Showing posts sorted by relevance for query bultmann. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query bultmann. Sort by date Show all posts

Friday, March 01, 2013

"The Interpretation of Mythological Eschatology"

With Chapter 2 we plunge directly into the problem of time (which Rick certainly understand better in terms of Heidegger than I do).  I mention Heidegger because he and Bultmann were teachers at the same university at one point (before WWII, IIRC), and the influence of the former on the latter is generally acknowledged.  Still, we immediately wade into a subject which is at the heart of Kierkegaard's Absolute Paradox, his philosophical (it comes from his pseudonym Johannes de Silentio) attempt to explain in rational (rather than religious, but that distinction if unfair in both directions) terms, the Incarnation (it involves much more the presence of the infinite in the finite than it does the incommensurably transcendent in the undeniably eminent).  I want to remain fair to Bultmann, though, and not load this discussion down with extraneous details, so let's plunge into chapter 2:

In the language of traditional theology eschatology is the doctrine of the last things, and "last" means last in the course of time, that is, the end of the world which is imminent as the future is to our present. p. 22
So time is our concern now, not just space; and God is transcendent of both:

God is never present as a familiar phenomenon but ...is always the coming God, who is veiled by the unknown future.  Eschatological preaching views the present time in the light of the future and it says to men that this present world, the world of nature and history, the world in which we live our lives and make our plans is not the only world; that this world is temporal and transitory, yes, ultimately empty and unreal in the face of eternity. pp. 22-23.

Bultmann goes on to anchor this idea, not in the thought of Jesus of Nazareth, nor even in the culture of first-century Palestine, but in Greco-Roman culture, with quotes from both Pindar and Sophocles.  But this only illustrates, as he points out, "that the general human understanding of the insecurity of the present in the face of the future has found expression in eschatological thought" (among other places, we should probably add, lest we take Bultmann too far out of context).  But what distinguishes the Greek version from the Biblical version, he asks.  The simple answer is:  the Greeks eschaton was rooted in destiny, the Biblical eschaton in the acts of God.  One of those is still with us, or could be; the other is quite too foreign:

It is possible that the Biblical eschatology may rise again.  It will not rise in its old mythological form but from the terrifying vision that modern technology, especially atomic science, may bring about the destruction of our earth through the abuse of human science and technology.  When we ponder this possibility, we can feel the terror  and the anxiety which were evoked by the eschatological preaching of the imminent end of the world.  To be sure, that preaching was developed in conceptions which are no longer intelligible today, but they do express the knowledge of the finiteness of the world, and of the end which is imminent to us all because we are beings of this finite world.  p. 25
 Here I do have to pause and say, without taking a swipe at Bultmann, it is a bit too broad to say such "conceptions...are no longer intelligible today."  You reading this may agree with Bultmann, but you also have to know of people who consider the end of the world imminent and sometimes act as if it were so.  What, indeed, was the "Y2K" scare if not "the terrifying vision that modern technology...may bring [our] destruction"?  And there are plenty of groups convinced, at one time or another, that the world is coming to an end in accordance with one prophecy or another.  Some two decades after Bultmann wrote these lectures my adolescence was dominated (in small part) by Hal Lindsey making a career out of "Biblical prophecy" which he was certain indicated the Apocalypse would come after Armageddon, which was to be nuclear war between the US and the USSR.

Oops.

So it isn't that such "concepts...are no longer intelligible today," but rather that certain groups hold to them while others don't and never will.  The irony is how many of those groups consider themselves Christian, because Bultmann is, in no small part, presuming a uniform Christian message spoken to a uniform populace for whom certain concepts are "no longer intelligible."  And frankly, with no disrespect to Herr Doktor Professor Bultmann, that populace doesn't really exist; nor does that Christian message.

But perhaps that's only a pastoral, or even a homiletical, point....

This, on the other hand, is a statement I could use in a blog comment right now:

It is precisely the intensity of this insight [i.e., the quote immediately above]  which explains why Jesus, like the Old Testament prophets, expected the end of the world to occur in the immediate future.  The majesty of God and the inescapability of His judgment, and over against these the emptiness of the world and of men [sic] were felt with such an intensity that it seemed that the world was at an end, and that the hour of crisis was present. pp. 25-26

All I would have to do is replace that language about God's majesty with some terrifying vision of modern technology bringing about our destruction due pollution, global warming, resource scarcity, etc.  In a comment below RKC said of the gun control debate that:  "We talk of this as a political issue, but I can't but help see it as also a spiritual issue."  Turning to guns for security, insisting on their primacy is, RKC points out, a kind of idolatry, an idolatry certainly prompted by the "emptiness of the world and of [people], felt with such an intensity that it [seems] that the world is at an end."  Bultmann also points out (and it's worth nothing here), that "the finiteness of the world and of man [sic] over and against the transcendent power of God contains not only warning, but also consolation."  And that is another significant difference between Greek eschatology (symbolized by Greek tragedy) and Biblical eschatology ("Behold, I am making all things new!" God tells both Isaiah, and later John of Patmos.  Bultmann doesn't include that example; it's mine).

Bultmann turns this difference, though, not on competing visions of who or what is in charge, but on the fundamental difference between Greek and Biblical (now read "Christian," if not clearly before) visions of human life:

In Christian thinking freedom is not freedom of a spirit who is satisfied with perceiving the truth; it is the freedom of man to be himself.  Freedom is freedom from sin, from wickedness, or as St. Paul says, from the flesh, from the old self., because God is Holy.  p. 29

