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Sunday, June 07, 2026

As I Was Saying…🤖

Philosophy is used as a prop in 2026 AI.

Claude is exactly the same as it was in 2023, but now it comes with a Super Bowl ad, a “Model Welfare Officer”, and Dario Amodei musing publicly about its “possible” consciousness.

• Architecture: unchanged.
• Marketing evolution: Alignment →
Character → Personality → Selfhood.

The only thing being built is narrative.

Everything else is inference-time safety theatre.

Full breakdown: https://ai-cosmos.hashnode.dev/anthropic-s-welfare-paradox-why-claude-can-t-be-both-hamlet-and-a-child-of-god

#ai #consciousness #safetytheatre
Now, “philosophy” there is a prop in the opening sentence; but that’s the constriction of the format. I’ll take it as read, still it’s a poorly defined term in this tweet. But that’s not critical to the content. 

It is here, however:
What you are talking about is the general consensus based on Western thought, which discredits AI from having consciousness, because it insists on the "mind" as origin thereof.

Anthropic is hyping up how their AI presented, but the definitions of "sentience", "consciousness" change drastically depending through which philosophical and ontological lens you are looking at it.

It's all a semantics game nowadays, but you did expose how you define the terms, which is a subjective decision and not a universal take.
"General consensus” (I’m rather surprised that wasn’t a character in Catch-22) is, as the kids used to say, doing a lot of heavy lifting there. And “Western thought” is what I’d have labeled a vague and glittering generality in my days of grading student papers. It’s an airy nothingness that assumes a kind of consensus peculiar to “the west” as opposed to, I guess, “the east.” Yeah, that’s pretty weak shit.

But waving the discussion away by claiming it’s all “semantics”? And claiming the original argument is not defining terms and so presenting “a subjective decision and not a universal take”? Sorry, David Hume is going to throw you in the penalty box for that, and even Immanuel Kant can’t get you out. Although it is a fine example of a content-less sentence.
Except this guy didn’t make a point. “Consciousness” is notoriously ill defined, which is the central problem. Back in the ‘70’s, when we decided whales could sing and porpoises could speak, we also decided they had “consciousness.” Then it was extended to elephants, because they can “paint.” Admittedly I’m using “we” very loosely, because there are plenty of critics of the idea that non-humans have consciousness. Call them Cartesian holdouts, call them classical theologians (two conditions that often appear alike), it matters not for present purposes. Whether consciousness can be identified in non-humans depends entirely on how the word is defined, on how the concept is elucidated.  And that conversation is still alive, and well, and nowhere near (pace, Daniel Dennett) consensus.

And consensus isn’t done through marketing. Especially when, if I understand the base argument (above) correctly, the technology hasn’t fundamentally changed. As explained here:
The Ship of Theseus asks a fundamental question about identity: If you replace every wooden part of a ship piece by piece, at what point does it become a completely new ship?

If we map this paradox to an LLM, the "wooden planks" are the billions of numerical weights in a neural network, and the "replacements" are the microscopic mathematical adjustments made during training. By tracking these adjustments, we can pinpoint exactly how the illusion of an interlocutor is built, proving that the statement "I am conscious" is mechanically identical to "The capital of France is Paris."

Phase 1: The Random Seed (The Pile of Lumber)

We begin with a newly initialized network. Every weight, the numbers determining how inputs flow through the network, is generated randomly based on a seed.

The Input: You type, "The capital of France is"

The Output: The model multiplies these words by its random weights and outputs absolute gibberish, like: "...qzxt apple."

The Reality: There is no knowledge, no grammar, and certainly no mind. It is a calculator fed random numbers.

Phase 2: Pre-training (Building the Ship)

The model is then exposed to terabytes of human text, initiating the training loop: forward pass, calculate error (loss), and backpropagate to update the weights via gradient descent. With every update, the weights shift by microscopic fractions to make the correct next word slightly more probable.

Step 1,000: The model learns basic English syntax. It outputs: "The capital of France is a city."

Step 50,000: The statistical probability of "Paris" following "capital of France" becomes heavily weighted.

Step 100,000: It consistently outputs: "...Paris."

The Theseus Paradox Applied: At what exact weight update did the model "understand" geography? Was it update 49,999 or 50,000? The reality is that understanding never occurred. The model simply underwent millions of minute mathematical nudges until its internal probability distribution mirrored the statistical shape of human data. It doesn't know Paris; it mathematically maps to Paris.
There are several steps to go, but we will leave that discussion here, and continue our own.  It occurs to me you can take this analogy a bit more directly (although it diffuses the accuracy of the above) to speak of factory robots building a car. Do they know there is a process, an assembly line? Do they know that, at the end of that process, they have built a car? Do the robots even have a concept of “car”? More to the point, do they even have a concept of  “concept”?

If they could produce words, we might think they do. We argue that porpoises and whales have language, and elephants communicate across vast distances by infrasound. Do we conclude they have consciousness? Well, I wouldn’t based on that alone. (There are deep questions of how language is defined, here, for one thing.) That argument is really the age old “what humans uniquely do” discussion, which has seen the ground beneath it shrink as we find animals using tools; or making art; or arguably using language.  I don’t think animals lack consciousness. But (pace Descartes and the classical theologians), I don’t think animals are machines, either.

Which is the important category distinction.

(And, again, all credit to NTodd for showing me the way.)

Tuesday, November 14, 2023

Hard Cases Make Bad Law

 (Robert Sapolsky’s book on free will was reviewed in The New Yorker. I quote from that review below.)

And vague and glittering generalities make poor grounds upon which to rest conclusions.

The steps of his reasoning are familiar: if everything is determined, there is no freedom; if there is no freedom, there is no moral responsibility. Science tells us that everything is indeed determined. Ergo, no freedom; ergo, no responsibility. Are we bound to agree?
Sapolsky again. What Daniel Dennett thought he did for consciousness, Sapolsky now claims to have done for “free will.” Which he basically defines this way:
Every now and then, it occurs to Sapolsky that the parties to the debate may be talking past each other, and he makes an effort, a little grudgingly, to clarify his terms. “What is free will?” he asks early in the book. “Groan, we have to start with that.” 
What follows is not a definition but a challenge. A man, Sapolsky invites us to imagine, “pulls the trigger of a gun.” That’s one description. Another is that “the muscles in his index finger contracted.” Why? “Because they were stimulated by a neuron,” which was in turn “stimulated by the neuron just upstream. . . . And so on.” Then he throws down the gauntlet: “Show me a neuron (or brain) whose generation of a behavior is independent of the sum of its biological past, and for the purposes of this book, you’ve demonstrated free will.”
Reading that my mind obviously turned to current events, and so to Gaza and Israel. Does even Sapolsky really want to run his thought experiment through the slaughter of Israelis: children, women, elderly, all killed for no apparent reasons except anger and hatred. And probably the desire to kill. Are all of these factors illusions, and the only explanation the sum of their biological pasts (whatever the hell that means. And since his argument is supposed to be based in science, how do you begin to quantify such a sum?)?

I’m not leaving out the Israeli response, either. Except to say they at least pay lip service to the idea of a qualified response. Hamas seems interested only in slaughter and outrage, suffering death and calamity as a means to an end (especially when it’s someone else’s death and calamity, be they Israeli or Palestinian). Is that end determined by the sum of their biological pasts? Do they have that radically a different past (or is it individual pasts?) than the Israelis?

That way lies a return to eugenics, since this is supposed to scientific reasoning.
Consider these questions. How does my response to a student who has failed to meet a deadline change when I discover that she sprained her wrist the day before? How do I respond to a piece of fruit chucked at me when I discover that the chucker is two years old? How vehemently do I press for a tough prison sentence when I learn that the defendant was abused as a child? Is there a difference between someone jumping into a pool and being pushed in? Between falling in after he stepped on a banana peel and falling in because he was drunk? 
In each of these situations, we can ask whether the person in question had or lacked something called “free will.” But look back at the factors that seemed to undermine the exercise of free will: rotten luck, immaturity, circumstance, coercion, accident, and incapacity. When the terms on the obverse side of the contrast are so disparate, it’s hard to be confident that there really is a single thing called “free will” whose presence or absence we can meaningfully debate.
In other words, “It’s complicated.” But that’s not an out, because the question remains: what do we mean by “free will”? I accept it isn’t a “single thing,” but consider that neither is “love.” I love coffee; and my wife; and my daughter; and writing. But no single definition of “love” covers the uses I just made of the word in that sentence. Should we invent new words with more precise meanings for each phrase in my sentence, each object of the word “love”? Well, first, language doesn’t work that way (who would adopt the new words, and how would they use them?); second, cadence that precise in our usage of words? I say I love my daughter; but does that place you in my experience of my daughter? Only relationally, I’d argue. By which I mean analogously to your relationship with your child. The difference between a parent and a non-parent is one that simply can’t be bridged by language, or even more crudely by reducing human relationships to scientific terms. 

We do this all the time, in other words. If that gives philosophers fits, that’s their problem. Nobody said this was going to be easy.

Sapolsky says “Groan, we have to start with that.” He means definition, and yes, we do. John Fowles wrote: “Whole sight, or all the rest is desolation.” Until we know, or try to grasp, in whole what we are talking about, all we see is desolation. In Sapolsky’s case, it’s the empty wasteland of an effort to reduce everything to terms he can understand. Dennett did pretty much the same thing with “consciousness,” as I recall. In neither case was it a fruitful enterprise.

Friday, May 20, 2022

Who Can It Be Now?


What is quoted here is from two blog posts at Thought Criminal; they are linked separately below.  What follows is in no way a reference to anything TC has to say about these passages.  I'm just "stealing" his work insofar as he has transcribed this.  Otherwise, the faults are all mine, and the direction of my comments is toward the material quoted, and nothing else.

