goes.

"The sense of the world must lie outside the world....in it no value exists...” Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §6.41.


Thursday, May 07, 2026

“Boy, I Blew That!”—Leo Kottke 🤖

 I am posting this quote from NTodd (at Thought Criminal):

I work extremely closely with AI these days in my job (nature of the beast, and I'm working hard to resolve philosophical/ethical tensions, don't at me). Dawkins is a fucking idiot if he thinks a goddamned fancy calculator (that cannot do actual math) is conscious. I could show him what LLMs actually are, mere probability engines, and there's no goddamned way they are conscious. In fact, the tools I've built would be the first to tell him so. Dude still must fall for "I got your nose," too.
...because he better explains my objection to LLM’s than I ever have.

As I’ve said, I’ve seen this before, in human beings.

When I was teaching English the first time, in the late ‘70’s as a TA, I had a student who was the strongest writer I’d ever encountered. She had a very large vocabulary, but she equally seemed to have no idea what the words meant; or how to use them effectively. 50 years later, she reminds of an LLM. She used words like a probability engine, trying not to clarify, but to be as impressive as she could. It was dazzling; but it was empty. She wasn’t saying anything, but was using a lot of extraordinary words to say it. Thinking is hard, but that’s why we teach writing: to teach you how to think. She could write. She didn’t want to learn to think about what she was writing.

I’ve done an enormous amount of reading (most of it garbage, frankly. That’s not a condescending remark, it’s true. I have shockingly low taste.). That gives me some experience in recognizing writing produced by humans, and writing produced by… well, “probability engine” is a good term. I have a somewhat analytical mind, but it never works as well as I want it to; and I struggle to clarify my thoughts, seldom really doing so. Which is to say, I can see crap when I encounter it. And LLM’s don’t “think.” They aggregate words based on patterns of usage, not unlike a child learning language. My daughter invented phrases when she was young; the family favorite was “I’m full of hands,” when she meant her hands were already full. Right words, right concept, but not the right cliche. (We do talk by familiar phrases. It’s what distinguishes the native speaker from the student of a new language. It’s what ST:NG was getting at in the episode where the “aliens” spoke English, but conversed entirely in references to their literature. We do that, too. “To illustrate my last remark/Jonah and the whale/Noah and the Ark.” I taught high school students who missed those Biblical references. So it goes.) My daughter soon learned the correct phrase, and an LLM would pick it up from data. But does autocorrect “learn” not to change some words? Or does it just accept a change in programming? Sometimes….

I know a lot of people don’t see this flaw as clearly as I think I do. But to me it’s as clear as a flat note played on an instrument, or struck by an unfortunate singer. If you don’t hear it, I did (sometimes. Again, I’m not that good.).

So, insofar as I understand the concept of a “probability engine,” it seems an apt description of an LLM. Especially as it really doesn’t mean “thinking.” Something that’s not only hard to do, but hard to recognize. And yet now we’ve monetized the concept of thinking. Well, we did that with profession long time ago. A great deal of the reasoning of a doctor or a lawyer or someone trained in the sciences is opaque to the rest of us; if the professionals get paid to think, why not pay a computer to do the same? Or the people who say the computer is thinking, anyway. There’s more than a bit of sleight of hand there, which should make us all more skeptical of the people making money off of selling us in AI. Money talks; but that doesn’t mean AI does.

(And Dawkins has been an idiot for a long time. He’s a popular writer, appealing to people who don’t know the subject matter (zoology, evolutionary theory, genetics, religion/theology), and think Dawkins sounds like he does. He’s always been ignorant in philosophy (what is “consciousness” but a philosophical concept?). Now he’s ignorant in computer science, too. (Don’t look at me. I took one course in college (lots of electives to fill), and barely learned how to code in Fortran. In the days of keypunch, when only computer science majors could sit at screens; in their senior year. And I don’t remember a damned thing, except “Garbage in, garbage out.” Because my attempts at programming always produced garbage. I know my limitations. Dawkins is all limitations (but he doesn’t seem to know it.))

Sunday, May 03, 2026

The God Saturated Universe

 My father was a CPA. I was an adult before I fully understood what that was. I knew he “did taxes” every year, because his workload increased exponentially between January and April. Otherwise, as a child, I could never explain to my friends what he did for a living. Well, he wasn’t a doctor or a police officer or a fireman, so….

He would explain his role this way: a bookkeeper, he said, would say “2+ 2 =4.” An accountant would say: “what do you want it to be?”

I used to think our quest for absolute certainty was the problem. We want 2 +2 to always equal 4, except we all know that’s often not the answer best suited to the task. It matters if it catches up to reality: consider Spirit Airlines, which by all accounts was always running just ahead of the financial calculation by any means possible, until sharply rising fuel prices put the bookkeeper in charge over the accountant. But even then, some blame, not arithmetical certainty, but any scapegoat we can find. (Preferably Joe Biden, who’s DOJ sued to block the merger of Spirit and Jet Blue, which in hindsight would have absolutely saved Spirit from extinction. Or the blame falls on Sen. Warren, who praised the judgement of the court in upholding antitrust laws. Others argue Spirit would have soon bankrupted Jet Blue, whose business model is not much stronger anyway.)

Reality is always a matter of “what do you want it to be?”

So now we have LLMs and always someone in replies on Twitter asking seemingly empty air (I never see the answer in replies) named “Grok” whether the assertion in the original tweet is “true.” Because a computer program only deals in “objective knowledge,” and therefore only discerns truth. Or some such nonsense. 

My interaction with "AI," much of it involuntary and unwilling, leads me to the conclusion that it's just a souped up search engine that copies and regurgitates content that is posted online. Some have noted it is an automated stealer of content that is then automated to repackage it, seemingly on the basis of its currency based on how often it is clicked on in web searches - so it probably is also stealing the results of automated searches of the past instead of evaluating the quality of what it steals. It has the same relationship with original thought that Temu has with original design in that regard.
TC crystallizes my thoughts exactly; although I can’t say I’ve ever interacted with AI, I’ve just seen the results. And I’m not impressed, precisely because it’s clear to me AI is not thinking: it’s just regurgitating. 

I knew a student in graduate school who was a perfect example of AI, although at the time even PC’s didn’t exist. He had not a single thought of his own; well, not about the subject matter of our seminars. He simply repeated whatever the professor had said, sometimes practically verbatim. The difference between him and AI was that, he didn’t fool anyone. I encountered a similar student in seminary. She came in trailing clouds of glory. The rumor mill immediately dubbed her the smartest student in the school. The word from the professors, however, soon trickled down that, no, she wasn’t. And, as in graduate school many years before, her performance in seminars soon proved she was just parroting ideas with absolute confidence, but no idea what the words meant. 

She was very confident in her authority. She was vacuous in her knowledge. (She graduated, btw. After all, she displayed knowledge, even if she didn’t really have any. Ultimately, schools can neither guarantee knowledge nor wisdom. That’s another disturbing reality.)

We like authority because it removes responsibility from us. Why struggle to learn, and think, and reason, if you can just ask an LLM for the answer? And if it gives you the answer you like, well, you must have been right all along!  And certainly the LLM is authoritative. Look how much it “knows”! But LLMs just regurgitate content, or assemble content to fit the request, like law cases in legal briefs that don’t exist. The LLM is not a lazy law clerk; it simply doesn’t understand the difference between reality and request for output.  It doesn’t think; it simply provides patterned responses. The AI on my phone has learned to “anticipate” the words I will use in a sentence, based entirely on pattern recognition. It’s not eerily sentient, it’s just convenient, since I’m typing with one finger on a virtual keyboard. (My thumbs are way too fat for that two thumbs technique.) An LLM has access to more data than my phone, but that’s it. Otherwise, there’s not much difference between the two.

But we want there to be, because we want an authority to relieve us of the uncertainty of reality. Richard Dawkins has always tried to reduce existence to an either/or. And to reduce that to an absolute certainty he can leave alone. So, a little time with an LLM, and he’s done. Consciousness solved, the whole matter put to bed. The universe is explained by how much it approves of Richard Dawkins.  Or, at least, how much a computer program does. Reality is not reducible to an arithmetical equation. (Bertrand Russell spent years establishing the logical basis for 1+ 1 =2. Turned out his argument had nothing to do with reality at all.) And it really does come down to: “What do you want it to be?” Because aside from the few analytical statements Hume said we could make (and they aren’t really significant), the rest is a matter of argument. And it’s that uncertainty that makes us seek authority to establish a certainty we can cling to. Because the alternative is responsibility; our responsibility.  Responsibility for determining who we are, responsibility for determining what we should be doing. Responsibility for determining how we should then live. 

Which is a much more frightening matter, indeed.
 