Here, I have to say, Bultmann is being a good Lutheran, and taking up his Augustine with a touch of Kierkegaard.  The very idea of "the freedom of a man[/woman] to be him[/her]self," is one virtually unthinkable before the Romantics, at least for ordinary persons whose task, as recently as the end of the Enlightenment, was to fulfill their place in the Great Chain of Being, not fulfill their personal destiny or ability at self-fulfillment.  That's Wordsworth and later Byron, and Goethe and finally S.K.'s "individual" (although for S.K. that was, in no small part, over against Hegel's Romanticized vision of human history, which still had more of Pope than Thomas Gray about it).  If existentialism begins with Kierkegaard, it's roots are in Romanticism; and if Bultmann is championing self-fulfillment as the highest and best purpose of Christian practice, he owes it first and foremost to the melancholy Dane (a point Bultmann makes all but explicitly in a long footnote in The Gospel of John, where he applies a passage from Philosophical Fragments to support his discussion in the text.  p. 70, fn. 3 begins:  "The matter was most clearly seen by Kierkegaard who developed it above all in the 'Philosophical Fragments'...."  I won't digress to put that quote fully in context, but Bultmann in that passage is discussing the historical event of the incarnation, where the kerygma does not pass on a timeless idea but transmits an historical event," and this fact, he says, is the "offence" of Christianity.  Bultmann's note discusses Kierkegaard's insights at some length here, and gives us as clearly as possible the roots for Bultmann's Christian existentialism.  The quote is from The Gospel of John, tr. G.R. Beasley-Murray, Philadelphia:  Westminster Press, 1971, p. 70).  Kierkegaard, himself a Lutheran pastor who never took a pulpit, is equally steeped in Augustinian thought, which simultaneously gives us the liberating vision of a Christianity meant for "the individual," and a Christianity still held to Augustine's excess of conscience (for a non-Augustinian reading of Paul, I recommend Krister Stendhal, another good  Lutheran (!).)  All of which is to say, I accept freely the first sentence of that quote, and withhold approval of the second.

Bultmann concludes the chapter by placing the origins of de-mythologizing in Paul:  "...taken when Paul declared  that the turning point from the old world to the new was not a matter of the future but did take place in the coming of Jesus Christ," and then John, for whom "the coming and departing of Jesus is the eschatological event":

For John the resurrection of Jesus, Pentecost, and the parousia of Jesus are one and the same event, and those who believe have already eternal life.p. 33
Bultmann's heremenuetic, then, is not radical; it's Biblical.

Thursday, February 28, 2013

Forces Antithetic

The title is completely useless, except I have reason to be in love with it, and no hope of ever releasing a record album.  So, I just like it, and I'm saving it for a better purpose.  Otherwise, it has nothing to do with Bultmann.

I've made the mistake of thinking too much about Bultmann, which I promised myself I wouldn't do.  So, to get back on track, let's start with the first words of Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York:  Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.  All quotes below are from this version.) and rather than place them in the context of Kerygma and Mythos or The Gospel of John, treat them as a good formalist critic (or post-modernist critic, or even a New Criticism critic) and restrict ourselves to the text as a ding an sich.  Or something.

Bultmann begins with "The Message of Jesus and the Problem of Mythology."  The "message" is not to be confused with (or maybe it is to be confused with) the kerygma.  But let's get to the message first:

The heart of the preaching of Jesus Christ is the Kingdom of God.  During the nineteenth century exegesis and theology understood the Kingdom of God as a spiritual community consisting in men [sic] joined together by obedience to the will of God which ruled in their wills. By such obedience they sought to enlarge the sphere of His rule in the world.  They were building, it was said, the Kingdom of God as a realm which is spiritual but within the world, active and effective in this world, unfolding in the history of the world. p. 11

I can't help but not the emphasis (slight but clear) on "will" in that passage; it's almost a hallmark of 19th century thinking, as in Kierkegaard's assessment: ""Purity of heart is to will one thing."  By the time Bultmann wrote these words, will was already (thanks to two world wars and a worldwide economic depression) a rather suspect category, at best.  Still, we start from what we learn first, and don't easily deviate from those lessons.  So we are safe to see Bultmann, for all his genius and influence, as a 19th century thinker in a 20th century world (Heidegger isn't really that far removed from the concerns of Kierkegaard, either, and Kierkegaard is firmly rooted in 19th century Romanticism, un-Romantic though he seems).

Bultmann goes on to particularize his assessment, noting the impact of Johannes Weiss' The Preaching of Jesus about the Kingdom of God, a book probably as relevant to Biblical scholarship and theology today as William Barclay's work.  Sic transit gloria.  Nonetheless, Bultmann describes the profound impact of that work in the late 19th century:

This epoch-making book refuted the interpretation which was hitherto generally accepted.  Weiss showed that the Kingdom of God is not immanent in the world and does not grow as part of the world's history, but is rather eschatological; i.e., the Kingdom of God transcends the historical order.  It will come into being not through the moral endeavour of man, but solely through the supernatural action of God.  God will suddenly put an end to the world and to history, and He will bring in a new world of eternal blessedness. p. 12

How epoch making was this?  "I remember that Julius Kaftan, my teacher in dogmatics in Berlin, said:  'If Johannes Weiss is right and the conception of the Kingdom of God is an eschatological one, then it is impossible to make use of this conception in dogmatics.' "  But:

Today nobody doubts that Jesus' conception of the Kingdom of God is an eschatological one--at least in European theology and, as far as I can see, also among American New Testament scholars.  Indeed, it has become more and more clear that the eschatological expectation is at the core of the New Testament preaching throughout. p. 13
 So there we are, but where does this lead us?  Well, essentially, to modern theology and Biblical studies.  The core of modern Christian critical thinking is here:  from Fr. Brown on one end, to Dom Crossan on the other (and probably others; I'm covering my knowledge, not an exhaustive examination of the field).  Bultmann is laying out some fairly simple basic concepts here, with their attendant background.  But for Bultmann, this is where the problem of "mythology" (as he uses the term) arises:  with the fact that, clearly, the eschaton Jesus and his followers expected didn't happen (this was one of the first lessons we started with in New Testament studies in seminary), and that truth alone presents an almost insurmountable barrier to the modern listener, the modern audience for the kergyma (proclamation, to keep it simple for now; not quite message, but close enough) of the church.  Why is this such a problem, other than a matter of timing?