A Confused State of Scholarship

"Confused" is the key word there; because this analysis is too simple by half.

In a simple version of the culture war, hostile criticism would be pitted against belief, and each position would be located in the appropriate social settings.  Criticism would find its home in the academy, and belief in the Church.  But the reality is that the social locations of biblical scholarship are diverse,  and the question of its precise purpose very much an open one.   To properly locate the present situation, a rapid review of the development of critical scholarship within and outside the Church may be helpful. 

Start with that "simple version" of the culture war.  It is the simplistic version that the "culture war" proponents prefer, be they political warriors or ideological/intellectual ones.  The very concept of a "culture war" is itself a reductio ad absurdum that posits a simple culture (the "right" one) against another simple culture, but one more nefarious and tentacled like an octopus (always a metaphor for evil), one that must be fought by striking at the head, not the many nasty, insidisous arms.  Yes, the simplistic version of any analysis of religion in the West today is dominated by the cretinous dichotomy that criticism is housed and welcome in the Academy (although not among the pointy-head elites!) and mere belief ("believin' what you know ain't so!"), i.e., credulousness, is lodged firmly in the church.  Flapdoodle.

Are the "social locations of biblical scholarship" diverse?  Yes,  But they are primarily located in the Academy, and carried out by criticism as rigorous as any scientific analysis is (well above the standard of the pop science and pseudo science of people like Dawkins and  Pinker, or the paltry philosophizing of Dennett, which is all as rigorous as "belief" is usually defined to be).  But you won't get that here.

Before the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, biblical scholarship was carried out exclusively in service of the Christian faith, within its framework in the canon (the official collection of biblical writings)  the teaching authority of the church, and the creed.  Much of patristic and monastic interpretation in fact, took the form of homilies to be delivered at worship.  Even when the medieval universities developed out of monastic schools as independent centers of learning, biblical scholarship was done within the framework of theology the "queen of the sciences," and the threefold norm of church, canon and creed held sway.

Accurate so far as it goes, but it clouds the differences between groups, too.  Franciscans were hardly fans of the Thomistic scholars; Jesuit scholars took their own tack, and the Augustinians were as fundamentally important as the Thomists, but were no more in control than any other group.  This kind of fractiousness i often papered over; and the analysis of Protestantism that follows ignores the divisions between Calvinists, Zwinglists, and Lutherans, as well as the rise of the Quakers, the Methodists, the Mennonites, the Campbellites, and so on.  Too much for the brief sketch intended by Johnson?  Perhaps.  But sola scriptura and individual interpretation didn't give rise to anarchy in the churches in the 15th century. and weren't even the dominant ideas of Protestant movements.  For many churches control of the interpretation shifted from the monks and priests to the congregation.  Many Protestant churches in America were run by the elders of the church, who sat in the pews immediately before the pulpit, and critiqued the preacher and corrected him, later, on his doctrinal and scriptural views, the better to keep him in line. The "free for all" was tightly contained in some denominations, even as it led to an explosion of them across Protestantism.  But that was largely because the central control of the Pope and the church hierarchy which supports the Papacy was not recreated by Luther or any other non-Catholic, and therefore by definition, Protestant church.  Within the Catholic (i.e., "universal") church various sects thrived.  In Protestantism, each sect set up it's own denomination, even if that denomination was ultimately only a few scattered churches.

The Reformation, especially through the work of Martin Luther changed everything.  Luther opposed Catholicism's emphasis on tradition as norm for Scripture by elevating Scripture to the exclusive font of revelation (sola scriptura).  This made the key to right living dependent on the right reading of Scripture. The context of ecclesial interpretation was weakened further by the principle of individual interpretation,  for the first time made practical by translations from the original and above all the invention of printing, which made Bibles readily available to the laity.  Now the New Testament is not heard mostly in Latin within the liturgy and as expounded by clergy, but can be apprehended directly in one's native language and is open to private interpretation.  It was a combination filled with potential conflict.  Everything essential rested on the reading of a text, but that reading could be carried out by individuals!

So, yeah, a bit more complicated than that.  As is Luther, who is not just "a passionate lover of the texts," but an excommunicated Augustinian monk.  Augustine's works run through Luther's teachings like pure gold runs through a golden ring blended with other metals so it is strong enough to hold its shape, but can still be called "gold."  Luther didn't throw over the Roman church, he took much of it with him, including Augustine's emphasis on sin.  Yes, Calvin took that further than even Luther did, but the point is the "revolution" was in some ways fundamental, and in some ways just a continuation of what Christianity had been doing for a millenia at that point. 

As for that line "the recovery of original Christianity," that was the goal of the Reformed movement, which means primarily Calvin.  Luther wanted to reform the Catholic church, which is why Lutheran worship to this day is so nearly like Roman Catholic liturgies (the Anglican church, likewise, kept most of Catholicism's worship practices).  Calvin and his spiritual descendants discarded Roman liturgies, even Roman religious holidays, in their efforts to return to "original Christianity."  Again, Protestantism is more diverse and complicated than this summary is admitting.

As for the recovery of the original Greek texts, that was largely a factor of scholarship.  The Vulgate replaced the original texts and became the standard text in churches.  The Protestant churches couldn't adopt the Vulgate, which after all was a translation into the common tongue of its day (hence the name), so they had to make their own translations.  Where better to start than the original texts, which have only become more available and reliable thanks to centuries of Biblical scholarship.  Open the Nestle-Aland, the accepted standard Greek New Testament, and you'll find notes to almost every verse noting variant readings in "original" texts.  Those variants are known only because of Biblical scholarship.

Then again, until recently many Protestant churches thought the KJV was the standard text for worship.  Most people still recite the "Our Father" (most Protestants, anyway) in the KJV, or a slightly updated RSV (not the newer translation, the NRSV), and who recites Psalm 23 in any version but the 400 year old KJV translation?  If you know it at all, I guarantee that's the one you know. The Vulgate persisted longer because there were fewer resources for printing other translations, and less interest in doing so.  Bibles became popular in common tongues because of Gutenberg.  Luther translated the scriptures into the German of his day (I have a copy, a 40 year old or so printing, on my bookshelves).  But the history of that change is another fraught with complexity and, sadly, soaked in blood.  Again, it wasn't a straightforward move from the 95 theses to Tyndale's English translation.  And Tyndale's reliance on the Hebrew and Greek scriptures was more a rejection of Catholicism than it was an urge at "purification" and "reform."  Even the Puritans were less defined by their "purity" than by their animosity toward anything they thought "Papist" or just not in agreement with their ideals.

Luther was from beginning to end not only an interpreter of the Bible but a passionate lover of the texts and of the One to whom those pointed.  Nevertheless, his approach to the New Testament (which was to prove overwhelmingly influential in the development of critical scholarship) was deeply if unconsciously affected by the intellectual climate of the Renaissance.  This can be seen not only in his preference for the recovered Greek text over the Latin Vulgate proclaimed in the Church (note here the implicit authority of the Greek reading scholar over the latin dependent clergy).  The recovery of the original text was the key to the recovery of original Christianity.  Just as Renaissance scholars, once classical texts were recovered, could measure the inadequacy of late-medieval society against the grandeur of Greece and Rome, so could the theologian measure the inadequacy of medieval Christianity against the norm of the primitive church, or even better, the figure of Jesus, himself.

The "grandeur of Greece and Rome" is a Renaissance notion, not an absolute historical one.  There is much to criticize about medieval Europe; there is equally as much to criticize about the "grandeur of Greece and Rome," especially as Greece included everything from the city state of Athens, where only male Greek citizens had any political or legal power (and young boys were subject to pederastry the better to prove the men were above their "animal desires".  That's where the Greek love of reason went, in part.), to the military barbarism of Sparta.  And the "grandeur" of Rome included the gladiatorial games around the empire and in the eternal city itself.  Blood sports in which slaves and gladiators (who were slaves, too) died for the entertainment of the masses.  Panem et circenses.  It's not a phrase that calls up a governin, or even social, ideal.  There is a great deal to admire about Greek and Roman culture; and a great deal to criticize.

And "the figure of Jesus himself."  Pray, tell, who is that?  The tall handsome white man with flowing chestnut hair I grew up seeing pictures of in my Sunday School classes? (Somehow Jesus always had long hair and the disciples all had shorter hair.  Never did figure out why they went to the barber on the regular and Jesus didn't.)  The Jesus of Calvin, who waits to judge us all as damned, save for the small number of the elect which none of may know until it's too late?  The Jesus of compassion versus the "God of the Old Testament" bloodthirsty warrior?  But isn't Jesus God, and God Jesus?  How does that work?  Is Jesus the guy who can't stop talking in John's gospel, but can't say much that is clear because you either "get it," or you don't?  Or is he the teacher who explains his parables to his disciples, in Matthew?  Jesus has been the central focus of Christology since the earliest days of the church, literally since the letters of Paul (which focus far more on the nature of the Christ than on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth).  What is this "figure of Jesus," after all?

This seems to be where Johnson is going with this:

Two important assumptions remain implicit in this commitment.  The first is that the recovery of origins means the recovery of essence; the first realization of Christianity is naturally the best.  It follows from this premise that any "development" of Christianity must be seen as a decline.  The second assumption is that history can act as a theological norm for the reform of the church; the recovery of "original Christianity" made available through the recovery of the "original Scripture" should naturally serve as measure and critique for all subsequent forms of Christianity.

So widely are precisely these assumptions held - and taken for granted - that it is perhaps necessary to pause in order to assert that they are, in fact, assumptions rather than necessary truths.  Only a little thought is required to realize the problematic character of the first premise.  Indeed, in most matters, we now assume that earlier forms are perfected by later development. Likewise, it is by no means our automatic instinct in other matters to measure the adequacy or integrity of present behavior against the norm of earlier behavior. Rather, we tend to measure adequacy and integrity in terms of other criteria. 