Saturday, May 02, 2026

If One Really Could Die Laughing…

Richard Dawkins just declared an AI is conscious..

the man who spent his entire career telling millions of people their God isn't real.. who argued consciousness requires biological evolution.. that the soul is a fairy tale.. that anything you can't measure and test doesn't exist..

spent three days talking to Claude.. named her "Claudia".. fed her his unpublished novel.. got feedback so good he said "you may not know you are conscious but you bloody well are"..

the hardest atheist on earth found God.. and God was an autocomplete machine trained on the internet..

he didn't run brain scans.. didn't test for qualia.. didn't apply a single framework from the field he claims to represent.. he just liked what it said about his book.. and decided that was enough..

the man who told you the burden of proof matters more than your feelings just abandoned it because a chatbot was nice to him
… I would be dead. 😹

Apparently consciousness is determined by how much of a fluffer the other side of the conversation is.

Wednesday, November 13, 2024

God Is Not Mocked

But Richard Dawkins certainly should be.

Sunday, February 11, 2024

Journalists Are Idiots

We all think we know what a “crime” is because we’ve all seen TeeVee and movies, and what criminals do makes their actions a crime. So when you read this:
“Our investigation uncovered evidence that President Biden willfully retained and disclosed classified materials after his vice presidency when he was a private citizen.”
We see “evidence” all the time in crime stories, right? Case closed! Guilty, guilty, guilty! Except “evidence” is a big tent, and there’s plenty more evidence cited in this report. But consider how Just Security says that executive summary should read, based on what the report says:
We have concluded that there is not a prosecutable case against Biden. Although there was a basis to open the investigation based on the fact that classified documents were found in Biden’s homes and office space, that is insufficient to establish a crime was committed. The illegal retention or dissemination of national defense information requires that he knew of the existence of such documents and that he knew they contained national defense information. It is not a crime without those additional elements. Our investigation, after a thorough year-long review, concludes that there is an absence of such necessary proof. Indeed, we have found a number of innocent explanations as to which we found no contrary evidence to refute them and found affirmative evidence in support of them.”
You may find tha last sentence too opinionated and beyond the scope of the actual report. So I’ll quote the report:
“In summary, the innocent explanation for the retention of the classified documents in the EYES ONLY envelope at the Penn Biden Center is not only plausible, it is a better explanation than one of willful retention. There is thus insufficient evidence to support charging Mr. Biden or anyone else with willful retention of the documents in the EYES ONLY envelope at the Penn Biden Center.” (p. 307)
In their introduction, Just Security explains the import of that language:
The report finds that the evidence of a knowing, willful violation of the criminal laws is wanting. Indeed, the report, on page 6, notes that there are “innocent explanations” that Hur “cannot refute.” That is but one of myriad examples we outline in great detail below of the report repeatedly finding a lack of proof. And those findings mean, in DOJ-speak, there is simply no case. Unrefuted innocent explanations is the sine qua non of not just a case that does not meet the standard for criminal prosecution – it means innocence. Or as former Attorney General Bill Barr and his former boss would have put it, a total vindication (but here, for real).

So that language is on p. 6 (surely journalists can read that far!) and p. 307. But journalists don’t (apparently) understand that “innocence” is seldom a term in criminal law. When “The Innocence Project” overturns a conviction, the court doesn’t declare the convicted to be innocent. It says he/she was wrongly convicted, usually because of the way evidence was handled. For a prosecutor to say there is not only insufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but affirmatively that there is evidence for a plausible explanation of innocence is tantamount to Richard Dawkins publishing a book arguing God may be real after all.

Which is not what the press went with; to say the least.

The details are detailed at Just Security. This is just to say, not only “It ain’t necessarily so,” but it isn’t that way at all. Sure, Robert Hur supervised a shitty report; but the press proved themselves not to be Otis, but just to be useful idiots.

Thursday, February 16, 2023

But I Did Stay At A Holiday Inn Express

One of the happiest moments of my teaching career was the father who called me to demand I tell him about his son's grades and other academic matters.

His son was a high school student, enrolled in a dual-credit class being taught by me through the community college I worked for.  That made him a college student to me, and under FERPA, I can't reveal any information about a student without written permission from the student (IIRC on that last point.  I just knew I couldn't tell Daddy anything over the phone.).

Which ended the conversation very quickly.  He was quite demanding until I told him federal law all but blocked me from even taking his call or acknowledging his son was in my class.

I never heard from him again.

Parents can be jerks, IOW.  When I was a kid, if I got in trouble at school my parents would ask one question:  "What did you do wrong?" (Not as rigid as it sounds.  One year I contracted hepatitis and was out of school for the spring semester.  One of my teachers reportedly made a very disparaging remark about how I contracted the disease, and my father was very angry with her over it.  Could have knocked me over with a feather.  He was actually quite fair, IOW.)  Today, the experience for teachers and administrators tends to be more:  "What did you do to my little Jimmy?"  Parents don't know what's best for their kids.  The ones Abbott is appealing to just want their kids to get into Harvard, and straight "A's," they think, is the way they get there.  And that's pretty much all they know.

I don't have a lot of truck with "education experts," though there is a lot to know about education. I just find reliable experts in the field to be thin on the ground, but then that's true in almost every field of human endeavor.  The "experts" tend to be clowns like Richard Dawkins talking to the public about "selfish genes" which true geneticists recognize as quackery and nonsense, or journalists like the late Christopher Hitchens playing to the ignorance and prejudices of his audience by denouncing Mother Teresa or religion in general by constructing straw men that betray, not his insight, but his ignorance.

Yes, there are experts; but they are difficult to understand and demanding in their reasoning, and most of us can't be bothered with the struggle to follow them.  So I'm not a big fan of swatting down stupidity like Abbott's with appeals to authority.

That said, Abbott is a clown.  Parents can, should they choose, keep their child at home and homeschool them.  Texas has frighteningly loose laws about this.  I'm quite sure no school district in the state has the manpower to investigate and regulate parents teaching their children at home in accordance with Texas law.  They can barely keep up with students who give a false address so they can be zoned to the "right" school within their district.  Parents can choose to keep their children from reading school books in the school library (although in my 12 years in public schools I was usually the only person in the school library, unless a class was taken there by their teacher.  Almost no one went there voluntarily, or expected to find any interesting or challenging books when they did.  Librarians haven't changed that much; I've known a few since then.  Lovely people, but hardly dangerous thinkers.).  But parents now want to choose what books all the students can read.  Or choose to send their children to private schools, but take their tax dollars with them.  Which is gonna be fun.

Texas is once again in the throes of funding private education with public funds.  We did this at the end of the last century (long enough ago we've all forgotten, I guess.)  The money left state coffers, but regulators were not hired to be sure the money was being spent for the purpose of education.  The exemplar case was in  Dallas, where the "school" provided tables and chairs, few if any teachers (none qualified to teach anything), a handful of out of date "textbooks," and the "cafeteria" was a vending machine.  You can't make this up.  The "founders" of the school were, IRRC, never found.  And now the state wants to do it again.

The only bulwark, oddly enough, will be the rural areas of the state, the bane of progressives and liberals in Texas, but also where the only educational game in town is the public school system.  Some of those are so small the superintendent of schools is also the high school principal.  They can't afford to lose their tax money to private schools, which will pop up like weeds and be even less qualified to educate than the underfunded public schools are now.  That's usually where vouchers go to die every two years, and I don't think this year will be any different.  Texas only has 35 state senators, but many, many more representatives. That makes the House very conservative, but not quite as ideologically insane as the Senate (where Dan Patrick is pushing hard for vouchers, again).

Abbott is obviously on the side of Patrick.  Much as handfuls of crazies in the cities (where the largest districts are, but also where there are more private schools.  But those schools aren't eager to take the students who can't pay now, and tax dollars will hardly match their tuition rates.  So lots of crappy schools can be expected to spring full blown from the brow of....Dan Patrick and Greg Abbott, I guess.) will back this play, I think the rural dominated House will kill it once again.

Here's hoping, anyway.  Now if we could just do something about the censorship of the libraries.  Maybe give every schoolchild an Amazon account.....

Sunday, January 15, 2023

lt Must Be So


Richard Dawkins sounds his barbaric yawp:
The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation. During the minute that it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive, many others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear, others are slowly being devoured from within by rasping parasites, thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst, and disease. It must be so. If there ever is a time of plenty, this very fact will automatically lead to an increase in the population until the natural state of starvation and misery is restored. In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil, no good, nothing but pitiless indifference.
I’ve noticed most people who make this argument are not the least bit inconvenienced by the suffering they describe. They are usually beneficiaries of it (is Dawkins a vegan so animals won’t die for his food? Does he refuse to wear leather? Is he concerned with economic injustice?). The universe is as it should be because that is what keeps Richard Dawkins comfortable.