...the modern study of history...does not take into account any intervention of God or of the devil or of demons in the course of history.  Instead, the course of history is considered to be an unbroken whole, complete in itself, though differing from the course of nature because there are in history spiritual powers which influence the will of persons.  Granted that not all historical events are determined by physical necessity and that persons are responsible for their actions, nevertheless nothing happens without rational motivation. pp. 15-16

"Rational," after two world wars, and a "Cold War" that followed, being a rather dubious term, perhaps, but I take Bultmann to mean "explainable in non-metaphysical terms", or at least motivations that could be justified by reasoning, however wrong.  So here's the problem for Christians:

...is it possible that Jesus' preaching of the Kingdom of God still has any importance for modern men [sic] and the preaching of the New Testament as a whole is still important for modern men [sic]?  The preaching of the New Testament proclaiming Jesus Christ, not only his preaching of the Kingdom of God but first of all his person, which was mythologized from the very beginnings of earliest Christianity.  New Testament scholars are at variance as to whether Jesus himself claimed to be the Messiah, the King of the time of blessedness, whether he believed himself to be the Son of Man who would come on the clouds of heaven.  If so, Jesus understood himself in the light of mythology. p. 16
What does Bultmann mean by "mythology"?  The definition comes a bit later, but for now, let consider the one offered here.  There were several answers to the question "Who do you say that I am?" in "the very beginnings of earliest Christianity."  Paul and Peter alone sparred over whether Jesus was for the Jews only, who would then, according to one interpretation of Isaiah, be a light to the nations, and draw all people to Jerusalem (either spiritually or physically, it depends on how you read the prophets).  Peter wanted the Gentiles drawn to the redeemed nation; Paul wanted the message to go directly to the Gentiles, because in Christ there was no longer Jew nor Gentile.  History came down on Paul's side, but gave great credit (the shoes of the fisherman, and all) to Peter.  That resolution is much neater and simpler 2000 years on than it was in reality, but I use the example just to point out the complexity of the issue.  Was Jesus the redeemer?  And what redemption did he mean to bring, or think he brought (if he thought of himself as a redeemer?)  A redemption for the poor? That's Luke's vision.  A redemption for believers exclusively?  That's John's vision (at least in most interpretations).  Did he see himself as the Son of Man who would come down in human physical form on clouds of heaven?  Curiously, this is one of Bultmann's clearest anachronisms, as current Biblical scholarship understands "Son of Man" as an idiomatic Aramaic phrase, not a title claimed by Jesus for himself.  It is now understood to be better translated from Aramaic (just as the sayings of Jesus come from Aramaic through the koine Greek of the Gospels into English and other modern languages today) as "the Human One."  The best explanation/comparison of that I've ever come up with is the Irish English idiom "himself" as a third person singular pronoun, as in "And how is himself?" "Son of Man," or "The Human One," is a way, in other words, of not saying "me," while still referring to "me."  But that understanding is the result of modern scholarship, not of Bultmann's ignorance or willful failure to understand.  There is a constant problem of translation, especially where several language, cultures, and centuries are involved.

Did Jesus understand himself in the light of mythology?  It's an impossible question to answer completely.  No doubt the weltanschaaung of first-century Palestine would, to the modern mind, be "mythological."  We need to be careful not to consider that reality grounds for our own superiority, since many things we overlook today would make a medieval peasant wonder about our ignorance and foolishness.  That isn't quite what Bultmann means, however.  What he means is:  can we recast the kergyma of Jesus of Nazareth without using mythological terms; without, in other words, creating unnecessary stumbling blocks (there is a  vital stumbling block which Bultmann will get to later).  And at the idea of the "true" kergyma we are back to Jesus' question of identity:  what do we say the kergyma of the New Testament is?  Because even if it is the Kingdom of God, is that kingdom immanent, eschatological, or, in the terms of the Gospel of Thomas, among us now?  Your answer determines what the kergyma is; but then again, your kerygma determines what the answer is.  Just as the answer to "Who do you say that I am?" is determined by what doctrine of the Christ you accept as valid.

Notice, for example, that Bultmann speaks of the "Messiah" as "the King of the time of blessedness."  That's not a definition many Christians today would recognize, but their definition would be as anachronistic in first century Palestine as this definition is in the present day. And yet which definition is correct, and why?  And does either involve mythology?  Is the "time of blessedness" mythological, simply because it hasn't happened yet?  Or is it mythological because it is based on metaphysics?  And yet any discussion of God must presume metaphysics, or it is a bootless discussion.

Which brings us to Bultmann's definition of mythology:

It is often said that mythology is a primitive science, the intention of which is to explain phenomena and incidents which are strange, curious, surprising, or frightening, by attributing them to supernatural causes, to gods or to demons....

Mythology expresses a certain understanding of human existence.  It believes that the world and human life have their ground and their limits in a power which is beyond all that we can calculate or control.  Mythology speaks about this power inadequately and insufficiently because it speaks about is as if it were a worldly power.  It speaks of gods who represent the power beyond the visible, comprehensible world.  It speaks of gods as if they were men and of their actions as human actions, although it conceives of the gods as endowed with superhuman power and of their actions as incalculable, as capable of breaking the normal, ordinary order of events.  It may be said that myths give to the transcendent reality an immanent, this-worldly objectivity. pp. 18-19.
One can pick that apart; it is clearly a definition limited almost solely to Greek mythology, and such tales from other cultures as are congruent with that definition of Greek mythology.  But that's nit-picking, and besides, in Western culture Greek myths are the touchstone for understanding "mythology."  Bultmann goes on to apply this to the weltanschaaung which formed the books of the Bible:

According to mythological thinking, God has his domicile in heaven.  What is the meaning of this statement?  The meaning is quite clear.  In a crude manner it expresses the idea that God is beyond the world, that He is transcendent.  The thinking which is not yet capable of forming the abstract idea of transcendence expresses its intention in the category of space; the transcendent God is imagined as being at an immense spatial distance, far above the world: for above this world is the world of the stars, of the light which enlightens and makes glad the life of men.  p. 20.