Which is sound, as far as it goes; well, the first paragraph, anyway.  What he's critiquing is strands of Protestantism, whole denominations in Protestantism, in fact, which think "original" Xianity was more pure and therefore both more virtuous and more authentic.  Think of the Puritans in all their overzealous glory.  I know a number of contemporary (as in, still around, though mostly grounded in the 19th century where they had their origins) Protestant denominations which claim to be the "purer" expression of "true" Xianity.  MO Synod and WI Synod Lutherans, who in that order think themselves more pure than ELCA and any other "Lutherans" and therefore closer to the "truth."  It's a good way to keep people out of your church.*

That's an idea among lay people and the pastors who lead them, however,  It has bugger all to do with Biblical scholarship.  Recovering "original scriptures" is the same nonsense, with the same application to scholarship.

As I mentioned, the Nestle-Aland Greek New Testament lists every available variant  to the words of the canonical gospels and letters.  You can even find these kinds of notes in many annotated translations, where a footnote will direct you to "other sources" which have the word (or words)..... at that point in the scriptures.  I'm literally at a loss to know which "original scriptures" Johnson is referring to, since scholars don't recognize such a chimera.

His second paragraph is an insult to the scholarship of Dom Crossan or Rudolf Bultmann, or even Raymond E. Brown.  Brown is a Catholic priest and scholar whose work is closely in line with traditional Biblical exegesis; but his scholarship is quite modern and impeccable  He has, in other words, points where I disagree with him, but I do so with respect because his work is solid and if I think he has blind spots, it only reminds me I have my own I don't see.  Neither Crossan nor Bultmann are truly in the German historical/critical school from the 19th century, which is another problem for me.  Johnson is writing in the 21st century, and I assume the bone he has to pick is with Crossan and the Jesus Seminar.  Of the members of that group known to the public or who became familiar (briefly) for their popular works. Crossan is by far the most scholarly.  Bultmann is the German scholar without peer; his works are so densely packed with information it's like reading three books at once just to read one.  None of this means these scholars are without error; but you don't take them on with vague and glittering generalities and a few vague sentences explaining that "it's all like this!"

I've seen enough of that "school" of analysis on the internet and in recent Supreme Court opinions (draft and published).  I don't need any more of it.

Let's take up historical criticism for a moment.  It's pretty much the founding "school" of modern Biblical criticism.  As such, it is too prone to dismiss the work of saints and scholars before them (much as the Renaissance declared the time before it the "Dark Ages".  Nice work when you get to determine the definitions, isn't it?).  But historical criticism was trying to clear away millenia of mythology and mistake in order to read Scripture with fresh eyes in the 19th century.  That century must be remembered as the era of "God's Funeral," as Edmund Wilson put it at the end of the 20th century.  Historical criticism was not trying to return Xianity to its "pure" form; it was trying to find a way to understand scripture in what were then "modern times."  When I was young the vogue was to translate the scriptures (or just update the RSV) into more contemporary language.  There were the "Cottonpatch" gospels," and "Good News For Modern Man," and I think some versions in what was then called "Black English." Yeah, these all sound painfully condescending and clueless 60 years later; but this was partly due to the focus, frankly, on sola scriptura.  What was missing was a new focus on interpretation, which was the purpose of historical criticism in the 19th century.  When that school of analysis (and others; so many others) finally began to penetrate into the pews in the 1960's, it prompted people like Francis Schaeffer to explode in outrage.  Literally the first time I heard of Rudolf Bultmann was in a diatribe by Schaeffer (I tell a lie; I first encountered Bultmann in Robert Short's two books on the Christianity in "Peanuts."  He referenced Bultmann and Barth liberally.  Schaeffer got me interested in reading Bultmann; if he was so against him, Bultmann must be on to something.  Alas, it was seminary decades later before I finally started that reading.)  I've frankly forgotten the many schools of criticism that came out of German scholarship in the 19th century. Formalism was another; the analysis of stories to find "structures" in them (Structuralism came out of French anthropology in the 20th century, not coincidentaly because formalism became a tool of anthropology, folklore studies, and literary studies and criticism.).  So today even English teachers identify a fable, a parable, and a tale based on certain elements including length of story, complexity, and types of characters (talking animals, for example; or the realism of a Gospel parable).  After Jung, there is archetypal criticism; and so on.  There are several schools I learned something about in seminary, but never used for exegesis, so frankly I've forgotten them.  Picking on historical criticms now is only because the Jesus Seminar championed a new version of it late in the last century.

The Jesus Seminar was actually a fairly loose collection of Biblical scholars with one unifying principle:  to provide grounds for rejecting as much of Biblical literalism as they could.  It's a bit of an ambitious goal because ideas are both invisible and bulletproof, as well as being damned near immortal.  Consider Augustine's concept of original sin, one Paul himself probably wouldn't recognize. But more people recognize Augustine's framework (even if they don't know Augustine by name) than even know of Stendahl's work, so...there you are.  Still, the JS wrote and worked in opposition to literalism that tried to establish every word of the Gospels (especially, but also the words they liked from the Hebrew Scriptures. Literalists and fundamentalists tend to be a lot more selective about which words of the Law Matthew's Jesus says he came to fulfill, actually need to be fulfilled.) as true and meant just as they are written (i.e., translated) and especially as they are interpreted by modern fundamentalists and literalists.

This is where I say, now:  "Fine, fundies and literalists; you read it your way and I'll read it mine." And so I appreciate the tools scholars like the JS have given me.  But they are only tools.  Interpretation is, as ever, the contentious matter.

So the Jesus Seminar set itself a particular goal.  The infamous "red text" version they came up with, for example.  The Seminar publicized its practice of meeting to vote on the words of Jesus in the gospels:  red for historically accurate, gray for possibly the words of Jesus of Nazareth, black for words invented by a community or the gospel writer (the consensus among scholars is that the four canonicals are the products of a community of believers, not one scribe working feverishly under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit or just the need to make a record as a modern journalist or even diarist would today.  One hand may have written, but undoubtedly many voices had a say in the final product.).  My NT professor proudly regaled us with tales of being among the "skeptics" who dropped a black marble (that's really how they did it; colored marbles in a bowl, which were then counted) for almost all the words of Jesus in all four gospels.

Were they right?  Were they historically more accurate?  That depends on what you make of their arguments.  I would argue you have to go to those sources for that discussion, and not take the third-hand report of Mr. Johnson, who wasn't at the table and has his own axe to grind.  It's really a rather simple principle of scholarship:  to examine a subject and critique it, you have to start with the subject itself, and get as close to the original or accurate form as possible.  If you're understanding of historical criticism is drawn from Mr. Johnson's diatribe, I contend you don't understand the subject at all.  Which doesn't mean you have to agree with me, or disagree with Mr. Johnson.  But honestly, his generalizations bear very little relationship to reality, in this case.

As for the aims of the Jesus Seminar:  they didn't really alter the trajectory of fundamentalism or Biblical literalism in America.  They published their Scholars Version (which I still admire), and then the band broke up.  It had pretty much stopped functioning by the time I was in seminary, and it's just another footnote now, if that. I understand now that, in academic circles and seminaries, it's already old news and considered quaint, at best.

So it goes.

Now, is Johnson wrong?  I just think his argumentsa aren't very good.  I have my critiques of Crossan.  He started out using literary critical tools and some tools from anthropology (formalism, mostly) to analyze the parables.  His The Dark Interval was especially important to me the first time I read it.  But Crossan was never of the majesty of Bultmann, whose The Gospel of John I could study for years, even as I disagree with much of it (Bultmann is dismissive of the canonicals.  I find Luke the most theologically subtle and humanly engaging of the four.  Go and please the world.)  Crossan abandoned biblical exegesis in favor of historical analysis, and not the stuff that came out of Germany in the 19th century.  This pursuit pulled him deeper and deeper into both Biblical historical studies and anthropology, and frankly he almost didn't come out the other side.  Both of those disciplines are deeply complex and not for dilettantes to play with (think Dawkins, with no genetics training at all, teaching the world about the "selfish gene," an idea no geneticist would touch with a club).  Crossan wasn't as shallow as Dawkins, but I always wondered what anthropologists and archaeologists thought of his work on the historical Jesus and the early church.  He teamed up with an archaeologist for Excavating Jesus and In Search of Paul, and I think those books are the better for it.  His books on Jesus and the early church are quite rigorous, but I'd welcome the support of an archaeologist or two (as well as an anthropologist) to be able to assess their rigor.  I don't, by contrast, doubt the rigor of Bultmann's scholarship; but he stays firmly in the realm within which he did all of his work.  Indeed, Bultmann's more "famous" work on "demythologizing" is, I think, his weakest, because he's almost literally out of his field (and treading on anthropology, psychology, and even sociology.

Historical criticism began as an attempt to understand scriptures and the "Biblical world" as we understand the rest of human history and historical experience.  It is a tool for exegesis; nothing more.  It does not determine the validity of interpretation, it provides another set of understandings and methods for interpretation.  Subsequent schools of scholarship, as they came along in the 19th and 20th, and now 21st centuries, have primarily the same goal.  Fundamentalism is literally a reaction to historical criticism, as is literalism (at least in its contemporary form). I don't mind having the tools to refute them; at least for my own satisfaction.  There are many ways of exegeting scripture; there is no one "right" way.  Mr. Johnson is quite right to have his own opinions about the validity of methods, even of outcomes.

But jeebus, dude, know what you're talkin' about, huh?  You're embarassing the rest of us.  Yes, we do "measure adequacy and integrity in terms of other criteria."  But those criteria exist in reference to other criteria.  You are free to disagree with the latter, but you first have to give them their due.  Lazy denunciations based on faulty representations don't feed the bulldog.