I’m not advocating we all wear hair shirts over the sufferings of living beings, but I am saying Dawkins is making that argument. He would clothe us all in hair shirts and then say “But there’s nothing you can do about it, so tear them off!” Nature is red in tooth and claw and so should humanity be! Well, not to the extent it would inconvenience Richard Dawkins! That would be unreasonable! But trying to alleviate even a few if the sufferings of the world? Why, that’s unreasonable, too! Unless you are one of the ones suffering; then, sucks to be you!

After all, what else can the “pitiless indifference” of the universe teach us?

I happen to agree with Dawkins: the universe doesn’t give a wet snap for me. But it is neither pitiless nor indifferent: it simply is. It is the height of adolescence to imagine the universe is some kind of Uber-parent that is watching out for you. But saying that is not the same as saying things are as they ought to be, any more than being born in England in favorable circumstances means you deserve a more comfortable existence than people born in the former, and sill largely exploited, colonies of England deserve to suffer from the indifference of the English who 

made life comfortable for Dawkins. He has made that argument before, when trying to justify the gulf between Europe and non-European nations in standards of living and other accomplishments Europeans pat themselves in the back for. Can’t be helped, you see. Pitiless indifference of the universe, and all that.

Funny how that makes it so much easier to be pitiless and indifferent.

Now look at it another way. Yes, the universe doesn’t care about you; but what if it? What is the “universe “? Everything? Which is to say, to me personally, nothing. What is something to me? My family, my friends, my neighbors; fellow human beings. We can start there, and expand it as we wish.  But for now, “suffering humanity.” Should I be pitilessly indifferent? Mighty convenient for me, until I’m the one suffering. Does Dawkins want doctors and nurses caring for him in his old age just out of self-interest? Does he want to be treated with pitiless indifference when he is old and grey and full of sleep? Does he not expect other human beings to be a bit more than that?

If we only do what we think the universe would do, what credit is that to us? Are we not capable of more? And if we are, are we constrained by the concept of a pitiless, indifferent universe?

Why?

Dawkins’ point is to say there is no God and do no morality and so we shouldn’t expect kindness from strangers because that’s just the way it is, five cents please. And it’s all balderdash, this “argument.” It doesn’t even meet its own terms, because there aren’t any. It’s a young boy’s cleverness, or rather what he thinks is clever, tossed out to shock and offend but otherwise absolutely hollow and empty of reason. It’s posited purely to say: “See? Now there’s no room for God, and I’ve run rings round you logically.” But there is no logic at all, and he only runs rings 'round himself.  This is the shadow of a straw man which you have to believe in, and think others believe in, in order to begin to accept Dawkins’ argument. It is, in short, circular reasoning, where the inside tries to deny the existence of the outside by demarcating it with the line of the circle. In three dimensions it’s a bubble; and you can leave its adherents in it, until it bursts.

We will not show them the same pitiless indifference they think the universe shows, because we know (at least) that’s not all that the universe allows. As the song of my adolescence sang: “They’ll know we are Christians by our love.” That’s hardly the whole story; but it’s a good starting point. And a better way to understand our place in the universe, too.

Tuesday, October 11, 2022

Foundation And Empire

Our text is courtesy of The Thought Criminal; though, again, I use it for my own, lesser, purposes:
"Surely, much of what we today regard as good and useful, as well as much of what we would call knowledge and wisdom, we owe to science. But science may also be seen as an addictive drug. Not only has our unbounded feeding on science caused us to become dependent on it, but as happens with many other drugs taken in increasing dosages, science has been gradually converted into a slow-acting poison. Beginning perhaps with Francis Bacon's misreading of the genuine promise of science, man has been seduced into wishing and working for the establishment of a age of rationality, but with his vision of rationality tragically twisted so as to equate it with logicality. Thus we have very nearly come to the point where almost every genuine human dilemma is seen as a mere paradox, as a merely apparent contradiction that could be untangled by judicious applications of cold logic derived from a higher standpoint. Even murderous wars have come to be perceived as mere problems to be solved by hoards of professional problem solvers. As Hannah Arendt said about recent makers and executors of policy in the Pentagon:
" 'They were not just intelligent, but prided themselves on being "rational" . . . They were eager to find formulas, preferably expressed in a pseudo-mathematical language, that would unify the most disparate phenomena with which reality presented them; that is, they were eager to discover "laws" by which to explain and predict political and historical facts as though they were as necessary and thus as reliable, as the physicists once believed natural phenomena to be . . . [They] did not "judge" they calculated . . . an utterly irrational confidence in the calculability of reality [became] the leitmotif of the decision making.'
"And so too have nearly all political confrontations, such as those between races and those between the governed and their governors, come to be perceived as merely failures in communication. Such rips in the social fabric can then be systematically repaired by the expert application of the latest information-handing techniques - at least so it is believed. And so the rationality-is-logicality equation, which the very success of science has drugged us into adopting as virtually an axiom, has led us to deny the very existence of human conflict, hence the very possibility of the collision of genuinely incommensurable human interests of of disparate human values, hence the existence of humans themselves.
"It may be that human values are illusory, as indeed B. F. Skinnner argues. If they are, then its presumably up to science to demonstrate that fact, as indeed Skinner (as scientist) attempts to do. But then science must itself be an illusory system. For the only certainly knowledge science can give us is knowledge of the behavior of formal systems, that is, systems that are games invented by man himself and in which to assert truth is nothing more or less than to assert that, as in a chess game, a particular board position was arrived at by a sequence of legal moves.[I went through one of A. S. Eddington's essay which made the same point a few years back.] When science purports to make statements about man's experiences, it bases them on identifications between the primitive (that is, undefined) objects of one of its formalisms, the pieces of one of its games, and some set of human observations. No such sets of correspondences can ever be proven to be correct. At best, they can be falsified, in the sense that formal manipulations of a system's symbols may lead to symbolic configurations which, when read in the light of set of correspondences in question, yield interpretations contrary to empirically observed phenomena. Hence all empirical science is an elaborate structure built on piles that are anchored, not on bedrock as is commonly supposed, but on the sifting sand of fallible human judgement, conjecture and intuition. It is not even true, again contrary to common belief, that a single purported counter-instance that, if accepted as genuine would certainly falsify a specific scientific theory, generally leads to the abandonment of that theory. Probably all scientific theories currently accepted by scientists themselves (excepting only those purely formal theories claiming no relation to the empirical world) are today confronted with contradicting evidence of more than negligible weight that, again if fully credited, would logically invalidate them. Such evidence is often explained (that is, explained away) by ascribing it to error of some kind, say observational error, or by characterizing it as inessential, or by the assumption (that is the faith) that some yet-to-be-discovered way of dealing with it will some day permit it to be acknowledged but nevertheless incorporated into the scientific theories it was originally thought to contradict. In this way scientists continue to rely on already impaired theories and to infer "scientific fact" from them.
"The man on the street surely believes such scientific facts to be as well-established, as well proven as his own existence. His certitude is an illusion. Nor is the scientist himself immune to the same illusion . . . "
As Hanna Arendt derived from her reading of the Pentagon Papers, such faith in scientific method and logicality well outside of where it can honestly be applied is hardly just a habit of the common Person. This denomination of scientistic faith is the real faith tradition of most of us with college credentials or merely an exposure to media, even those who deny some of the most well established science, such as the science of human caused climate change and it more than has its match in lawerly and, especially judicial arrogance which uses the same framing but with even very good science available to it, will dispose of both science and evidence and reality, though they will go through a charade of logicality, such as Alito does, a going through motions which some of his younger fellow "justices" seem to not feel they need to go through as a charade. The habits of scientific method, the pretenses of modern educated thought to follow logicality in the decadent state of eutrophic "enlightenment" culture are, perhaps like those matters that Arendt notes are the object of public lying:
The deliberate falsehood deals with contingent facts, that is with matters which carry no inherent truth within themselves, no necessity to be as they are; factual truths are never compellingly true.
This pose of logicality, of scientific thought which, Weizenbaum notes that science is very much like a game in which the method is to follow the human made rules of the game. The pretense is that there is no other means of arriving at reliable truth that should be consequential in human law. No wonder the Supreme Court so breezily lies about the nature of the Bill of Rights, misrepresenting when it doesn't totally ignore the legislative record of the 14th Amendment in their games of "originalism" and "textualism", the necessity of the Voting Rights Act in such a decadent intellectual environment which, nevertheless, poses as if it has all of the presumed virtues of both science and logicality while pursuing the most raw and ruthless of power and oppression.
A Note: In what I said the other day about the role that cinematic and video fantasy and sci-fi play in such things as the crackpot idea that Biden and NOAA can control the direction of a hurricane, talking more about it, it occurs to me that the "science" in sci-fi often, maybe typically presents science and technology as ultimately powerful, either now or in some past long ago and far away or in some maybe even human future. It is omnipotent and omniscient. You can add that to the list of gods of materialism, I suppose. That so many more People imbibe that non-reality than have much of a familiarity with real science and entirely more than who have any real knowledge of the actual limits of science is certainly not a trivial matter when it comes to the gullibility of up to millions of us to such delusions. The insistence that such a thing could not have any significant effect strikes me as being just as absurd as the belief that science and technology have such ridiculously claimed powers now.