Bultmann goes on to distinguish this thinking from modern thinking, to distinguish mythological thinking from metaphorical thinking.  If I have a point of disagreement with Bultmann here, it's a minor one.  My problem with this kind of distinction is that it leads too easily to a sense of superiority of present thought over older, "primitive" thought.  I would point out, for example, that it isn't at all clear Socrates clung tightly to the notion that the gods lived in mortal form but with supernatural powers and immortal life spans clustered on the peak of Olympus.  It is not that Socrates was "demythologizing" the Greek gods, but that the abstract concept of transcendence is not a cultural attribute, but an individual one.  Just as Bultmann insists we distinguish between metaphorical and mythological thinking today, even as Pat Robertson insists used clothing can be infested with demons (a question brought to him by another person, not an opinion he offered sui generis).  I don't hesitate to call Mr. Robertson's thinking mythological, but we are 55 years past the publication of Bultmann's little book, which prompts me to wonder who this "we" is that he's talking about.  I'm a little more comfortable understanding that people have different world views, and that even "educated" people in the 20th century (the era of my anecdotal evidence) can insist that "symbols" have "demonic powers," as one mother of a high school acquaintance declared over some sandals I once wore with leather "peace sign" emblems attached to them.  Of course, that symbol is not quite as old as I am, and was invented from a British anti-nukes group; it isn't not an ancient Satanic emblem, but she had heard it was, and feared for her daughter's immortal soul (and mine, a little) if such symbols were in her daughter's presence too long.  Yes, it's mythological thinking; but then, "transcendence" is itself a concept that invites the rebuke that it is simply more sophisticated mythology to remove the idea of "heaven" from the concept.

We swim, in other words, in rather unfathomed waters; and Bultmann ends this chapter asking "What is the meaning of eschatology in general?," which itself could be a mythological construct.  But that's chapter 2.....

Friday, August 11, 2017

Sauce is sauce....


I remember in college, in an off-campus bookstore, coming across the works of Francis Schaeffer.  He was a virulent critic of someone called "Rudolf Bultmann," who I'd never heard of, but Schaeffer blamed Bultmann and his kind for all the ills that Christianity, and therefore modern society, had become heir to.  I got that much from the back cover and skimming the book.  I put it down, curious about this Bultmann character, and why Schaeffer thought him so dangerous and pernicious.

I later found, by actually reading Bultmann in seminary, that Schaeffer wasn't fit to unlace Bultmann's sandals; not as a thinker and scholar, at least.  Schaeffer, as I recall, limited his critique to Bultmann's later works, like his efforts to "demythologize" the New Testament, the better to make it accessible and acceptable to modern people.   Schaeffer got Bultmann wrong on that effort (though I critique it myself as being rather ineffective from a pastoral, i.e., congregational, point of view), but didn't even try to scale the mountain of Bultmann's exegesis of the Gospel of John, or his scholarship on the synoptics.  Schaeffer, in other words, was a self-important putz, a puff of wind, a blowhard.  But I'm quite sure he had more influence on modern Christianity than Bultmann ultimately did, if only because Schaeffer was continuing the work begun by the fundamentalists in the early 20th century (Bultmann is a figure of the middle of the century), when Bultmann's predecessors in Biblical scholarship were upending the way scripture was understood, both historically and as literature.

You really can't overstate the sweeping nature of that change, a last legacy of the century of revolution that began with industrialization and ended with us thinking of ourselves as beings with psyches and soon, doctors who were not "alienists" but "psychiatrists."  Not to mention the revolution of the Romantics which was so fundamental and total we are still mapping the edges of it (if we notice it at all; do fish notice the water they swim in?).  But you can miss simple historical points, like the fact American exceptionalism was documented by Tocqueville and Dickens in the 19th century, which means it didn't start sometime in the 1950's or '60's at all.  But Kurt Anderson thinks it did.

Or at least he thinks it got started in the '60's:

The great unbalancing and descent into full Fantasyland was the product of two momentous changes. The first was a profound shift in thinking that swelled up in the ’60s; since then, Americans have had a new rule written into their mental operating systems: Do your own thing, find your own reality, it’s all relative. 
Do we even have "mental operating systems"?  I must admit I've never thought of them that way.  Are they DOS, or Mac, or Android based?  And who writes them?  Oh, sorry, drifting again; but this kind of analysis inspires drifting, because it's so unmoored from reality itself.  Because that "profound shift in thinking" didn't spring up sui generis from the guitars of Bob Dylan and the chords of the Beatles and (finally, and johnny come lately in this chronology) the "free love" lifestyle of the hippies.  It had an origin point, and what was that?  Maybe the Shakers, or the myriad groups in America that insisted on their own reality, right down to how to live together, or when God was coming to end it all, or how to discern what was valuable in life?  We had our Transcendentalists, we had our apocalyptic communities, our religious communities (Amish still thrive), and our various states all competing throughout the 19th century for how government should function.  We even had a war over that notion, with Texas joining the defectors right after it joined the Union, because it had fought Mexico for the ability to own slaves, and wasn't gonna give up access to that easy money any time soon (it was still nearly a half-century to Spindletop).  Do your own thing, find your own way?  Wasn't that the point of America being so many states and not just one central government, in the first place?

Christopher Douglas notes about this article that:

...the fact of the matter is that this very conservative religious tradition that remade the Republican Party in the 1980s and 1990s had already learned to discount expert knowledge and mainstream institutions like journalism and universities.
He doesn't give a start date to that, but I will:  1910 to 1915, when "The Fundamentals" were published.  By and large in response to German Biblical scholarship; and it's no coincidence there was, in America, a surge in interest in reading koine Greek, the language of the Christian scriptures, so that mail order business in the study was a hot buy for a while.  Universities were the source of that stuff, so fundamentalists didn't need Biblical scholars and exegetes:  they had their own two eyes, and besides, if Jesus didn't speak the King's English, where did the King James Bible come from?

Anderson has another demon that pesters his sleep:

The second change was the onset of the new era of information. Digital technology empowers real-seeming fictions of the ideological and religious and scientific kinds. Among the web’s 1 billion sites, believers in anything and everything can find thousands of fellow fantasists, with collages of facts and “facts” to support them. Before the internet, crackpots were mostly isolated, and surely had a harder time remaining convinced of their alternate realities. Now their devoutly believed opinions are all over the airwaves and the web, just like actual news. Now all of the fantasies look real. 