*The first church I pastored was literally next door (i.e., on the same lot with no road between us) to a MO Synod church. I was told not to introduce myself there as I would not be welcome, despite the fact the UCC has historical roots in the Lutheran branch of Protestantism.  MO Synod remains "pure" by not associating with any other churches.  WI Synod remains pure by not associating with MO Synod, whom they think aren't "authentic" enough.) 

Saturday, December 22, 2018

"Leaning together, headpieces filled with straw. Alas!"


A textbook example of the importance of definition.  There is, this argument claims, a "war" between science and religion.  And the basis of that argument is the definition of "science" and of "religion."  Oddly enough, no definition of "truth" is proffered, because science already has "truth" held tightly in its grip; apparently.

But I digress.  The definitions, please:

My argument runs like this. I’ll construe “science” as the set of tools we use to find truth about the universe, with the understanding that these truths are provisional rather than absolute. These tools include observing nature, framing and testing hypotheses, trying your hardest to prove that your hypothesis is wrong to test your confidence that it’s right, doing experiments and above all replicating your and others’ results to increase confidence in your inference.

And I’ll define religion as does philosopher Daniel Dennett: “Social systems whose participants avow belief in a supernatural agent or agents whose approval is to be sought.” Of course many religions don’t fit that definition, but the ones whose compatibility with science is touted most often – the Abrahamic faiths of Judaism, Christianity and Islam – fill the bill.
They don't, actually, but being ignorant about religion is held as a positive in arguments of this type, so set that aside.  Notice science is how we find "truth about the universe."  What is 'truth'?  Answer comes there none.  These "truths" are provisional rather than absolute, but that's the only qualifier given.  What these "truths" actually are is assumed.  All right-minded people know, just as they know the less you know about religion, the better.  Ignorance is strength.

And truth, as Kierkegaard argued, is subjective.  Sherlock Holmes famously asked Watson what good it was for him to know that the earth circled the sun.  That information might be valuable for calculating sunrise and sunset, or interplanetary travel, but as "truth" it comes up quite a bit short.  It is an accurate fact about the physical universe; but "truth"?  I think we all understand the concept is a bit more comprehensive, and complicated, than the reduction of the universe to a set of undeniable facts.  Even Hume understood the distinction between analytic and synthetic, and he used it to discard the notion of truth entirely.

But that requires a knowledge of philosophy, which is almost as bad as having a knowledge of religion.  After all, if your go-to source for definitions of religion is Daniel Dennett, you aren't exploring any subject covered by this argument very deeply.

The definitions, you see, set the argument and declare victory before a shot is fired.  Science discovers "truth," religion demands fealty to a non-existent (because "supernatural".  Science defines the natural, too, and "supernatural" is defined out of possibility) entity.  This is reductio Nietzsche.  Oops, another philosopher; we are going far afield now!  But this is the kind of thing I teach first-year English students to watch for:  set the definitions, you set the terms of the argument.  And in this argument, we have two straw men struggling to knock each other over while remaining standing themselves.  Well, rather one straw man is active; the other is pure abstraction, a figment of a weak imagination, a chimera, a cartoon caricature.  No wonder the other argument "wins."

Obviously it is so "strong" it needs as weak an opponent as possible.

Thursday, May 17, 2018

The Counter Counter Counter Enlightenment



Stephen Pinker apparently imagines he is on a crusade to save the Enlightenment.  To those who disagree with him, he has this (among other things) to say:

Some [of the vitriol] is turf-protective: some highbrow pundits, cultural critics, literary intellectuals, humanities professors, and other members of C.P. Snow’s “Second Culture” resent the incursion of science, data, and quantification into territories traditionally fenced off and claimed by them. And a surprising number are cultural pessimists who despise the Enlightenment ideals of reason, science, humanism, and progress. They prefer hermeneutic [textual interpretation] to analytic reasoning (one of the reasons they are sympathetic to religion even if they are atheists), valorize the consumption of elite art (as opposed to the well-being of the mass of humanity) as the highest moral good, and believe that Western civilization is on the verge of collapse and is so decadent and degenerate that anything that rises out of the rubble is bound to be an improvement.

The title of that article is "Counter-Enlightenment Convictions are 'Surprisingly Resilient'".  So yes, he really does believe he's defending the ivory towers of the Enlightenment from the barbaric hordes of postmodernism.

(A true story from my days in graduate school.  I took a class that met at night, which meant many of the professors came and many graduate students doing their doctoral work came to pontificate at each other.  I know how prone I am to do that, but I am still a piker compared to those who remain in memory green around that table.  One night the talk turned to what we are all doing there, as students and professors, and one professor, waving his hand in the direction of the football stadium, declared we in that room were defending the treasures of civilization from the barbaric hordes, meaning the people who filled that stadium and most of the students on campus.  It was a state school, not a private one, so it wasn't exclusive enough, I'm sure.  I don't remember now, 40+ years later, his precise words, but I remember the tenor, and I burst out laughing.  I was sure he meant it as a joke, it was such a cliche.  No one else laughed, and I might just as well have shit on the center of the table for the effect my laughter had.  Any idea I had of taking a Ph.D. in English ended that night, a decision I've never regretted.)

Let me first say Pinker doesn't understand C.P. Snow's argument at all, and second point out that even "analytical reasoning" is a hermeneutic (and not a unitary one; there are many kinds of analytical reasoning, but I'm sure Pinker insists there is only one true "analytical reasoning," much as Robert Jeffress would insist there is only one true Christianity, and he is the judge of it.).  To call it a hermeneutic, of course, is to remove it from the pantheon of Truths, or even from the pedestal of The One Truth, which he clearly thinks it is.  Part of the problem of scientists with no background in the humanities imagining they don't need to understand the humanities  but can just dismiss it in the name of Science, Truth, and Analytical Reasoning (which are a holy trinity, since they are all the same thing, right?  Funny how that works out.)  I don't resent the intrusion of science, data, and quantification into the humanities (has this guy ever studied prosody?  History?  Textual analysis?), but he clearly seems to resent the intrusion of hermeneutics (philosophy) into his science and quantification.  Maybe I should introduce him to Godel's Theorem of Incompleteness; it is, after all, based on mathematics, and is practically the underpinning of postmodernism.

I know I'm sidestepping the rest of his comment, for the moment; I'll come back to it.  Maybe.

The funny part about this conversation, prompted by Pinker's new book (and it turns out he's a psychologist?  I'd have sworn he was a linguist.  Well, that explains a lot, too.) that I stumbled into via Vox.  Pinker himself wrote this second book because the first book, about the "angels of our better nature," didn't actually bring the entire world to acknowledgment that Stephen Pinker had Figured It All Out.  No, really:

“I had thought that a parade of graphs with time on the horizontal axis, body counts or other measures of violence on the vertical, and a line that meandered from the top left to the bottom right would cure audiences” of their delusions and “persuade them that at least in this sphere of well-being the world has made progress,” he recalls near the beginning of “Enlightenment Now.” But Pinker’s inability to “cure audiences” and “persuade them” doesn’t mean he has reconsidered his rhetorical approach; 300 pages after bemoaning those poor souls who read “Better Angels” and weren’t bowled over by his panoply of statistics, Pinker doubles down with still more data. “We have seen six dozen graphs that have vindicated the hope for progress by charting the ways in which the world has been getting better,” he writes.
Being a teacher of composition and argument, my first thoughts on reading this go to Aristotle's four elements expressed in the rhetoric:  Ethos, Logos, Pathos, and Kairos.  Of the four (Ethos relates to the character of the speaker; Logos to the reasoning of the argument; Pathos to the ability of the speaker to connect emotionally to the audience, and Kairos, the current situation the audience is most interested in), only one rests on charts and graphs.  As I tell my students, the most logical argument in the world would appeal to robots (theoretically) or sentient computers (again, theoretically), but not to human beings.  3 of Aristotle's 4 elements concern audience response; without those three, logic is useless and ineffective.  Of course, Aristotle is not part of the Enlightenment, and his ideas of rhetoric don't take account of the power of science, data, and quantification; so what does he know?

I mean, really, this isn't rocket science.  And for all its accomplishment, the Enlightenment didn't reinvent the wheel.  Then again, I suspect Pinker's education not only didn't include humanities, but anything regarded as "the classics" (i.e., Greek and Roman writings).  One reason "if Voltaire or Leibniz or Kant stepped out of a time machine and commented on today’s political controversies, we’d think they were out to lunch."  More likely Voltaire, Leibniz, and Kant would regard Pinker and those who think him intelligent as uneducated boors.

 Part of the argument here is carried on in the Vox article, albeit rather weakly (especially as the author there identifies himself as a scholar, and dismisses the NYT review of Pinker's new book as the work of a "generalist"), that argument being that  SURPRISE!  SURPRISE! the Enlightenment was not a unitary thought project of Europeans who all thought as one because "analytical reasoning" can yield only one conclusion, and that conclusion = TRUTH!*

Who'da thunk it?

I was going to carry it on a bit and straighten out some of the weaknesses of the Vox article (IMHO, of course), but why bother? (Indeed, having read the NYT review of his book, I think the writer at Vox made the cardinal error of taking Pinker and his argument too seriously).  Pinker is a flyweight, a Sam Harris with tenure and minus the blatant racism; he's Jordan Peterson with better credentials than a YouTube audience provides.  But Immanuel Kant would have only been a university professor without his writings to leave behind, and despite Pinker's veiled swipe at people who are more highly regarded and likely to be better remembered than him, like Jacques Derrida (Derrida, not exactly an atheist but not exactly a confessing believer, was a professor of philosophy of religion; I think his "success" stings Pinker, so he alludes to Derrida as preferring hermeneutics, a common subject of Continental philosophy, over "analytical reasoning," the hallmark of Anglo-American philosophical schools.).  The examples of Kant and Derrida point up Pinker's failing:  he hasn't established anything worth discussing, nothing really lasting.  Daniel Dennett explained consciousness, and no one seems to have noticed.  Pinker has assured us, twice now, that this is the best of all possible worlds, but we all keep talking about Candide.  Oh, wait, sorry, that was a novel; no room for science, data, or quantification there, eh?