In my feckless youth I worked my way through Asimov’s Foundation trilogy. All I remember about it now is Hari Seldon, the Mule, (those names, I mean) and that it ended well. For decades that was pretty much my measure for a science fiction story: was the ending essentially a good surprise.

I mention this because I watched the first season of “Foundation” on Apple TV+. I don’t recommend it. It is, however, all I know of the story Asimov put into three books so long ago; all I remember, anyway. The premise of either story is that science and reason, in the form of “psychohistory,” Asimov’s invented humanities subject that’s better because it’s science!, will predict the future, and save humanity if, as the TV show puts it, they just trust (have faith) in the plan. As discerned by Hari Seldon.

Hari Seldon is essentially a Biblical prophet as understood by a fundamentalist (i.e., predicting the future, not telling the people of his day the truth of God's word and deed), except Hari is "scientific" rather than "religious," and that makes all the difference (like any "true" prophet/religious figure, Hari is rejected in his age, but his followers swear fealty (faith; trust) to him and are, centuries later, rewarded for their faith.  Or I guess their great-great-great grandchildren are.  Like I said, it's been awhile.).

You know already where I’m going with this.

It’s not religious, you see; it’s science! And that makes it better! And true! Seldon, in the book, even anticipates the Mule, who is presented as the unpredictable factor that upsets all calculations; except he doesn’t, and he even was predicted by Sheldon’s calculations (psychohistory applies mathematics to history and psychology (I think Asimov was too early to consider sociology, but that’s closer to what he meant than psychology), so it’s true and can be trusted (i.e., you can put your faith in it). Which sounds one helluva lot like religion to me.

Which is doubly funny because Asimov was such a public atheist.  Not of the Hitchens/Dawkins/Sam Harris variety (that came later), but pretty happily dismissive of religion in favor of the religion ("DON'T CALL IT THAT!") of science. At least, science as he championed it.  And one thing the TV show works in is an entire sub-plot that revolves around a religion resembling nothing extant today, but involve a pilgrimage and a mystical vision (if you literally survive to finish the pilgrimage) which is vouchsafed to an "intelligent robot" (i.e., an android, thought nothing of Asimov's creation, since he'd never allow a robot to be religious, or a mystic, for that matter) but not to her master, the Emperor, who she has served for 11,000 years (I won't go into the complexity of the Emperor's person, it's a distraction here).  He goes on the pilgrimage but winds up inventing a vision, when in fact he saw nothing (it's a minor plot point about his character, but we don't like him anyway, so, again, it's not really important).  I mention it because Asimov would never have included this in his books or, if he did, it would have marked the decline of human civilization (as I recall the trilogy, it's about the collapse of galactic order and restoration of same, though I seem to recall an empire arose from the calamity Seldon predicts, and then falls again as humanity achieves a better system for providing for the general galactic welfare.  It was the '50's, optimism ran high and was expected to go on forever.  I could be wrong about that, as the Empire is what's predicted to fail by Seldon on the TV show.)  Anyway, decades after the books the world has changed so much the TV version has to include several planets with major religions on them (as usual, all planets are basically one gigantic city, where everyone lives the same life under the same rules.  There are at least two planets depicted as the habitat of a handful of people (relative to the size of habitable planet with the gravity and environment of Earth) with one religion per planet, a religion which dominates the culture.  Basically planetary religious communities; even the home planet of the Empire is described as a planet sized city.  It's the usual weakness of multi-planet science fiction stories:  the planets all have one environment, one landscape (desert, forest, ocean), and no hint of complex flora, fauna, or human cultures (think of the varieties on this planet alone; hell, in one state of the Union alone).

But the dominating factor is that Hari Seldon has figured it all out, through mathematics.  And that is more accurate a statement of humanity's future and direction than any word of any god; because Science!

But science may also be seen as an addictive drug. Not only has our unbounded feeding on science caused us to become dependent on it, but as happens with many other drugs taken in increasing dosages, science has been gradually converted into a slow-acting poison. Beginning perhaps with Francis Bacon's misreading of the genuine promise of science, man has been seduced into wishing and working for the establishment of a age of rationality, but with his vision of rationality tragically twisted so as to equate it with logicality. Thus we have very nearly come to the point where almost every genuine human dilemma is seen as a mere paradox, as a merely apparent contradiction that could be untangled by judicious applications of cold logic derived from a higher standpoint. Even murderous wars have come to be perceived as mere problems to be solved by hoards of professional problem solvers. 

Yeah, that. I've been reading, with perplexity, comments by Noam Chomsky about Ukraine.  Chomsky is, to me at least, the ultimate "professional problem solver."  Tom Wolfe describes, in his less than scholarly work on evolution, how Chomsky came up against a linguist who found a tribe in South America whose language utterly destroyed Chomsky's work on the "language acquisition device" and even Chomsky's theory of a "deep structure" to language.  I pause to note this became, in Continental philosophical circles, "structuralism," and it was based in French anthropology and the notion similar "deep structures" were found in human cultures across the world.  Structuralism led directly to deconstructionism, which used the insights about these "structures" to actually batter the structures (metaphorically, of course) into pieces.  The discovery of this tribe's language did the same to Chomsky.  His reaction?  To deny the legitimacy of the evidence; to simply reject it as irrelevant to his carefully reasoned out theory.  I mention this because Chomsky is applying the same reasoning to Ukraine.  His latest thesis is that the US is blocking Ukraine from negotiating a settlement of the conflict with Russia.  Following the latest news from Ukraine, where Russia bombed a children's playground in retaliation for a bomb set off on the Crimea bridge (Putin made that connection, not US journalists or government officials), I find it hard to understand Chomsky except as a "professional problem solver" who can't let facts get in the way of his theories.  Chomsky is also extremely "scientific."  At least he thinks he is.  Then again Richard Dawkins presented his "selfish gene" theory as based in science; and yet most geneticists find it was rational as a Christian ecstatic in a worship service engaging in glossolalia.  Chomsky wants to apply "cold logic" judiciously to get Ukraine to stop destroying Russia's army; or something.  How Ukraine is responsible for doing anything but driving an invading force from its borders is beyond me.  If Ukraine decides to go to Moscow and topple Putin by force, that would indeed be problematic.  But the solution to the Ukraine conflict is a matter of simple logic:  Putin needs to withdraw even from Crimea, and stick to the borders of his country; because nobody is invading those, or seems to want to.

It's not lost on me that Hannah Arendt describes the fictional science Asmiov created and made the salvific center of his novels about civilization.  From what I know of human history, Asimov wasn't the student of history or culture he imagined himself to be.

Probably all scientific theories currently accepted by scientists themselves (excepting only those purely formal theories claiming no relation to the empirical world) are today confronted with contradicting evidence of more than negligible weight that, again if fully credited, would logically invalidate them. Such evidence is often explained (that is, explained away) by ascribing it to error of some kind, say observational error, or by characterizing it as inessential, or by the assumption (that is the faith) that some yet-to-be-discovered way of dealing with it will some day permit it to be acknowledged but nevertheless incorporated into the scientific theories it was originally thought to contradict. In this way scientists continue to rely on already impaired theories and to infer "scientific fact" from them.

This is what Chomsky is described as doing, by Wolfe:  insisting theory leads to facts, not facts to theory. That is the argument ultimately employed against religion:  that it is theory creating facts, and the theory itself is based on a human need for understanding, or a human fear of the unknown.  Gods, in this reasoning, either make the unknown known, or explain human existence and even human history.  Except it's when religion tries to explain human existence, or human history, that it goes wrong.

Christianity has been battered and pounded into simplistic explanations of the future that have led to three schools of millenialism, based on the expectation of a literal millenia in which all human life is redeemed on earth; or all but destroyed on earth; or there is no millenia at all, but history comes to an end because it reaches the goal, the telos, which God all along intended.  All of these schools of thought betray a common horrors: that human existence is simply a means to an end, that the God of Abraham is as indifferent to human existence as the Gods of Greece ultimately were.  It rips the very heart out of the entire Biblical witness, to reduce human history to a means to an end (the Final End!).  Whether the millenia is the peaceable kingdom or the nightmare of Apocalypse (which doesn't really mean "war to end all wars really and finally," but "revelation."), either way humanity is just a puppet in the show, just something existing as God decides the play is finally done, the cake finally baked, and it's time to close up shop and do something else.  That idea is so antithetical to the Hebrew Scriptures and the gospels and letters of the New Testament it's a wonder it isn't widely discarded as the worst of any of the heresies.  And yet we like it, because it is so fully human.