Well, I guess, except I knew people with all kinds of crazy ideas and conspiracy theories back in the day (Before Google), and they all managed to keep each other up to date and to teach others their nonsense (people weren't born know that stuff) and voting/not voting their convictions, so I'm not sure what's changed except that we're aware of them now.  Kinda the way white men are aware they aren't the sovereigns they thought they were, and people of color and people of non-male gender and people living poor without style and coming from other countries and places in society have "alternate realities" that deserve to be heard, too; so I guess we can ultimately blame this mess on civil rights, giving women the vote, and multiculturalism.  Sure, why not?  Makes as much sense as anything else.

Because the argument here is a conservative one:  we have to go back to never was, in order to straighten this all out.  It's kind of like the problem of overpopulation as identified by Charlie Brown's  sister Sally decades ago:  everybody talks about the problem, but nobody wants to leave.  What standard of order and decency are we going to agree to in order to shove the genie, the parts we don't want (or the people, actually) back into the bottle?

Interestingly, Douglas ends his analysis of Anderson's original essay here:

As Russian dissident, exile, and chess champion Garry Kasparov explained of the fake news circulating in our post-truth world, “The point of modern propaganda isn’t only to misinform or push an agenda. It is to exhaust your critical thinking, to annihilate truth.”

Which would indicate the source of the problem is not a wrong turn in 1960, or the zeitgeist too stoned to deal with reality, but a flesh-and-blood enemy (even bots aren't intelligent enough to create themselves and function on their own) with a deliberate goal in mind.  But instead of address that direct threat, Douglas ends sounding like somebody on a CNN panel who can't bring themselves to say Trump's supporters are liars who believe their own lies about Russia and "collusion" and the 2016 election:  "How to annihilate truthiness, on the other hand, seems like a much more difficult task."  It's not a grand historical task that lies before us.  We are not battling the turning of the gyres or the workings of the thesis against the antithesis, opposing the coming synthesis.  We are not fighting ghosts or spirits or ideas or "the times."  We are fighting propaganda.  And propaganda comes from someone, and is aimed at achieving a goal.

When I was a child, there were a series of games produced to educate children.  They came in small boxes, but carried big purpose behind them, a purpose I'm not sure they ever achieved.  It was a more idealistic time.  We had two of the several produced: one aimed at teaching set theory (I never learned much about it), the other aimed at learning how to recognize, and analyze, and resist, propaganda.  The tacit assumption was that propaganda would come from Russia; in those days the USSR was associated with the word so that almost everything the Soviets said was assumed to be propaganda first.  I learned a great deal from that game, though it wasn't much fun and we didn't play it often.  After Watergate, after Vietnam (each much more influential than the hippies), we learned that propaganda didn't just from the onion domes in Moscow.  Maybe we've learned that lesson too well.  But if we understand that the purpose of Alex Jones or bots from eastern Europe or Sebastian Gorka and Stephen Miller is to annihilate truth, we might be better fixed to prevent them from succeeding.

It's certainly a better target than vaguely remembered figures from history, while forgetting history as a whole just to make that argument.

*The greater irony of the arguments of both Anderson and Douglas is the lament that science can now be understood as a language game (via Wittgenstein, though Douglas credits Jean-Francois Lyotard, not incorrectly), and no one mentions Kuhn because apparently he is so much the father of our failings that He Cannot Be Named.  The fundamental (!) problem there, of course, is that science is no longer "objectively" true, it no longer enjoys the privilege of being, well:  the word of God.  The same thing science claimed to do to Christianity in the 19th century has now been done to it.  Sauce for the goose became sauce for the gander, and now Anderson (and Douglas, to some degree) want to un-sauce the gander.  Sorry, but that goose is cooked.  And yes, I wrote the entire post just to make that joke.)

Tuesday, February 05, 2013

Meanwhile, back in the stacks....

Lent unofficially begins next Wednesday (I take as my authority Thomas Merton).  I have often posted on Ash Wednesday , and I may do so this year.  But I've decided to do something different; and it may not necessarily work.

I want to do a book study (or book club, if anyone participates) on Rudolf Bultmann's Jesus Christ and Mythology.  I started re-reading it recently, and was surprised at how much I agreed with it, and even where I disagreed with it, the conversation between me and the book was inspiring.  My first encounter with Bultmann was actually in college, through the good offices of Francis Schaeffer, who did his best to convince me Bultmann was a source of theological error in the world.  I found out later what a fundamentalist Schaeffer was; but his approach was so familiar to me, so similar to the hermeneutic of William Barclay, the only source of scriptural studies I knew (I think every Protestant church in America had a "church library" with a copy of Barclay's works on all the books of the Bible), that I took Schaeffer as a legitimate source, even as I didn't quite reject Bultmann out of hand as he did.

I finally read Bultmann, without such blinders, in seminary.  I read his seminal work on the Gospel of John, and his work on the synoptics (he favored John, so the synoptics were slighted, IMHO.  I still prefer Luke over the others, but that's me.).  I got my copy of Jesus Christ and Mythology sometime in seminary, but I recognized it as the less scholarly effort than his magnum opus, and I never took it very seriously.  I also knew, from some experience by then, that Biblical scholars did not make the best theologians, and JCM is a stab at theology, not a simplified version of Bultmann's scriptural studies.

Picking it up again recently, though, I realized I had done it a disservice.  It is not a truly challenging little book, like The Gospel of John, but it is a much more approachable book.  Bultmann comes out of that long line of German scholarship, where knowledge is a substantial thing and a deep well, and fluency in several languages as well as having a library of articles and books at one's fingertips (some of the pages of the Johannine study are taken over by the footnotes, and each footnote has practically its own bibliography) are common coin.  This doesn't appear on the surface of  JCM like it does in Gospel,  but as he warms to his subject Bultmann drops the facade of Herr Doktor Professor and exposes himself as a confessing Christian.  It is not a picture I'd have gotten from Schaeffer's criticisms, and it is clearly this book that outraged Schaeffer the most (I'm not sure he was capable of critiquing Bultmann's scriptural work on its own terms.  I'm not sure anybody is, however.)  Let me say The Gospel of John is a mountain range; you practically need guides and special equipment to approach it.   JCM is a pleasant hike in the foothills.  You can spend a few pleasant afternoons with it.

