Thursday, August 13, 2026

He Really Doesn’t Get It

Iran has “..no Navy, they have no Air Force.”
Citing The New York Times, TWZ reports that a senior U.S. military official said Iranian drones provided commanders with the F-15E’s location, speed and direction, potentially allowing a dispersed missile team to target the aircraft.

The significance may be less about a sophisticated “drone swarm” than the use of inexpensive drones as airborne sensors. After U.S. and Israeli strikes degraded Iran’s conventional air defense network, drones could provide a relatively cheap and expendable way to detect and track aircraft and pass targeting information to dispersed shooters.

The report also connects the account to the previously reported “jellyfish” or “minefield” of drones seen by the F-15E crew shortly before they ejected, while cautioning that it remains unclear whether those drones were actually involved in the shootdown.

If accurate, the incident illustrates a broader lesson demonstrated in Ukraine: cheap, distributed sensors can help cue much more expensive weapons against high value targets.
Iran doesn’t seem too hampered:
Iran is adapting its tactics to wear down U.S. air defenses, and exploit dwindling interceptor stocks, according to new reporting from The New York Times.

During five days of attacks on U.S. bases in Jordan last month, Iran combined drones with maneuvering ballistic missiles to overwhelm defensive systems. On July 17, one missile penetrated the defenses at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, killing 3 U.S. soldiers and wounding more than 100.

The scale of the expenditure is becoming increasingly important: the U.S. has fired more than 1,500 Patriot interceptors during the war and reportedly has fewer than 1,700 remaining, while producing only about 600 Patriots in all of 2025. On one day during the Jordan attacks, U.S. forces reportedly fired around 50 Patriots, at roughly $4 million each.

Iran has also demonstrated other adaptations, including using drones to provide targeting data that helped shoot down a U.S. F-15E in April and expanding attacks through partners such as the Houthis to force U.S. forces to defend against threats from multiple directions.

The Pentagon continues to publicly deny that the U.S. has a munitions shortage.
New reporting sheds more light on why Trump was secretly removed from Air Force One in Ankara last month.

U.S. intelligence reportedly picked up multiple streams of information indicating a specific surface to air missile threat against the aircraft carrying Trump. Someone near the NATO summit was also reportedly observed with a shoulder-fired missile.

Even more concerning is that U.S. officials say Iranian intelligence knew where Trump was staying in Ankara, including the floor of the building.

The threat was considered credible enough to trigger an extraordinary deception. Trump publicly boarded the legacy VC-25A 'Air Force One', was secretly removed in a catering container, and departed Turkey aboard a C-32A. The VC-25A then flew on with senior officials, staff and reporters aboard, creating the appearance that Trump was still onboard.

There is no public evidence Iran actually attempted to attack the aircraft. But the combination of a potential missile threat and highly specific knowledge of Trump's location was apparently serious enough for the U.S. to treat the threat as real.

The biggest unanswered question may be how Iran obtained such detailed information about the president's movements and lodging.

1 comment:

  1. We're in "every accusation is a confession" territory here.

    ReplyDelete