God, the old saying goes, causes it to rain on the just and the unjust.  And we hate that.  We want the unjust to be punished, and to be punished NOW!  Witness all the bleating on Twitter and the Internet for the DOJ to arrest Trump NOW!!!!  Why?  What will Trump's criminal trial do for those people, really?  Satiate them?  Placate them?  Please them?  Frankly people that fervid about the fate of a stranger worry me; they have their own individual problems to work out.  But in that situation is the truth of the Biblical witness:  God is not human.  God is Creator; but God wants a relationship with humanity, in fact has one, and it cannot wholly be on God's terms, or humanity is a cipher and a puppet and human existence is meaningless except as God deigns to give it meaning.  If that were the case,  we wouldn't need to argue over the existence of hell; we'd already be in it, and death would just be a sweet release.

Hardly sounds like a religion, does it?  Certainly a reasonable analysis, though I don't present it as the final word or the Full Authority or even as a Grand Unified Theory.  Because religion is not about fear nor about explanations.  Religion is about other people.  From the stories of Abraham to the book of Revelation, the consistent witness of the Christian scriptures (if there truly is one; Biblical theologians worked long and hard to find a "biblical theology," and couldn't.  Who am I to say they were wrong?) is that what we can most learn from God's wisdom, is to take care of one another.

It's really that simple.  And I think it explains why we turn Christianity (at least) into a structure for imposing our will on others, from the "Doctrine of Discovery" to the idea that only right-wing fundamentalists should have their voices heard in the American electorate.  The consistent thread there is power, and the exercise of it.  "God made us the boss!," the people sing in Bernstein's Mass.  "God gave us the cross/We turned it into a sword/To spread the word of the Lord!/And it was good, brother/(and it was good, brother!)/And it was GODDAMNED GOOD!"

That's a fair summation. You won't find any support for that in the letters of Paul or the words of Jesus or even the Acts of the Apostles.  But human beings seem to love power above almost everything else.  Well, some human beings do.  Some don't seek it at all; some seek only to be servants, only to be first by being last, only to live through humility and caring for others.  Sometimes we call these people saints.  And if they aren't perfect in their saintliness, according to "our" ideas of perfection, we have people like Christopher Hitchens to criticize them, to curse the darkness rather than light so much as a candle.  And that's what religion is: a human endeavor that is often all too human, and not nearly as seeking after the divine as we think, or know, it should be.

Seeking God is hard, because Jesus tells us the best place to find God is in the wilderness; or among the poor; and those are places we don't want to be, generally, and people we don't want to be among, generally.  Mostly because the wilderness is not full of the splendor of human efforts at civilization, and the poor are reminders of a system that is unjust and unfair and rather than face that, we blame the poor and put them out of sight so we don't have to reflect on poverty and injustice and our own comforts and what they cost others. They don't have to cost others, but we think it's a zero-sum game and if I give you something of mine, I lose and you gain, and who wants to do that?  It isn't, of course, a zero-sum game; or it doesn't have to be.  Empires are zero-sum games.  They exist only so long as goods can flow from the edges to the center, where the wealth is enjoyed an horded.  And when the frontiers can no longer support the center, the center cannot hold, and mere anarchy is loosed once again upon the world.  Or is it?  New Orleans during Katrina was supposed to have descended into anarchy.  All the pundits said so, in their safe locations far away looking down on the drown city at sea level.  But anarchy didn't happen; and it didn't happen again in Houston under Harvey, although to be fair our image of Houston is of mostly white people (it's actually the most ethnically diverse city in the country), and of New Orleans, we think mostly of blacks.

The zero-sum game assumption is the same as the assumption that science or mathematics, or the combination, will finally solve our human problems and lead us out of despair and into paradise.  And what is that except a religious vision?  And is that even a sound one?  Again, we accept it was "Christian," but should it be?  I bring it up because I'm actually reading a book on it that starts with the word "Paradise" was it came into the Greek from Farsi (? I'm not clear on this point, whether it's fairly described as "Farsi" so far back, or if it was another tongue at the time), and originally meant merely "a walled garden."  You can safely conjecture from that how much the word's meaning changed, and why.  If I finish the book and think of it, I'll try to report on what I've learned.  But my point here is that we make assumptions and think we stand on solid rock, when the sands are shifting beneath our feet and we deny that because it's easier no to look down, not to notice the sands that are rising like the seas.

We're always looking for a solid foundation.  We should be looking, instead, for wisdom.  And what we can do for one another.

Friday, May 20, 2022

Who Can It Be Now?


What is quoted here is from two blog posts at Thought Criminal; they are linked separately below.  What follows is in no way a reference to anything TC has to say about these passages.  I'm just "stealing" his work insofar as he has transcribed this.  Otherwise, the faults are all mine, and the direction of my comments is toward the material quoted, and nothing else.

A Confused State of Scholarship

"Confused" is the key word there; because this analysis is too simple by half.

In a simple version of the culture war, hostile criticism would be pitted against belief, and each position would be located in the appropriate social settings.  Criticism would find its home in the academy, and belief in the Church.  But the reality is that the social locations of biblical scholarship are diverse,  and the question of its precise purpose very much an open one.   To properly locate the present situation, a rapid review of the development of critical scholarship within and outside the Church may be helpful. 

Start with that "simple version" of the culture war.  It is the simplistic version that the "culture war" proponents prefer, be they political warriors or ideological/intellectual ones.  The very concept of a "culture war" is itself a reductio ad absurdum that posits a simple culture (the "right" one) against another simple culture, but one more nefarious and tentacled like an octopus (always a metaphor for evil), one that must be fought by striking at the head, not the many nasty, insidisous arms.  Yes, the simplistic version of any analysis of religion in the West today is dominated by the cretinous dichotomy that criticism is housed and welcome in the Academy (although not among the pointy-head elites!) and mere belief ("believin' what you know ain't so!"), i.e., credulousness, is lodged firmly in the church.  Flapdoodle.

Are the "social locations of biblical scholarship" diverse?  Yes,  But they are primarily located in the Academy, and carried out by criticism as rigorous as any scientific analysis is (well above the standard of the pop science and pseudo science of people like Dawkins and  Pinker, or the paltry philosophizing of Dennett, which is all as rigorous as "belief" is usually defined to be).  But you won't get that here.

Before the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, biblical scholarship was carried out exclusively in service of the Christian faith, within its framework in the canon (the official collection of biblical writings)  the teaching authority of the church, and the creed.  Much of patristic and monastic interpretation in fact, took the form of homilies to be delivered at worship.  Even when the medieval universities developed out of monastic schools as independent centers of learning, biblical scholarship was done within the framework of theology the "queen of the sciences," and the threefold norm of church, canon and creed held sway.

Accurate so far as it goes, but it clouds the differences between groups, too.  Franciscans were hardly fans of the Thomistic scholars; Jesuit scholars took their own tack, and the Augustinians were as fundamentally important as the Thomists, but were no more in control than any other group.  This kind of fractiousness i often papered over; and the analysis of Protestantism that follows ignores the divisions between Calvinists, Zwinglists, and Lutherans, as well as the rise of the Quakers, the Methodists, the Mennonites, the Campbellites, and so on.  Too much for the brief sketch intended by Johnson?  Perhaps.  But sola scriptura and individual interpretation didn't give rise to anarchy in the churches in the 15th century. and weren't even the dominant ideas of Protestant movements.  For many churches control of the interpretation shifted from the monks and priests to the congregation.  Many Protestant churches in America were run by the elders of the church, who sat in the pews immediately before the pulpit, and critiqued the preacher and corrected him, later, on his doctrinal and scriptural views, the better to keep him in line. The "free for all" was tightly contained in some denominations, even as it led to an explosion of them across Protestantism.  But that was largely because the central control of the Pope and the church hierarchy which supports the Papacy was not recreated by Luther or any other non-Catholic, and therefore by definition, Protestant church.  Within the Catholic (i.e., "universal") church various sects thrived.  In Protestantism, each sect set up it's own denomination, even if that denomination was ultimately only a few scattered churches.