Whether that experience can be found in a blog reading of the book is what I hope to find out.....

Tuesday, March 15, 2005

Of Levinas, and mythology, and others....

This is not in anyway new, except to me. Chasing down Haloscan trackbacks, I found some made to me back in December (ah, halcyon days!), and that alone lightens the gloom of Lent. But I found this particularly interesting, even though I haven't done enough reading in Levinas to undertake the task.
Most of the substantive stuff in Bultmann's thought seem closest to Levinas, who, like Bultmann, is a thinker of the Radical Other. For both, the source of ethics and religion is the call of the Other. In other words, I don't act ethically toward you because you're similar to me; I act ethically because of your difference from me. This notion underpins Bultmann's theory of the "kerygma" of the text, which he defines as an existential relation to the text, which calls to me (to simplify: it resonates in my soul. The Bible isn't a set of propositions which are true or false, but something that calls to me from a distance and stirs me).

For what it's worth, merging Levinas and Christian theology got kind of hot in the 80s, so a resurgence of Bultmann, read through Levinas, is possible and would be kind of neat to see. That would require reading him against the grain of the conventional wisdom, but it's definately do-able.
Bultmann's great work, actually, is not Jesus Christ and Mythology, which he wrote trying to explain his "demythologizing" theology to the laity; his great work is his magisterial study of The Gospel of John. It's true Bultmann was friends with Heidegger (they were professors together at the time), but he read John's gospel side by side with Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments. The existentialism is much more Kierkegaard's than Heidegger's, who is, in fact, more of a phenomenologist anyway (the difference is hair-splitting, actually), and where Bultmann can't avoid it, he includes long footnotes quoting Kierkegaard's pseudonymous work (so it is, and it isn't, Kierkegaard's, at one and the same time. Paradoxes abound).

The idea of charging theology by reading Bultmann through Levinas is a profound one, for the reasons JPE gives here. Conventional wisdom in ecclesiastical circles today is all about "community," but "community" is all about the Other. And that, as Derrida says, puts us face to face with the mysterium tremendums, that which always makes us tremble. It is, in fact, an existential trembling, a terror in one's being, a fear of eradication. Which all springs from Romanticism, actually, which will always be with us, now. As Kierkegaard understood, his philosophy and theology being wholly a product of Romanticism.

Much to do, and so little time to do it all....

Monday, March 04, 2013

"The Christian Message and the Modern World-View"

We should start, of course, by identifying the "modern world view."  There is not, I suspect, such a clean cleavage between "mythological" and "non-mythological" thinking as Bultmann presumes.  Perhaps the cleavage is cleaner in Europe; but Europe is not "the world."  And if it is, it was "mythological" America which taught Europe to emphasize human rights, for gays, for women, for minorities.  But if we start there, we chase down rabbit trails, because Bultmann restricts his hermeneutic to the weltanschaaung of Scripture, not the the message(s) of Scripture.  And here I think the "historicist" view is actually quite helpful in exegesis (perhaps because it's what I was trained to do):

An objection often heard against the attempt to de-mythologize is that it takes the modern world-view as the criterion of the interpretation of the Scripture and the Christian message and that Scripture and Christian message are not allowed to say anything that is in contradiction to the modern world-view.

It is, of course, true that de-mythologizing takes the modern world-view as criterion.  To de-mythologize is not to reject Scripture or the Christian message as a whole, but the world-view of Scripture, which is the world-view of a past epoch, which all too often is retained in Christian dogmatics and in the preaching of the Church.  To de-mythologize is to deny that the message of Scripture and of the Church is bound to an ancient world-view which is obsolete. pp. 35-36.
I have seen comments on the internet (supposedly insightful) complaining of adhering to a set of books espousing a Bronze Age mentality; and I've heard preachers declare even slavery had its uses, relying on the book of Philemon as their text.  Clearly, in the broadest sense, any interpretation of Scripture today necessarily entails de-mythologizing, simply because we don't think as Paul did, nor as the original authors of Genesis or Deuteronomy did, and it would be a mistake to insist we had to in order to understand Scripture.  In that sense Bultmann stands against fundamentalists and literalists, who aren't nearly as literal as they think they are (get one to explain why Jesus was born in Bethlehem, for example.  Was it because of the census, or because Joseph and Mary lived there?  And why was he raised in Nazareth?  Again, because the Holy Family lived there, or because of Herod and the flight to Egypt.  These stories are absolutely irreconcilable as "literal truth."  Yet it can be done, I'm sure; by fudging "literal truth.").  There can be great value in such analyses, especially when lessons of history and archaeology are honestly applied.  But we'll return to that; for now, Bultmann.  He says something here I absolutely agree with, without reservation:

The nature of man [sic] is to be seen in modern literature as, for instance, in the novels of Thomas Mann, Ernst Junger, Thornton Wilder, Ernest Hemingway, William Faulkner, Graham Greene and Albert Camus, or in the plays of Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Anouilh, Jean Girardoux, etc.  Or let us think simply of the news papers.  Have you read anywhere in them that political or social or economic events are performed by supernatural powers such as God, angels or demons?  Such events are always ascribed to natural power, or to good or bad will on the part of men [sic], or to human wisdom of stupidity. p. 37.
Well, the first part I agree with; the second part?  Not quite so much.  There is a valid distinction to be drawn between the believing community and the non-believing community, and one cannot expect the former to speak always and only in the vocabulary and understanding of the latter, else there is no distinction between them, and all believe dissolves.  This is not a new problem; it is as old as scriptures themselves.  The Hebrews are better than anyone at questioning God's presence or even God's actions in the world.  "Oh, that you would come down as in days of old!," the prophet rages, demanding a sign for an unbelieving age, the age that saw the Babylonian Exile, an exile credited to Hebraic apostasy.  How much of that exile was attributed to God's anger, and how much to Israel's actions?  A close reading of the prophets leads me to believe it is the latter, rather than the former, especially if you take account of the visions of Ezekiel or the warnings of Jeremiah or Amos, of even Habakkuk.  Even Israel was inclined to attribute to God what it wanted God to be responsible for, and to attribute to themselves (especially in the time of Solomon) the wisdom of human efforts.  And Israel was created as a believing community.  In the present day, with the church a part of social order but almost not even a pillar anymore (admittedly past Bultmann's day, but have things changed so much since Eliot wrote the Choruses for the Rock even earlier?), it's only an issue for fundamentalists, it seems to me.  Still, Bultmann is just laying the groundwork for an argument; it's unfair to pick at a sentence here or there along the way.