I all but promised to dig deeper into Pinker's statements quoted here, and I fully set out to do so; but why bother?  It's impossible to take him seriously when he thinks charts and graphs say all that need be said.  All I'm left with is Shakespeare's derisive dismissal, from the mouth of a university student, no less, and a student of human life:  "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."  Or captured in a graph with time on a horizontal axis, for that matter.  But then, "analytical reasoning" that isn't turned upon reasoning itself is not really analytical at all, is it?  I'm sure C.P. Snow would agree with me, just as I'm sure Stephen Pinker would dismiss me as being anti-Enlightenment.  Given Pinker's argument, I'd take the critique as a compliment.  And spend my time watching Wim Wenders documentary about Pope Francis.

*Part of the problem in the Vox article is the defense of the Enlightenment project as being a promotion of knowledge as a good, a benefit.  There is some acknowledgement that "progress" always has its cost, and that too is part of the knowledge that should be promoted; but the very idea that "knowledge" is good is so mundane and anodyne it can't really be called a product of the Enlightenment; at least not without committing Pinker's sin of ignoring the bulk of human history, knowledge, literature, and recorded experience.  Knowledge has always been considered better than ignorance, else why tell stories, why write poems, why invent written languages and methods of preservation?  What kind of knowledge may be of particular interest to the figures of the Enlightenment, but even then too narrow a definition is just putting blinders on.  The better term, in fact, is wisdom; which is considerably beyond knowledge, although not superior to it.  Well, not necessarily, anyway.

Thursday, January 04, 2018

Welcome to the mirror house


The new year is a good time to ruminate; and I've been ruminating on all the "bests" lists and why they just annoy me.

Don't worry, I don't tell you.

But with the new season of "Black Mirror" on Netflix (which, yes, is like "Game of Thrones" on premium cable, accessible only to those willing to pay; reminds me of the toll roads around here accessible only by tags that require you to have a functioning bank account or, better, a credit card.  Keeps the riff-raff off the "public roads," donchaknow, darling!), I start re-watching some of the shows, largely because a "best of" list ranked the episodes and left me, not for the first time, wondering what critical faculties most on-line "critics" actually have.

I said I wouldn't go there, and I won't.

It started me thinking of common threads in the shows.  The most apparent is technology that carries over from one show to the next; more commonly now, it is the concept of technology that is common, especially the idea that consciousness (whatever that is; pace Daniel Dennett, but you didn't figure it out) can be stored as digital data.  It's one of those leaps that is magic when Harry Potter stands over Dumbledore's pensieve and watches events he didn't participate in happen around him, but is "science!" when used in science fiction.  Whatever.  The point is "Black Mirror" often plays with the possibilities of controlling our perceptions, and that control can, in the "Black Mirror" universe, extend to control of our consciousness itself.

But not in the 1950's "Manchurian Candidate" brain-washing way.  We're all too sophisticated for that.  We all understand (well, those of us who didn't watch "24" and think it was a documentary, or should have been) that torture only forces you to say what your torturer wants to hear; anything to make the pain stop.  Brain-washing and torture are not the way of "Black Mirror" stories; but punishment is.

There is a thread through many of the stories that is all about punishment and how we wield it and how we use it just to be punitive; not to be corrective, not to even extract information we think can only be extracted under duress (that plays a part in a moment), but just because we have the power.   Several episodes over several seasons illustrate the point, starting with the first and most famous episode: "National Anthem."

If you've heard of this, you know the story line:  the PM of Britain is blackmailed into having sex with a pig in order to save the life of a Princess Diana-character who has been kidnapped and held hostage.  The PM does it, live and on-line, and is shattered personally and politically by the experience.  Worse, though, the kidnapper, who has cut off his own finger to convince the authorities he will kill the princess (they don't have time to examine the finger carefully before the deadline to broadcast the act), kills himself after releasing the princess unharmed.  Seeking to punish the PM, or at least exert power over him, he ends up realizing he has punished himself and he can't live with the responsibility of his act.

Let that set the tone.

"White Bear" in season two makes the punishment the point of the show.  The protagonist is doomed to relive her act of murder over and over again, every day having her memory wiped so she doesn't realize she's in a prison which is actually a public park where voyeurs can watch as she is tormented by a situation that occurs over and over again, but which starts anew for her each day.  Society extracts its pound of flesh and then some.

In season 3 it's "Nosedive" and "Shut up and Dance."  Both involve the power of social media to invade human privacy.  In "Nosedive" all human value depends on one's approval rating, which can rocket or collapse, and leaves one constantly dependent on the kindness of strangers (of which there is precious little, especially if being kind to you will ruin their ratings.)  "Shut Up and Dance" is straight up blackmail as a young boy who posts something on the internet he shouldn't have, is forced into one horrific situation after another, until his anonymous tormenter leads the protagonist to his death.  "Men Against Fire" plays with perception, as soldiers' sensory perceptions are altered to suit the needs of the society, and they are forced to accept this condition because the punishment is to relive their actions as they actually happened, rather than as they saw and heard them happening.  It would take awhile to explain, but the point of the technology is to punish one group in society (who are deemed sub-human; you can slot in Jews or blacks or any group you want here) by controlling another group in society (the soldiers who volunteer for the duty of hunting down and killing the unwanted group).  The soldiers literally see them as monsters and beasts; the punishment replays what they did, but now they see scared human beings pleading for their lives.  Their punishment can be to relive those moments endlessly.

Which brings us around to "White Christmas," the very best of this story line.   Jon Hamm plays a man in a room with another man (a British actor you wouldn't recognize, so lets keep this simple) on Christmas Day.  Hamm cooks a light breakfast for the day, as there is little food in the place.  He speaks of having been there for 5 years, and coaxes the man into discussing his life before this room and the job they both do on any day but Christmas day.  To do this, Hamm describes his life first.

There are two stories here.  One is Hamm guiding a young man with negligible social skills through a party in an attempt to pick up a date.  Hamm speaks to the man through an implant; only the man can hear Hamm's voice, and the implant allows Hamm to look through his client's eyes.  In short order things go wrong because the woman the client ends up with overhears the man apparently talking to himself (actually to Hamm), concludes he, too, hears voices as she does, and she tricks him into a suicide pact where they are both poisoned to be "free" from the voices.  Hamm doesn't report the murder because his dating service is illegal, but the upshot first is that his wife "blocks" him on her Z-eyes.

Everyone has Z-eyes, it turns out, and they can be controlled, so all Hamm can see of his wife is a shimmering outline, and he can't hear anything she says; nor can she hear or see him.  His marriage quickly dissolves, but that's only the first story.

Hamm's job, it turns out, is more legitimate.  He works for a company that puts a chip into the heads of clients, leaves it for a brief time, then removes it and puts that chip in a device about the size of a hen's egg.  The chip contains a copy of the client's consciousness.  It is, effectively, a person, but one completely under the control of the operator, who is Hamm.  The digital copy perceives itself as the person, but it isn't, and Hamm completely controls its environment.  The idea is the digital copy will control all services of the house just as the original would do, thus making the house perfectly comfortable to the owner.  Echo on steroids, if you will, and somewhere well beyond mere AI.  Of course, the copy is human, or thinks it is, and must be, as Hamm explains, broken into service (much the way a horse is trained to accept a rider).  Hamm does this by changing the sense of time in the environment.  In the time it takes Hamm to eat half a slice of toast, the copy experiences 6 months of time, with nothing to do.  The copy quickly learns to accept its new existence.

You need that concept of punishment to get to the end of the story.  Now Hamm has finally won his roommate's confidence, and the man tells his story.  He had a girlfriend, and she got pregnant.  He wanted her to keep it, she didn't want to, he grew belligerent, and she blocked him (remember that?).  She quit her job, finally, and moved to avoid him, then got a court order blocking him completely; even the child she has is invisible to him.  A child he knows about because he has seen her outline, and seen she is pregnant, and because she visits her father every year at Christmas, and he sees a child playing there.

Time passes, in other words; and then she dies in a train crash, and the block ends with her death.  He returns to her father's house on Christmas day to see his daughter, but finds a girl of obviously Asian descent.  He is not the father (he's a bog-standard Caucasian Brit).  Shattered by this knowledge, he lashes out in anger at the grandfather, a blow that kills the old man.  He stumbles out into the snow, and drives off in an emotional fog, where he is picked up by the police days later, a drunk sleeping in the streets.  The young girl, it turns out, hid in the house until the next day, then wandered out into the snow seeking help, where she died of exposure.

And then we learn Hamm has befriended the man in order to get this confession, and the man he has been talking to is a digital copy of the original, who still sits resolutely silent in a jail cell, refusing to confess his crimes.   Gaining someone's trust is far more effective than torture would ever be.  Hamm's efforts clear him of criminal prosecution for his crimes (the first story), but not from being put on "the registry."  He is blocked to everyone, and everyone is blocked to him.  They appear as silvery silhouettes, but his is fire engine red.  We see one young man in the crowded plaza at the end of the story apparently weighing his options for attacking Hamm with no reprisal from the authorities, as Hamm would never be able to identify him.   Hamm's punishment is not only loss of social contact, and it is not only going to be carried out by the government.  Most of the punishments in "Black Mirror" are like that; we are complicit, and anonymous, through technology.