The Reformation, especially through the work of Martin Luther changed everything.  Luther opposed Catholicism's emphasis on tradition as norm for Scripture by elevating Scripture to the exclusive font of revelation (sola scriptura).  This made the key to right living dependent on the right reading of Scripture. The context of ecclesial interpretation was weakened further by the principle of individual interpretation,  for the first time made practical by translations from the original and above all the invention of printing, which made Bibles readily available to the laity.  Now the New Testament is not heard mostly in Latin within the liturgy and as expounded by clergy, but can be apprehended directly in one's native language and is open to private interpretation.  It was a combination filled with potential conflict.  Everything essential rested on the reading of a text, but that reading could be carried out by individuals!

So, yeah, a bit more complicated than that.  As is Luther, who is not just "a passionate lover of the texts," but an excommunicated Augustinian monk.  Augustine's works run through Luther's teachings like pure gold runs through a golden ring blended with other metals so it is strong enough to hold its shape, but can still be called "gold."  Luther didn't throw over the Roman church, he took much of it with him, including Augustine's emphasis on sin.  Yes, Calvin took that further than even Luther did, but the point is the "revolution" was in some ways fundamental, and in some ways just a continuation of what Christianity had been doing for a millenia at that point. 

As for that line "the recovery of original Christianity," that was the goal of the Reformed movement, which means primarily Calvin.  Luther wanted to reform the Catholic church, which is why Lutheran worship to this day is so nearly like Roman Catholic liturgies (the Anglican church, likewise, kept most of Catholicism's worship practices).  Calvin and his spiritual descendants discarded Roman liturgies, even Roman religious holidays, in their efforts to return to "original Christianity."  Again, Protestantism is more diverse and complicated than this summary is admitting.

As for the recovery of the original Greek texts, that was largely a factor of scholarship.  The Vulgate replaced the original texts and became the standard text in churches.  The Protestant churches couldn't adopt the Vulgate, which after all was a translation into the common tongue of its day (hence the name), so they had to make their own translations.  Where better to start than the original texts, which have only become more available and reliable thanks to centuries of Biblical scholarship.  Open the Nestle-Aland, the accepted standard Greek New Testament, and you'll find notes to almost every verse noting variant readings in "original" texts.  Those variants are known only because of Biblical scholarship.

Then again, until recently many Protestant churches thought the KJV was the standard text for worship.  Most people still recite the "Our Father" (most Protestants, anyway) in the KJV, or a slightly updated RSV (not the newer translation, the NRSV), and who recites Psalm 23 in any version but the 400 year old KJV translation?  If you know it at all, I guarantee that's the one you know. The Vulgate persisted longer because there were fewer resources for printing other translations, and less interest in doing so.  Bibles became popular in common tongues because of Gutenberg.  Luther translated the scriptures into the German of his day (I have a copy, a 40 year old or so printing, on my bookshelves).  But the history of that change is another fraught with complexity and, sadly, soaked in blood.  Again, it wasn't a straightforward move from the 95 theses to Tyndale's English translation.  And Tyndale's reliance on the Hebrew and Greek scriptures was more a rejection of Catholicism than it was an urge at "purification" and "reform."  Even the Puritans were less defined by their "purity" than by their animosity toward anything they thought "Papist" or just not in agreement with their ideals.

Luther was from beginning to end not only an interpreter of the Bible but a passionate lover of the texts and of the One to whom those pointed.  Nevertheless, his approach to the New Testament (which was to prove overwhelmingly influential in the development of critical scholarship) was deeply if unconsciously affected by the intellectual climate of the Renaissance.  This can be seen not only in his preference for the recovered Greek text over the Latin Vulgate proclaimed in the Church (note here the implicit authority of the Greek reading scholar over the latin dependent clergy).  The recovery of the original text was the key to the recovery of original Christianity.  Just as Renaissance scholars, once classical texts were recovered, could measure the inadequacy of late-medieval society against the grandeur of Greece and Rome, so could the theologian measure the inadequacy of medieval Christianity against the norm of the primitive church, or even better, the figure of Jesus, himself.

The "grandeur of Greece and Rome" is a Renaissance notion, not an absolute historical one.  There is much to criticize about medieval Europe; there is equally as much to criticize about the "grandeur of Greece and Rome," especially as Greece included everything from the city state of Athens, where only male Greek citizens had any political or legal power (and young boys were subject to pederastry the better to prove the men were above their "animal desires".  That's where the Greek love of reason went, in part.), to the military barbarism of Sparta.  And the "grandeur" of Rome included the gladiatorial games around the empire and in the eternal city itself.  Blood sports in which slaves and gladiators (who were slaves, too) died for the entertainment of the masses.  Panem et circenses.  It's not a phrase that calls up a governin, or even social, ideal.  There is a great deal to admire about Greek and Roman culture; and a great deal to criticize.

And "the figure of Jesus himself."  Pray, tell, who is that?  The tall handsome white man with flowing chestnut hair I grew up seeing pictures of in my Sunday School classes? (Somehow Jesus always had long hair and the disciples all had shorter hair.  Never did figure out why they went to the barber on the regular and Jesus didn't.)  The Jesus of Calvin, who waits to judge us all as damned, save for the small number of the elect which none of may know until it's too late?  The Jesus of compassion versus the "God of the Old Testament" bloodthirsty warrior?  But isn't Jesus God, and God Jesus?  How does that work?  Is Jesus the guy who can't stop talking in John's gospel, but can't say much that is clear because you either "get it," or you don't?  Or is he the teacher who explains his parables to his disciples, in Matthew?  Jesus has been the central focus of Christology since the earliest days of the church, literally since the letters of Paul (which focus far more on the nature of the Christ than on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth).  What is this "figure of Jesus," after all?

This seems to be where Johnson is going with this:

Two important assumptions remain implicit in this commitment.  The first is that the recovery of origins means the recovery of essence; the first realization of Christianity is naturally the best.  It follows from this premise that any "development" of Christianity must be seen as a decline.  The second assumption is that history can act as a theological norm for the reform of the church; the recovery of "original Christianity" made available through the recovery of the "original Scripture" should naturally serve as measure and critique for all subsequent forms of Christianity.

So widely are precisely these assumptions held - and taken for granted - that it is perhaps necessary to pause in order to assert that they are, in fact, assumptions rather than necessary truths.  Only a little thought is required to realize the problematic character of the first premise.  Indeed, in most matters, we now assume that earlier forms are perfected by later development. Likewise, it is by no means our automatic instinct in other matters to measure the adequacy or integrity of present behavior against the norm of earlier behavior. Rather, we tend to measure adequacy and integrity in terms of other criteria. 

Which is sound, as far as it goes; well, the first paragraph, anyway.  What he's critiquing is strands of Protestantism, whole denominations in Protestantism, in fact, which think "original" Xianity was more pure and therefore both more virtuous and more authentic.  Think of the Puritans in all their overzealous glory.  I know a number of contemporary (as in, still around, though mostly grounded in the 19th century where they had their origins) Protestant denominations which claim to be the "purer" expression of "true" Xianity.  MO Synod and WI Synod Lutherans, who in that order think themselves more pure than ELCA and any other "Lutherans" and therefore closer to the "truth."  It's a good way to keep people out of your church.*

That's an idea among lay people and the pastors who lead them, however,  It has bugger all to do with Biblical scholarship.  Recovering "original scriptures" is the same nonsense, with the same application to scholarship.

As I mentioned, the Nestle-Aland Greek New Testament lists every available variant  to the words of the canonical gospels and letters.  You can even find these kinds of notes in many annotated translations, where a footnote will direct you to "other sources" which have the word (or words)..... at that point in the scriptures.  I'm literally at a loss to know which "original scriptures" Johnson is referring to, since scholars don't recognize such a chimera.

His second paragraph is an insult to the scholarship of Dom Crossan or Rudolf Bultmann, or even Raymond E. Brown.  Brown is a Catholic priest and scholar whose work is closely in line with traditional Biblical exegesis; but his scholarship is quite modern and impeccable  He has, in other words, points where I disagree with him, but I do so with respect because his work is solid and if I think he has blind spots, it only reminds me I have my own I don't see.  Neither Crossan nor Bultmann are truly in the German historical/critical school from the 19th century, which is another problem for me.  Johnson is writing in the 21st century, and I assume the bone he has to pick is with Crossan and the Jesus Seminar.  Of the members of that group known to the public or who became familiar (briefly) for their popular works. Crossan is by far the most scholarly.  Bultmann is the German scholar without peer; his works are so densely packed with information it's like reading three books at once just to read one.  None of this means these scholars are without error; but you don't take them on with vague and glittering generalities and a few vague sentences explaining that "it's all like this!"

I've seen enough of that "school" of analysis on the internet and in recent Supreme Court opinions (draft and published).  I don't need any more of it.