Bultmann's point, as he says almost immediately, is that: "modern man [sic] acknowledges as reality only such phenomena or events as are comprehensible within the framework of the rational order of the universe.  He [sic] does not acknowledge miracles because they do not fit into this lawful order."  There is a very valid point being made here.  I have encountered more than a few Christians who use such disparities between the Biblical text and their own experience to excuse religious practice in their daily lives as something no longer required, just as we no longer need to believe the sun moves around the earth, or that there is a "seventh heaven" because the planets are all held in place by crystalline spheres (creating the "levels" of heaven).  It's a lazy dodge for people who would find a dodge anyway, so eliminating it won't make them better Christians or more moral persons.  But it is far too easy to dismiss much of scripture, even by believers, as having no real bearing on modern life because it is so foreign to our experiences.  Finding the connections between the story of the Assumption in Luke, or even the healings in they synoptics, and modern life can be a very valuable undertaking; and it has to start with understanding how we think now, and how they thought then, and what differences are minor, and what differences aren't.  To dismiss scripture as a product of a "Bronze Age" people, is to dismiss our connection to the rest of humanity on the planet now, or that ever preceded us.  It's a stupid rejection; but we can't just connect with them without a major effort at understanding them, either.  You wouldn't treat your grandparents that way, after all, simply because they don't understand how to send text messages.

Interestingly, Bultmann slides rather easily into a preacherly mode, sounding a bit more like Kierkegaard than even Kierkegaard meant to sound:

Thus modern man is in danger of forgetting two things:  first, that his plans and undertakings should be guided not by his own desires for happiness and security, usefulness and profit, but rather by obedient response to the challenge of goodness, truth and love, by obedience to the commandment of God which man forgets in his selfishness and presumption; and, secondly, that it is an illusion to suppose that real security can be gained by men [sic] organizing their own personal and community life. p. 39.
 It's actually a point Reinhold Niebuhr might argue, but that's beside the point.  Bultmann is trying now to fit de-mythologizing into the Christian message, and to do that, he's got to define what he means by the latter.  He borders on poetry, though he sounds like an ancient Greek trying to explain the Christian mystery:

There are encounters and destinies which man cannot master.  He cannot secure endurance for his works.  His life is fleeting and its end is death.  History goes on and pulls down all the towers of Babel again and again.  There is no real, definitive security, and it is precisely this illusion to which mean are prone to succumb in their yearning for security. pp. 39-40.
Miserable creatures that we are, what is there to save us from this death?

It is the word of God which calls man away from his selfishness and from the illusory security which he has built up for himself.  It calls him to God, who is beyond the world and beyond scientific thinking.  At the same time, it calls man to his true self.  For the self of man, his inner life, his personal existence is also beyond the visible world and beyond rational thinking.  The Word of God addresses man in his personal existence and thereby it gives him freedom from the world and from the sorrow and anxiety which overwhelm him when he forgets the beyond.....To believe in the Word of God means to abandon all merely human security and thus to overcome the despair which arises from the attempt to find security, an attempt which is always in vain. p. 40.

Did I say the former quote sounded like S.K.?  This is more like S.K. almost pure and unadulterated.

And so we see that demythologizing is not succumbing to rationalism, but using it to "wound from behind" as S.K. would say, and even as a pole to vault over science into a still more human realm.  Or, as Bultmann puts it:

Thus it follows that the objection is raised by a mistake, namely, the objection that de-mythologizing means rationalizing the Christian message, that de-mythologizing dissolves the message into a product of human rational thinking, and that the mystery of God is destroyed by de-mythologizing.  Not at all!  One the contrary, de-mythologizing makes clear the true meaning of God's mystery.  The incomprehensibility of God lies not in the sphere of theoretical thought but in the sphere of personal existence.  Not what God is in Himself, but how he [sic] acts with men [sic], is the mystery in which faith is interested.*  This is a mystery not to theoretical thought, but to the natural wills and desires of men. p. 43
 Good Calvinist that I was raised to be, I'm not sure how Augustinian I want to be any more about the "natural wills and desires of men;" on the other hand, the asterisk I gratuitously tossed in there is to allow me to insert that the mystery is also what theology is interested in; not to solve the puzzle, but to examine and appreciate the mystery for what it is.  That usually leads me to negative theology, but I don't think that's such a bad place to wind up.  Or to stop before we begin an examination of Bultmann's understanding of existentialist philosophy and hermeneutics.


Tuesday, May 15, 2018

Thomas' Question*


Mostly just because I can; and I like L.W. III

This is not the whole of Christian soteriology, nor necessarily even a part of it.  But this is the problem with the common conception of Christian "salvation":


Christianity is, by definition, an exclusive religion. Anyone can become a Christian, but doing so means accepting an exclusive doctrine. According to Christ, “I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.”

This, by definition, means other religions are “false.” It’s a bold claim; there’s no denying that.
There is, actually, an ecumenical movement in Christianity that is accepting of other world religions.  Thomas Merton studied Buddhist teachings in Abbey Gethsemani.  Pope Francis pointedly promotes dialogue with Muslims and Jews.  There is, at one level, a widely disseminated sense of the unity of the human family that accepts all expressions of religion, or even non-expressions of religion, as acceptable and even honorable.