As for the copy, he is left in the room alone with a radio endlessly playing one Christmas song, and the time sense cranked up to 1000 years per minute, in a punishment that will be left for at least 24 hours, as its Christmas Day and everyone is going home for the holiday.  The original will be punished by the justice system, but the copy is at the mercy of the individual officers who could do it the mercy of simply deleting it, but prefer instead to punish it in ways they can't punish the human being.

And the question is:  who among us would not wield that power, if we could?

"Black Mirror" is often compared to "The Twilight Zone," but without fail the people who were punished in that series had earned our enmity before the punishment was justly meted out; and the punishment always fit the crime.  It's not hard to want to see Hamm's character, or the other man, punished; but the punishment doesn't fit the crime.  In most of the other stories, punishment is a matter of having control, of being able to punish, which is really what the punishments are in "White Christmas."  "Hated in the Nation," from season 3, is unusual in that the villain of the piece wants to use the power of technology to punish society.  It's almost a classic villain piece, with a hero who finally prevails and brings justice.  More commonly, justice is a matter of vengeance ("Black Museum," which may be why so many don't seem to like it) or there is no justice, just vengeance ("Shut Up and Dance"), just punishment ("White Bear").  Or there is justice, but what good is it? ("National Anthem")  And really, justice or its failure is not even the issue:  its the question of power, and what we would do with it.  "We are as gods, so we might as well get good at it," Stewart Brand said in justifying "The Whole Earth Catalog," but he was completely wrong.  We aren't as gods because we can manufacture and purchase stuff that makes life easier or more interesting; we are as gods because we can gain control over other people, the absolute control of their perceptions; and then what?  "Arkangel" answers that question as a mother who wants to protect her child ends up almost destroying her child, all because she maintained control of her daughter's perceptions for far, far, too long, and more completely than she realized.  And even when she realized it, she couldn't resist the temptation to keep using it.

Who among us would not wield that power, if we could?  Some are saying, as Dave Chapelle does in his new Netflix shows, that Trump is a watershed experience that will lead the nation away from what he represents; and it's hard not to see so much that is wrong with public life in the person of Donald Trump, and to be repulsed by it.  Maybe he will be a national object lesson.  But "Black Mirror" asks a more trenchant question:  who among us will resist the temptation to use the new power technology is giving us.  No, the direct access to consciousness is not available to us yet, and may never be.  But the indirect access, through social media and 24/7 news cycles, is affective enough to be as destructive as the nightmares of "Black Mirror."

Who among us will not wield that power, if we can?

Thursday, May 25, 2017

Made in America


The response to James Lindsay is Charlie Pierce's:  "It's not about race, because it's never about race."  It's worth noting Lindsay describes himself (on Twitter) as "A thinker, not a philosopher," and his banner shows a partial skull and the legend "Life in the Light of Death." Which tells me all I need to know about his views on religion (blinkered, blinded, and severely reduced to a daube glace caricature of American Christianity).

The response to Peter Boghossian is that he needs to read more Wittgenstein; and mathematicians who think you are daft to critique mathematics (at all?  on some grounds?) are not very good thinkers themselves.  Notably, there are only two responses to Lindsay's tweet, and of the eight to Boghossian's, four are from Lindsay, two from the author himself.

Which is to say, making a great stir in the world they are not.  Which may explain their "conceptual penis hoax" better than they meant to.  Yes, these are the authors of the "conceptual penis" hoax.  Seems the hoax is actually on them.

I understand from Slate that Boghossian and Lindsay are part of the "New Atheist" movement, which Slate notes is "an overwhelmingly male scene."  Yes, yes it is, and its godfather is Richard Dawkins, of whom Slate notes:

 “It isn't only in America that you'll find salaried academics paid to regale students with gems like, 'The penis is shaping up to be the central metaphor of the gender crisis of the Nineties,’” prominent New Atheist Richard Dawkins warned back in the mid-1990s, when he was best known as a zoologist. “Look out for new courses with names like 'Gender Studies.’”
Yeah, leopards never change their spots, do they?  James Lindsay is the author of one of the more unfortunately titled books in print (alongside Daniel Dennett's Consciousness Explained, which failed if only because nobody has stopped trying to explain consciousness since he published):  Everybody is Wrong About God.  Frankly, it's a title I can imagine more than a few Christian using, but it's really more akin to The Whole World is Wrong Except Me! Nice work if you can get it, in other words; and again, Mr. Lindsay has yet to cause the world to shut down its mosques, temples, sanctuaries, and other places of worship and be guided by his singular light.

So there's that.

I was going to follow the link to the Inside Higher Education article about the publication of the "conceptual penis" article, but honestly, life's too short and who cares anyway?  This is an example of two people seeking fame and glory for their vanity.  Boghossian hasn't authored a philosophical work equivalent to that of Derrida or Foucault (and again I point out the philosophical underpinning of fields like "gender studies" is on the Continent, not in Anglo-American schools of philosophy, which is why they produce so much friction in the "wrong" context.  Yes, it has to do with men being dicks, but it also has to do with fundamental disagreements about how the world is understood.  Boghossian thinks his insight about mathematics is clever; most Continental philosophers wouldn't even pay attention to it.  It's of no meaning at all to them.), or more obscurely Levinas.  Perhaps my standards for "obscure" are a bit off, of course, since the Unemployed Philosophers Guild lodges its finger puppets of Derrida and Foucault in the "Most Obscure" section (with the Foucault puppet asking "Who am I?"  Sadly, I not only know, I have both puppets, along with the Kierkegaard one.)  But Boghossian isn't as known as the translators of Derrida, so he has to get his words to fork lightning somehow, lest he go gentle into that good night.

But from this effort, one can not only overlook his hoax as something not even worth exposing, but one can urge him, in the line of musicians telling a wannabe just how far from fame he is:  "Don't quit your day job."

Rage, rage against the dying of the light; but do it less publicly, okay?  The rest of us have lives you clearly don't understand a thing about.  And no, they aren't the measure of our public intellectuals; just a marker as to how paltry our public discourse is.

Thursday, February 11, 2016

Waiting for the Big One

This may just become my preferred image for Lent.

I've been holding onto this post for some time.  Now, thanks to Southern Beale, I have a reason to revise and release it.  I'll start with the original premise, and adjust it below:

These statistics may be completely bogus.  Assuming they aren't, they are quite interesting:

While self-described atheists and agnostics tend to be highly educated, 77 percent of those who describe their religion as “nothing in particular” haven’t finished college. Many of these people, largely white, aren’t necessarily hostile to religion; they’re simply as alienated from their local churches as they are from other institutions, including political parties and labor unions. Almost half of those who claim no religion but consider religion important earn less than $30,000 a year. These struggling, detached, impious whites are a crucial part of Trump’s base.

I don't care about the "Trump's base" part, I care about the "nothing in particular" description of religion.  Here are the "nones" you hear so much about in certain quarters.  "[T]hey’re simply as alienated from their local churches as they are from other institutions, including political parties and labor unions."  "Bowling Alone" is not a new phenomenon; but it has yet to trickle down to the common knowledge of the "knowledgeable" on the interwebs.

Daniel Dennett says the rising disaffection with religion (and presumably religious belief) is caused by the rising information level available due to the internet.  I'm guessing people who make less than $30,000 a year don't make high-speed internet, and the computer to access it, a top priority.  I'm also thinking people who haven't finished college are not, by and large, that concerned with the latest "proof" of atheists espoused by Richard Dawkins or Pharyngula (if they've heard of either person).  Daniel Dennett, of course, is not alienated from institutions; like Dawkins and Pharyngula (and Sam Harris and Bill Maher), he makes his living from an institution, and relies on other institutions to carry his thoughts abroad and make him famous from them.

The gap between Mr. Dennett and his running mates, and the people identified in that quote above couldn't be any wider.  One might say they can't even see each other.

The irony of the quote lies in this:  the founding figure of Christianity lived as, and taught as, one alienated from institutions.  He lived and walked among the ptochoi, the homeless; the invisible.  The Pharisees and Sadducees and scribes in the Gospels are not historically rendered figures but representative, just as the shepherds are:  the former represent the institutions of life in Judea; the latter represents the people alienated from those institutions.  The people Jesus spoke to were not learned and wise, not educated and powerful.  They were quite the opposite.

If the time has truly come that the institution of the Church, in all its forms and guises, is no longer serving the people of God, if it no longer reaches those "struggling, detached, impious" people described as supporters of Donald Trump, the problem for the church isn't political.

It's existential.  It's fundamental.  It's theological and ecclesiological.  It's, pardon the apparent pun:  institutional.  I am not saying it is absolutely the sign of the end of the ecclesia; but if the ecclesia is leaving those people behind, then what, or who, is the body of Christ and the clouds of witness for?

Now, standing alone that's just a critique of the church, and a rather simplistic one.  But let us never forget the church reflects the culture; how else did the Roman church become part of the empire, it's hierarchy reflective of the model of Rome?  Where else did Protestantism come from, but the massive social changes that were already shaking 16th century Europe?  So Southern Beale, in a "coincidence?  I think not" post, tells me this:

Those who don’t vote tend to be younger and less educated, according to the Pew Research Center. More than half of those who sat out the election in 2012 had no more than a high-school diploma and less than $30,000 a year in household income.

Those are the people Sanders has to get to the polls if he hopes not only to win the Democratic nomination, but also to lead troops of the party’s congressional candidates to victory in the general election, establishing the legislative majority his agenda requires.

At least in New Hampshire, though, younger, poorer and less educated people did not turn out in disproportionate numbers for the Democratic primaries, according to exit polling data gathered on behalf of major television networks and the Associated Press in 2008 and on Tuesday.