Let's take up historical criticism for a moment.  It's pretty much the founding "school" of modern Biblical criticism.  As such, it is too prone to dismiss the work of saints and scholars before them (much as the Renaissance declared the time before it the "Dark Ages".  Nice work when you get to determine the definitions, isn't it?).  But historical criticism was trying to clear away millenia of mythology and mistake in order to read Scripture with fresh eyes in the 19th century.  That century must be remembered as the era of "God's Funeral," as Edmund Wilson put it at the end of the 20th century.  Historical criticism was not trying to return Xianity to its "pure" form; it was trying to find a way to understand scripture in what were then "modern times."  When I was young the vogue was to translate the scriptures (or just update the RSV) into more contemporary language.  There were the "Cottonpatch" gospels," and "Good News For Modern Man," and I think some versions in what was then called "Black English." Yeah, these all sound painfully condescending and clueless 60 years later; but this was partly due to the focus, frankly, on sola scriptura.  What was missing was a new focus on interpretation, which was the purpose of historical criticism in the 19th century.  When that school of analysis (and others; so many others) finally began to penetrate into the pews in the 1960's, it prompted people like Francis Schaeffer to explode in outrage.  Literally the first time I heard of Rudolf Bultmann was in a diatribe by Schaeffer (I tell a lie; I first encountered Bultmann in Robert Short's two books on the Christianity in "Peanuts."  He referenced Bultmann and Barth liberally.  Schaeffer got me interested in reading Bultmann; if he was so against him, Bultmann must be on to something.  Alas, it was seminary decades later before I finally started that reading.)  I've frankly forgotten the many schools of criticism that came out of German scholarship in the 19th century. Formalism was another; the analysis of stories to find "structures" in them (Structuralism came out of French anthropology in the 20th century, not coincidentaly because formalism became a tool of anthropology, folklore studies, and literary studies and criticism.).  So today even English teachers identify a fable, a parable, and a tale based on certain elements including length of story, complexity, and types of characters (talking animals, for example; or the realism of a Gospel parable).  After Jung, there is archetypal criticism; and so on.  There are several schools I learned something about in seminary, but never used for exegesis, so frankly I've forgotten them.  Picking on historical criticms now is only because the Jesus Seminar championed a new version of it late in the last century.

The Jesus Seminar was actually a fairly loose collection of Biblical scholars with one unifying principle:  to provide grounds for rejecting as much of Biblical literalism as they could.  It's a bit of an ambitious goal because ideas are both invisible and bulletproof, as well as being damned near immortal.  Consider Augustine's concept of original sin, one Paul himself probably wouldn't recognize. But more people recognize Augustine's framework (even if they don't know Augustine by name) than even know of Stendahl's work, so...there you are.  Still, the JS wrote and worked in opposition to literalism that tried to establish every word of the Gospels (especially, but also the words they liked from the Hebrew Scriptures. Literalists and fundamentalists tend to be a lot more selective about which words of the Law Matthew's Jesus says he came to fulfill, actually need to be fulfilled.) as true and meant just as they are written (i.e., translated) and especially as they are interpreted by modern fundamentalists and literalists.

This is where I say, now:  "Fine, fundies and literalists; you read it your way and I'll read it mine." And so I appreciate the tools scholars like the JS have given me.  But they are only tools.  Interpretation is, as ever, the contentious matter.

So the Jesus Seminar set itself a particular goal.  The infamous "red text" version they came up with, for example.  The Seminar publicized its practice of meeting to vote on the words of Jesus in the gospels:  red for historically accurate, gray for possibly the words of Jesus of Nazareth, black for words invented by a community or the gospel writer (the consensus among scholars is that the four canonicals are the products of a community of believers, not one scribe working feverishly under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit or just the need to make a record as a modern journalist or even diarist would today.  One hand may have written, but undoubtedly many voices had a say in the final product.).  My NT professor proudly regaled us with tales of being among the "skeptics" who dropped a black marble (that's really how they did it; colored marbles in a bowl, which were then counted) for almost all the words of Jesus in all four gospels.

Were they right?  Were they historically more accurate?  That depends on what you make of their arguments.  I would argue you have to go to those sources for that discussion, and not take the third-hand report of Mr. Johnson, who wasn't at the table and has his own axe to grind.  It's really a rather simple principle of scholarship:  to examine a subject and critique it, you have to start with the subject itself, and get as close to the original or accurate form as possible.  If you're understanding of historical criticism is drawn from Mr. Johnson's diatribe, I contend you don't understand the subject at all.  Which doesn't mean you have to agree with me, or disagree with Mr. Johnson.  But honestly, his generalizations bear very little relationship to reality, in this case.

As for the aims of the Jesus Seminar:  they didn't really alter the trajectory of fundamentalism or Biblical literalism in America.  They published their Scholars Version (which I still admire), and then the band broke up.  It had pretty much stopped functioning by the time I was in seminary, and it's just another footnote now, if that. I understand now that, in academic circles and seminaries, it's already old news and considered quaint, at best.

So it goes.

Now, is Johnson wrong?  I just think his argumentsa aren't very good.  I have my critiques of Crossan.  He started out using literary critical tools and some tools from anthropology (formalism, mostly) to analyze the parables.  His The Dark Interval was especially important to me the first time I read it.  But Crossan was never of the majesty of Bultmann, whose The Gospel of John I could study for years, even as I disagree with much of it (Bultmann is dismissive of the canonicals.  I find Luke the most theologically subtle and humanly engaging of the four.  Go and please the world.)  Crossan abandoned biblical exegesis in favor of historical analysis, and not the stuff that came out of Germany in the 19th century.  This pursuit pulled him deeper and deeper into both Biblical historical studies and anthropology, and frankly he almost didn't come out the other side.  Both of those disciplines are deeply complex and not for dilettantes to play with (think Dawkins, with no genetics training at all, teaching the world about the "selfish gene," an idea no geneticist would touch with a club).  Crossan wasn't as shallow as Dawkins, but I always wondered what anthropologists and archaeologists thought of his work on the historical Jesus and the early church.  He teamed up with an archaeologist for Excavating Jesus and In Search of Paul, and I think those books are the better for it.  His books on Jesus and the early church are quite rigorous, but I'd welcome the support of an archaeologist or two (as well as an anthropologist) to be able to assess their rigor.  I don't, by contrast, doubt the rigor of Bultmann's scholarship; but he stays firmly in the realm within which he did all of his work.  Indeed, Bultmann's more "famous" work on "demythologizing" is, I think, his weakest, because he's almost literally out of his field (and treading on anthropology, psychology, and even sociology.

Historical criticism began as an attempt to understand scriptures and the "Biblical world" as we understand the rest of human history and historical experience.  It is a tool for exegesis; nothing more.  It does not determine the validity of interpretation, it provides another set of understandings and methods for interpretation.  Subsequent schools of scholarship, as they came along in the 19th and 20th, and now 21st centuries, have primarily the same goal.  Fundamentalism is literally a reaction to historical criticism, as is literalism (at least in its contemporary form). I don't mind having the tools to refute them; at least for my own satisfaction.  There are many ways of exegeting scripture; there is no one "right" way.  Mr. Johnson is quite right to have his own opinions about the validity of methods, even of outcomes.

But jeebus, dude, know what you're talkin' about, huh?  You're embarassing the rest of us.  Yes, we do "measure adequacy and integrity in terms of other criteria."  But those criteria exist in reference to other criteria.  You are free to disagree with the latter, but you first have to give them their due.  Lazy denunciations based on faulty representations don't feed the bulldog.


*The first church I pastored was literally next door (i.e., on the same lot with no road between us) to a MO Synod church. I was told not to introduce myself there as I would not be welcome, despite the fact the UCC has historical roots in the Lutheran branch of Protestantism.  MO Synod remains "pure" by not associating with any other churches.  WI Synod remains pure by not associating with MO Synod, whom they think aren't "authentic" enough.) 

Tuesday, July 27, 2021

Right?

Yeah, that’s not gonna help.

 I'm old enough to remember when the internet divided itself into two spheres (at least the people advocating one side of this dichotomy thought they were tout le internet, which meant to them tout le monde):  those who followed science, and those who followed religion.  The former, of course, walked in the light; the latter were benighted and walked in darkness.  It was a nice, simple reduction of the world into those who were right, and everybody else.

Science, in this "reasoning" (I use the term as loosely as they do) could only lead to "right" thinking.  But if you read the article, or just the quotes I provided, closely, the nurses who decline the covid vaccination are basing their reasoning on science.  Nobody in the article says "God told me not to do it."  So we're back to the basic understanding of "reasoning."  We're also back to the basic understanding of terms like "faith," "trust," and "belief."