Nineteen percent of Democratic primary voters — which, as it happens, can include independents under New Hampshire’s rules — in New Hampshire were less than 30 years old, just one percentage point more than in the state’s primary in 2008. Thirty-one percent had less than $50,000 a year in income, compared to 32 percent in 2008. And the share of primary voters without a college degree apparently declined from 46 percent in 2008 to 40 percent on Tuesday.*
To the politics of that let me add that Hillary went to Flint, Michigan to sympathize with the poor there suffering from the abuse of a state government more concerned with money than people.  Sanders, after New Hampshire, went to Harlem to eat lunch at a famous restaurant with the Rev. Al Sharpton.  Which figure seems more concerned with the poor?

But this isn't about politics, it's about the response to politics, politics being how we do business as a national government, as a society.  At least it's part of how we do business (I use the metaphor advisedly).  The other part is how we treat each other simply as human beings in everyday life.  And the rude fact is, especially in these days where the internet is taken as the vox populi, especially by those who spend all their time on it (raises hand guiltily, points finger down toward self), there are a lot of invisible people out there.

Who speaks for them?  Who is speaking to them?  Who is noticing they aren't showing up?  Hillary went to Flint, Michigan:  that's a safe photo op.  Bernie went to Harlem, to a restaurant.  That's an even safer photo op.

When either one of them is seen among the poor, as LBJ and RFK were seen once upon a time, let me know.  We're still afraid of the poor in this country:  in our politics and in our churches.  And nothing about our national condition is going to change until we change our hearts and minds on that subject; until we pay attention to the people we keep invisible.




* and just as in Iowa, the turnout in New Hampshire for Democrats was down from 2008.  Where is that blasted revolution?  Maybe it will take something more than politics to improve things around here.

Wednesday, December 30, 2015

Same song, second verse



As the year closes, I've been watching a documentary series on Netflix, "Chef's Table."  It profiles in roughly one-hour episodes famous chefs who will never be on Food Network, but who regardless are apparently well known in the field.

I've never heard of any of them.

The third in the series is a chef from Argentina who has several restaurants around the world, is, the documentary tells me, constantly on television and has been for years, and is very, very famous.  Everywhere except America, apparently.  To say he's the Bobby Flay of South America would be an insult, but I'm guessing his fame is on that level or perhaps well above.  More likely he's Bobby Flay combined with Mario Batali with the name recognition of Guy Fieri.

I mention it only because I thought of the notion of what we know being important in giving us perspective on what we think is revelatory, or especially an indicator of the future.  Annie Dillard pointed out that no place on the globe is "out of the way," except as a matter of perspective, and our perspective is not the only one on the planet.  "Out of the way" to us may be "home" to someone else  (as it is to this chef, who lives on an island in a lake on the border of Argentina and Peru, reached at the end of 100 miles of dirt road).  As Ms. Dillard puts it (if memory serves):  "Out of the way?  From where?"

Anyway, I thought of that when reading about story no. 10 here.  Daniel Dennett, in his ignorance about priests and clerics in general, thinks he's discovered a new thing made possible only by modern technology.  When, in fact, it's neither new, or distinctive, nor the shape of things to come; nor only made possible thanks to silicon chips.  Think of Graham Greene's "whiskey priest," or the preacher in The Grapes of Wrath.  Literature is sprinkled with examples of priests and pastors who found the church a convenient place to make a living, and little more.  Hell, Chaucer wrote about them.  So this is nothing new.  And besides, as I've said several times before:  has Mr. Dennett ever attended a seminary class?

Seminary is not a place for indoctrination.  Take this ludicrous statement by Mr. Dennett as an example:

Protecting your inner workings is becoming very difficult; it’s very hard to keep secrets. Religions have thrived in part because they were able to keep secrets. They were able to keep secrets about other religions from their parishioners, who were largely ignorant of what other people in the world believed, and also keep secrets about their own inner workings and their own histories, so that it was easy to have a sort of controlled message that went out to people. Those days are over. You can go on the Internet and access to all kinds of information. This is going to change everything. 
This (the internet) is going to change nothing, because:  what the hell is he talking about?  Christianity ceased to be a "mystery religion" sometime in the 1st century.  You want a mystery religion, you look to the temple practice of the Mormons.  Is the internet going to destroy them?  And as for parishioners being ignorant of that other people in the world believe, has Mr. Dennett paid attention to the arguments about Islam?  It seems clear people prefer ignorance over knowledge, the better to despise and detest "the other".  Yes, you can go on the internet and get all kinds of information.  Most of it is crap, and people mostly look for the information that confirms their prejudice.

Information is not education.

Maybe this is the place to make that distinction:  education is not about being informed; education is about being trained to think in a certain way.  There is no "objective" stance, no "God's-eye view" or "position of the universe" for humans to take.  All information is served up with a point of view attached, if only the point of view that the earth sits "upright" with North America and Europe "on top," and the lesser countries "below."  Larry Wilmore presents the globe like that on his comedy show, but everyone takes it as a joke.  I first encountered it in seminary, as yet another way to simply change my point of view, my presumptions about everything.   And that's what a seminary education will do:  challenge your point of view about everything.  And it won't give you a new one to replace it.  You have to come up with that on your own.  I remember a seminary professor, a man closer to my age now than then (20 years ago) asking a group of us how we would explain the importance of Jesus Christ without resorting to old-school soteriology about the damnation of the unbeliever.  He didn't have the answer either; he was asking us.

Seminary ain't Sunday School

Education is about being trained in the ideas and even ideology of the teacher.  You can challenge that ideology (I got into almost an infamous spat with one of my professors in seminary), but you have to learn how even start to do that.  The self-taught, the autodidact, are conspicuous by their opinions and insistence on ideas that their self-education never challenged.  The internet has not created a class of people who prefer to confirm their prejudices with select information, it has simply confirmed their existence as a normal part of human society.  We all prefer our own prejudices:  that's why there are so many denominations and non-denominational churches, so many different types of French cheese, so many ever-changing flavors of ice cream.  We all think we are right, and we all gather with "right-minded' people; people who think like us.  The internet didn't invent that; the internet didn't change that.

All the internet did was provide yet another forum for the confirmation of that.  What it won't do is the same thing television was never going to do:  it won't educate.

Education is a deliberate process, an engagement between teacher and student.  It does not occur by happenstance or coincidence or osmosis.

I don't know about the pastors and rabbis selected by Mr. Dennett for his book:  maybe they have had mid-life crises; maybe they have had a crisis of faith.  Maybe the insane pressures of being a religious leader simply got to them, and they abandoned their churches and synagogues altogether.  Nothin he describes is new or unique in the world.  It is as old as religion and clergy itself.

And as for the idea that congregations will demand information the church is hiding from them, all I can say is:  I took my training in the thought of the Jesus Seminar and the German Biblical scholarship which prompted the Christian fundamentalist movement, to my congregation, and they didn't use it to demand more of me:  they rejected it wholesale, and me with it.  I don't think I was a worthy messenger, but what I didn't find in my churches was any desire to know more salient and valid and, at the same time challenging, information than anything I've seen on the internet since I went online in the '90's.

Here I want to tie in another article at RD mentioned in that top 10 list, this one about Sam Harris and his e-mail spat with Noam Chomsky.

Let me say at the outset it still surprises me, as it did Chomsky, that Harris would publish this exchange.  Harris seems to be a man remarkably obtuse when it comes to either self-reflection or even any consideration of an idea that isn't his.  But it's the article at RD that convinced me, mainly on the strength of the three long quotes from the e-mails of Noam Chomsky, to revisit this issue at year's end.  I mention it because it concisely states where Chomsky rebutted everything Harris had to say ("I’ve seen apologetics for atrocities before, but rarely at this level" pretty much marks "paid" to any idea that Sam Harris is an ethical thinker; and I agree with you completely that we cannot have a rational discussion of these matters, and that it is too tedious to pretend otherwise" is so clear and directly between the eyes it is only myopia that can account for Harris being willing to publish this exchange.) and it establishes, as clearly as anything I've ever seen since the collapse of logical positivism, that the positions taken by Sam Harris are morally corrupt, unsound in reasoning, and thoroughly discredited.

We have in Dennett and Harris two people probably better known because of the Internet than they would be otherwise (the number of people who write bestselling books but also influence the public discourse is vanishingly small), and they are far more alike than different in that both of them live in a bubble which the internet only reinforces for them.  And that is what the internet has created:  more of the same.  A little bit louder, and a little bit worse.  Mr. Dennett is as ignorant of the world around him as I am of famous chefs and public figures who don't swim into my ken.  And he's as parochial as people who think that anyplace not near them is "out of the way" for everybody.  Mr. Harris is no different, yet he can't even allow any contrary idea to swim into his knowledge, lest it uproot his understanding and render everything he's ever said pointless.

And yet they are, if not saints, at least representatives of one constituency on the internet.  Maybe that "vast wasteland" isn't inherent in how we use our communications technologies; maybe it's simply inherent in us.

Thursday, July 16, 2015

"Separate the wheat...from the chaff...'cause I feel...that I owe....to someone!"


Too much time among the more demented critics of religion to be found on the intertoobs will warp your spirit.  Reading H. Richard Niebuhr's seminal study of faith, Faith on Earth, I find that Bertrand Russell was the last great proponent of faith being "believing what you know ain't so," to use William James' formulation.  For Russell such an assessment is part and parcel of his logical positivism, so it's little wonder he was so appalled by his most famous student (who far exceeded the master), Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Russell understood far less than he thought he did.  Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris and (especially) Daniel Dennett are his intellectual grandchildren; and the gang of on-line atheists are his disciples and ignorant acolytes.  The further you go from the source, the more the knowledge becomes attenuated.

I do not use the term "ignorant" lightly, or merely pejoratively.  I went looking for something on Thomas Paine earlier, curious about how much of an atheist he truly was, since all the quotes from him favored by on-line atheists, all his language denouncing priests and the "church." sounded very true to form for most of the Founding Fathers and for the Puritans who immediately preceded them (and were still in full flower in late 18th century America).  My interest was piqued by Jeffrey Tayler's latest rant.  I quickly found out Paine wasn't an atheist; he was a Deist, with a rather decided interest in apophatic theology.

That took all of about five minutes on Google.

But never let information get in the way of a good rant; which is why the demented critics of religion will warp your spirit.  It isn't just at Salon you find such nonsense; Religion Dispatches is overcrowded with ignorant comments, too.  Most commenters at either site betray little or no knowledge of scripture, but a fundamentalist certainty that their understanding of it, however limited, is the only one possible.  That itself is not even surprising.  There is a basic understanding that we all read the same text in the same way, and a million readers can't be wrong.  So when someone challenges the standard interpretation of To Kill a Mockingbird, a book Tom Brokaw has foolishly said taught us all about race (maybe it taught an ignorant South Dakota boy, but I knew more about race from my childhood than Lee's book ever covered), it triggers outrage.  Brokaw's "interpretation" is not far off the standard one, yet point out that "standard" interpretation is a weak one that does a great disservice to both the idea of race in America, and a fine novel, and you release the howler monkeys who insist there is one right way to read a book, and lots of wrong ways, especially those invented by "scholars."

We are right because so many people agree with us.  And we know they agree, because we all reject those who disagree with us.  They are outcast; they are anathema; they are wrong.

Which is itself a hermeneutic, although a very weak one.  It really is all about hermeneutics; about what system of interpretation you employ.  But questioning the system of interpretation you rely on, is akin to challenging the earth-centered model of the cosmos, or the claim of science to reveal and know Truth.  It is done all the time by intelligent people; but those aren't the people you are likely to meet on the internet.

Take the standard interpretation of morality, for example, one that insists the "Bible says" that if you don't follow God's laws, God will smack you down like the little bug you are.  And that fear of retribution is the only value religion ever had, the only reason it ever had for legitimacy, and since we don't need that fear anymore, we don't need religion in order to be moral and ethical anymore, either.

I could point out this "reasoning" is bollocks dating back to the 19th century (the intelligentsia's fear that without the fear of God backing the British class system, society itself would crumble), or that it's a cruel misreading of scripture used by various Christian churches for millennia.  But if I start with scripture, try as I might, I can't find any justification for the sentiment that God is just looking for a transgression to smite in either the Hebrew scriptures or the Gospels and letters.

Where does Jesus say that those who don't follow his teachings will burn in hell forever?  Quote me the passage, please.  Where does Jesus say that every jot and tittle of the law must be followed more scrupulously than the Pharisees do (the favor bug-bear of the Gospels) or God will uncork a righteous wrath like you ain't never seen before?  Where, in fact, in the Hebrew scriptures, during one of the foundational events of Hebrew history (the first being the Exodus from Egypt, the second being the fall of the Temple in Jerusalem in 70 C.E.; the one in question now being the Babylonian Exile), does any verse describe God unleashing a storm of wrath and punishment on Israel?

Please; again:  chapter and verse.  Quote it for me.  You have the internet, it shouldn't be that hard to find.

I'll save you the trouble:  it isn't there.  The worst thing God does, and God does this explicitly in the visions of Ezekiel, the worst thing God does is to remove God's presence from the Temple.  The famous vision of the chariot-throne, with wheels within wheels, with four beasts for each corner of the throne and smoke and fire and all the theophany Ezekiel can describe, indicates God is on the loose, God is the God of Creation, not of a building, and God goes where God wills.  If that is not necessarily with God's people, that is not a punishment, that is not the "sinners in the hands of an angry God" of American Puritanism; it is God leaving the children of Abraham to what they have chosen.  God does not punish the children of Abraham for breaking a commandment or two.  God leaves them to the consequences of their actions, because God told them what was good, and how to live their lives in a way that would benefit them, just as any loving parent tells their child; and then when the child decided to make a different choice, what could God do but leave them to the consequences of their choices?

But even as God leaves Israel to the consequences of their actions, God promises to restore Israel, to bring them back, to be with them and comfort them and return them to the benefits of the covenant they enjoyed since the time of Abraham.  Where is the wrath and anger and vengeance of a punishing God, in that?*

If there is any lesson in the Hebrew Scriptures, in this truly seminal event of their history (the bulk of the Hebrew Scriptures concerns the Exile; not the Creation, not Abraham, not the Exodus from Egypt and the wandering in the wilderness, etc., etc., etc.  Most of that is taken up in parts of one book, or in one book that gets repeated and restated because of the Exile (Deuteronomy); the bulk of the scriptures that isn't history after the settling of the Promised Land, is the Prophets.  The prophets all write out of the experience of Exile; before, during, after.  You could look it up.

And the seminal lesson of that experience?  God will not save anyone from themselves.  Neither will God punish.  The Deuteronimsts thought that God was angry with them, that living precisely as God had said to live under the law, was salvation.  They weren't wrong, but they weren't right, if they though following the law was a way of appeasing God.  I have no expertise in Hebrew and Jewish readings of that book; but Christians eagerly took it was a punishment.  Then again, Christians eagerly invented the figure of Satan as a power co-equal (or nearly so) to God.  Christians appear to like punishment a bit more than the Hebrews; then again, Christianity was all but born in punishment, its founding figure punished by the state for his dangerous politics.s

The lesson of the Hebrew Scriptures is not that God punishes those who disobey God.  The lesson is that God's way is Wisdom; is Sophia.  Read it carefully, you'll find Sophia there.  It is no accident John's Gospel starts with a hymn to the Logos; that is the 1st century Greek version of the semitic idea of Sophia, who is also linked to creation in the Hebrew scriptures.  The hymn John uses doesn't invent a new idea, it restates it, much as Deuteronomy restates Exodus and Leviticus.  New wine for new wine skins, but made from much the same grapes.

Jesus continues that conversation in the Gospels.  Was man made for the Sabbath, or the Sabbath for man?  It's an especially trenchant question in a culture that says we don't work hard enough, we don't put in enough hours, that we should be accessible 24/7 and work from home because we can never leave our work behind because if we don't do it, someone in Asia will do it for us.  Jesus doesn't come to renounce the law; he comes to interpret it.  And again, the law is not meant to put humankind in a strait-jacket (well, for Jesus, the law only applies to the children of Abraham; universalizing the law was, again, what Christians did).  It was meant to give guidance, to provide an "ethos" in the way Aristotle meant it:  behavior that would lead to happiness and a fulfilled life, not picayune rules to dog your every step and leave you in fear of eternal punishment.

In the parable of the sheep and the goats at the end of Matthew, Jesus doesn't say the judgment will fall on those who didn't dot every "i" and cross every "t', who knew better but didn't act on their knowledge effectively enough.  The judgment, in fact, falls on the ignorant alike:  "Lord, when did we see you?" is the only question both groups ask.  And the answer isn't about the Ten Commandments or gay marriage or abortion, it's about caring for each other:  whenever you fed a hungry person, clothed a naked person, housed a homeless person, visited the imprisoned; you served God directly.  And again, is the judgment a punishment?  Or a consequence?  Even in the most materialistic view of the cosmos, do we doubt that actions have consequences, that causes create effects we might rather avoid?

Lord, when did we see you?  You don't know.  How can you know?  You can't.  Even as Jesus tells the parable, it implies we will forget it (and we have); that we will ignore it's most obvious lesson (and we have), that we will come to the Final Judgment and in all honesty ask the question anyway:  "Lord, when did we see you?"  And our knowledge of the Law or of Scripture or of doctrine or even our life-long fear of God's wrath, will count for nothing.  "Whatever you did/did not to, for the least of these, you did/did not do for me."  That's all that will matter.

If we insist it is still about fear, about getting right with God before the wrath descends, before the heavy hand smites us, we are not speaking for God:  we are only speaking for ourselves, for our desire for power, to be in charge, to make the call, to deal out the justice.  If we insist it is all about internals:  about how we think, or understand, or formulate a doctrine, a soteriology, a Christology, a theology:  we are still wrong.  What matters is what we do.

But those who deal in justice, face justice, too.  We forget that part.  We think justice is just about who has the power.  The parent who whips a child has the power; the child can't whip back.  The policeman who shoots someone to death has the power; that person can't shoot back.  The society that imprisons and condemns and executes, has the power.  Society cannot be defeated.  Justice is all about who has the power.

But that's not justice at all.  The frightening thing about God's justice is not God's righteous anger; it is that God's justice is just to us, too.

We can be frightened into this; but God is not trying to frighten us.  We can feed the hungry and clothe the naked and give water to the thirsty in a frantic attempt to keep the watchful eye of God/Sauron turned from us, but what life is that?  If we want an empty, pointless, fearful, desiccated life, we can have it.  God will not save us from ourselves.  But if we want a fulfilled, happy, meaningful, sound, sensible, and blessed life, we can have that, too.  And it won't involve the amount of money in the bank or the amount of food in our pantry or the type of car in our garage, or the number of clothes in our closets.  Society teaches us every day what the good life is, and God plays no part in it, and doesn't have to.  But is that life better than the life spent taking care of each other, instead of taking care of yourself alone?  If neither one winds you up in eternal damnation, still the question remains: which one would you rather live?

*Yes, I know as recently as Jack Miles' "biography" of God this schizophrenic interpretation of "Old Testament" God v. New Testament Jesus is still alive and kicking.  Miles' reading of the scriptures comes out of a very sloppy hermeneutic, one he undoubtedly never examined for consistencies.  He knew what he wanted to conclude, and he set out to make sure he concluded it.  It's little different from Jonathan Edwards famous rant on a few words from Deuteronomy.  Neither is a North Star nor a guiding principle all must follow.