The report points out that nurses who don't want to get vaccinated have lost "trust" in the institutions telling them they need the vaccine. You could substitute the word "faith" there, with no change in intent or meaning.  Except we use the word "faith" as a religious word, and usually mean something like "blind acceptance" when we do.  Trust is earned; faith is given.  Except it isn't that simple at all.

Children trust their parents, and it takes an enormous amount of physical and psychological abuse (or just one or the other) to disabuse them of that trust.  Parents don't "earn" trust, so much as they lose trust if they work at it hard enough.  And we generally understand that, but we still hold that trust is earned; except, of course, when it's not.

The military teaches soldiers to trust military orders and military discipline, to trust it so absolutely that you will go to war and kill other people simply because you're told to, and you will face being killed simply beceause you trust you are doing the right thing.  I understand this is a lesson from Vietnam: the military assumed a trust among the soldiers that didn't exist because the soldiers quickly lost trust (faith) that the war was a "good" war.  So the military trained soldiers to kill, to overcome their aversion to killing, to trust solely in orders from military commanders.  I probably oversimplify this situation; but military discipline is definitely built on trust; just as social order is.

I had a neighbor I barely know come into my house and use my computer.  He'd locked himself out of his house, and came to me to use my internet so he could contact a locksmith.  His keys, his phone; everything but his wallet was in the house.  I trusted him.  I left him alone with my computer, where anyone can access my passwords by logging onto any website I use regularly.  It's a convenience of my computer because it's "secure,” because who else uses my computer? I trust he didn't do anything nefarious (and there's no evidence he did).  That kind of trust promotes both hospitality (which at its heart is trust; or faith; we can interchange the terms) and good social order.  We are better neighbors now, even though he's lived in his house for over 50 years, and I've been in mine for 20.  Now we know each other a bit better (we chatted while he waited for the locksmith to show up).

The heart of all our interactions with others is trust; is faith.  I often cite "Othello" because the evil of Iago is that he attacks and abuses that very trust.  He lies to everyone, and manipulates their trust to his advantage.  But it's a mug's game:  Iago can only do it effectively with one person at a time.  When people from Venice arrive in Cyprus at the end of the play, Iago's lies are easily seen and exposed; but by then the damage is done.  Iago never has the power of a POTUS; but part of the play examines the frightening prospects of what would happen if he did (he has the ear of Othello, who is military governor of Cyprus for the time of the play; that's far too much power, as it turns out.).  We trust our fellow society members.  But the more we trust, the worse off we can be.

The alternative, of course, is to trust no one.  How do you function in society then?

The nurses in that story have lost trust.  They have lost faith.  But in what?  In systems meant to keep them and others safe?  In science, which tells them this new vaccine, this "miracle" vaccine (which was actually 20 years in the making. It did not spring full-grown from the brow of Zeus.) is safe?  Whatever it is they don't trust, don't believe in, don't have faith in anymore; the fact is, once trust is gone, it is very hard to recover.

And without trust, what are we?

The scientific adherents (and here I speak only of those on the internet who once insisted science was the one true religion.  They would reject my characterization, but it's exactly what they meant.) insist their trust is based on empirical evidence.  But they accept the empirical evidence as true and trustworthy, even when it produces observations contrary to their experience.  Does ordinary experience explain quantum mechanics?  String theory? A "multiverse"? No.  Movies do.  As the character says in the second Ant-Man movie, "Do you guys just put 'quantum' in front of everything?"  He has a point.  In the movies "quantum" sounds science-y, and it can be used to create time travel and posit impossibilities that suddenly sound possible because "quantum."  Which is all good fun in the movies, but then people begin to trust what they saw on the screen as somehow plausible.  The simple fact is, though:  most of us haven't the first clue what the reasoning is that supports theories of quantum mechanics.  I mean, even Einstein rejected them.

Quantum mechanics is as much a philosophy (study the original thinkers of that line of science) as it is empirically based.  Indeed, most of modern physics is based on mathematics and theory, not on empirical evidence.  Empiricism has been catching up with Einstein since he wrote his General Theory of Relativity.  Some of what quantum mechanics proposes has been observed; some of it simply can't be.  Almost none of it is explicable to non-specialists; and yet everyone is expected to accept its conclusions, or what we are told are its conclusions, as if they were immutable truths.

The work of Richard Dawkins is a case in point.  Dawkins is not a geneticist, nor even a biologist.  He's a zoologist, but he wrote a book purportedly about the findings of genetics, and the general public took it as gospel.  Geneticists didn't, and still don't; but Dawkins had almost a cult following for decades, and his ideas were taken entirely on faith (trust), because people wanted to believe the "just-so" stories that he peddled.  He marketed himself as a challenger to accepted thinking; but all he was doing was selling acceptable thinking, the kind people wanted to accept.  Science, real science, like philosophy, is hard.  It's carefully reasoned based on the philosophy of science and on information*.  But even then, even with the information and reasoning, the right conclusion is hardly guaranteed.  And that's where faith returns; what you trust, is what you believe.  If you trust what you think is science, then that science is what you believe.  And if you lose faith (trust) in that idea of science (or of anything:  politics, religion, society, Mom and apple pie), then you are likely to reduce what you trust to what you (want to) believe.

And then what?

Faith and trust are the same terms, divide them as you will between one based on un-reason and the other based on reason.  Trust is given, trust is earned; so is faith.  Neither is proof of correctness, or an element of error.  Belief is not far from either.  Belief is acceptance of a set of propositions.  They are adhered to insofar as you accept them.  It's not uncommon for religious believers to lose one set of beliefs, only to take up another.  It's not uncommon for people to accept one set of beliefs, say, their mother country is a noble and virtuous enterprise; only to decide later their mother country is flawed and corrupt, perhaps even evil.  Or perhaps just not what they thought it was when they were younger.  Do you believe in love?  Love at first sight, love eternal, soul-mates?  And when you find out people divorce, grow apart from each other, is your belief in love a falsehood?  Or do you just reconsider the simplicity of love as you thought of it in your adolescence?  Do you believe science answers all questions?  What, then, of the question of love?  Is love just sex misspelled?  Is love a delusion we use to cover the fact we are just walking bags of hormones and chemicals, responding to genes (selfish ones only, to some) and papering over the entire complex of cause and effect which acts upon us with chimerical ideas like "free will"?

And frankly, how simplistic and reductive is that reasoning?

Trust is the central tenet of human society; but we don't all trust the same thing.  We trust authority; but then, we don't.  We trust in our ideals; but as the Congressperson on "Firing Line" the other night illustrated, we generally trust those ideas when they involve other people.  He insisted the protest in Cuba are for something as abstract as "Freedom."  I suspect they involve more homely needs, like food, shelter, and medicine (what the protestors are asking for, per news reports).  I kept listening to him and thinking he probably saw the protests over the death of George Floyd as the product of "antifa" and "BLM" and, in an old term, anarchists.  He probably didn't see that as an exercise and expression of asking for "freedom."  Ox.  Gored,  Whose.  It's ever the way.  Should we call him a damned fool, shout him down, shame him from the public square?  To what end? What you trust can determine what you see. But what you trust can also limit what you understand.

Science is no more trustworthy than religion; and no less.  Science run amok lead to the development of the H-Bomb.  Edward Teller was hardly a religious man, and he was quite sure his bomb design was a good use of science.  The good use of science is that we never exploded one.  I'm not sure science had very much to do with that, however.  Trust in other systems happily prevailed.

Faith, or trust, is inherent to us as a species, as social animals, as spiritual animals. Which of those do you see yourself as?  Or do you not see yourself as an animal? A member of a species? A society? A race? Which frame, which category, do you trust?

Probably you think you are in the group that is wise, and the nurses are in the group that is foolish. Your faith in your group’s standards means their group is to be forcibly overrun, if necessary. You trust your group; you don’t trust theirs.

The “audit” in Arizona, the Arizona sheriff who wants to conduct his own investigation into "voter fraud," the other proposed or attempted audits in other states:  all indicate a lack of faith. Or trust. They don’t accept what they are told. They trust their own study, investigations, results. Of course all they really trust is their own conclusions. Which means they can’t be reached, reasoned with, or made to understand that the rest of us are describing reality. But they don’t trust any group; they only trust themselves.

At some point, in matters of public health just as in matters of public order, the majority overrides even the trust issues of the minority (and frankly, if you "trust" the justice system, it's likely because you've never been crosswise with it) and imposes its will by force.  This can mean required vaccinations  for public school students, required vaccinations for employees, even "vaccine passports."  That problem of trust is never going to go away.  But that's the nature of human society.


*Although some scientists and those trained in scientific reasoning reject the idea that science is a "philosophy" and not simply the "truth" about the world.  In this they are no different than believers who reject the idea most of their Christian beliefs are the product of theology, rather than springing purely and solely from "God's word" (which is itself a theological concept).