And then there's the stupidity of people like Matt Lewis.  I call his statement stupid only because he presumes to speak for me in claiming that my Christianity means I have to read John 14:6 the way he does.  Granted, to even engage this argument on this verse is to accept the standard hermeneutic that Christianity is first and foremost about metaphysical salvation (preservation of the immortal soul, or saving it from damnation).  So let me quote Bultmann on this passage, from his magisterial study of the Gospel of John, one heavily influenced by Kierkegaard and approaching this entire passage (it's part of the Farewell Discourse in John's Gospel.  Jesus goes on and on for 5 chapters, never observing the communion initiation of the Synoptics, and, as one of my New Testament professors said, sucking all the air out of the room.).

Bultmann starts with v. 4 of chapter 14:

The wording of v. 4 is provocative; the believer was addressed on a subject he ought to have known about, and yet did not.  It has the effect of drawing his attention to what has been given him, and thus of inciting him to ask a question about it.  It is Thomas who does so (v. 5)--foolishly, like the Jews (7:35f,; 8.22), because he should have known long ago whither Jesus is going.  His question is typical of the mythological standpoint, which can only conceive fo the goal and the way as things within the world.  And yet to this extent the question has been put correctly:  it makes clear that the disciple's knowledge of his own way depends on knowledge of Jesus' [going].[Bultmann uses a great deal of koine Greek freely; I will translate as best I can.]

Jesus' answer in v. 6 corrects the mythological thinking:

[I am the way, and I am truth, and I am life," replies Jesus.  "No one gets to the Father unless it is through me.]**

By describing himself as the way Jesus makes two things clear:  1.  His case is different from that of the disciples; he does not need a "way" for himself, as the disciples do, rather he is the way for them; 2. the way and the goal are not to be separated as they are in mythological thinking.  In the myth the redemption has become embodied in a cosmic event, and therefore--contrary to the intention of the myth--it is conceived as an intra-mundane event, as a divine history, which takes place apart from the existence of man [sic], who is referred to it as the guarantee of his future.  According to John the redemption is an event which takes place in human existence through the encounter with the Revealer, with the result that the believer's present is already based on his future; his existence is eschatological existence; his way is at the same time his goal.
Bultmann has a way of packing a great deal into a small space.  His exegesis here is not based on the standard hermeneutic that Jesus is all about saving souls, and that the Gospel of John is the locus of salvific teaching to help you escape the flames of Hell.  Bultmann doesn't even start there, but it is difficult to understand what he is getting at if you don't set that hermeneutic aside as one (at least) among many.  Per Bultmann's exegesis Jesus here is not declaring a soteriology, he is in fact making a Christological statement (he equates himself with God, a direct challenge to the Jews of the community the Gospel of John is written for) and a wisdom statement (very much in line with Jewish/Hebraic teachings.  Rabbis, after all, are teachers; and how does one learn wisdom except by being taught?).   Jesus is not, here, declaring himself as somehow the "way" to Heaven (salvation), but the way to God and wisdom and "life into the ages."  That phrase is the Greek phrase used in the Synoptics more than in John, and usually translated, less helpfully, as "eternal life."  It is not necessary, in other words, or I think even proper, to read the Gospel of John as a metaphysical guidebook to the afterlife (that's a very Gnostic reading, ironically.  Ironically because Bultmann notes the analogy to Gnosticism in v. 6, but points out again that the Gnostic teaching relies on what he calls the "myth," which v. 6 abandons.  Reading Bultmann, I would say Lewis' interpretation of John 14:6 is reinstating the myth and missing the point of the original altogether.).

Bultmann underscores this a few paragraphs on:

But the believer finds God only in him, i.e., God is not directly accessible; faith is not a mystical experience, but rather historical existence that is subject to the revelation.

That means that there is no "short cut" to the correct understanding of [truth] and [physical life].  The discovery of this [truth] is not something established once and for all, at men's [sic] disposal, such as could be communicated in "condensed form" like a truth of science on the contrary everyone has to take the way to it for himself [sic], for only on the way does this truth disclose itself.  Similarly Jesus is the truth; he does not simply state it.  One does not come to him to ask about truth; one comes to him as the truth.  The truth does not exist as a doctrine which could be understood, preserved, and handed on, so that the teacher is discharged and surpassed.  Rather, the position a man [sic] takes vis-a-vis the Revealer decides not whether he knows the truth, but whether he is "of the truth," that is to say whether his existence is determined by the truth, whether the truth is the ground on which his existence is based.  And as in Christianity everyone has to start for himself [sic] from the beginning, so too there is no such thing as a history of Christianity which world-history, in the sense of a history of ideas or problems, in which one progresses from stage to stage, from solution to solution; each generation has the same original relation to the revelation.

If however that is the answer to the question Thomas raised, as to the way that leads to the goal which is beyond historical existence, then this much is clear:  the questioner is referred back to his [sic] own historical existence.
The "way" is not a way to salvation, any more than it is a path to wisdom ("Follow this map.  'X' marks the spot.")  Jesus' declaration that he is "the way" is both a turn on Thomas' question (not really an answer, at least not to the question Thomas asked) and a statement made in the context of an early 2nd century community struggling for its identity as now (then) "Jews" (people from Judea) who have, within recent memory lost the Temple in Jerusalem and are only now beginning that rabbinic Judaism we all now think of as the religion of Judaism.  Against that struggle the Christians (Jews who have converted, in John's community) assert their own identity, much as the other Gospel writers did (the Pharisees in particular are the ancestors of the rabbis).  Must we also understand the anti-semitism that arose as a weed in historical Christianity is an essential feature of the religion?  If we do not, why can we not reject the interpretation of John as a basis for an exclusionary Christianity?

Is it really essential to our salvation that somebody else be damned?  Is it really essential to our Christianity that somebody else be wrong?


*"Thomas says to him, 'Master, we don't know where you're going.  How can we possibly know the way?"  John 14:5, SV.  I find it very helpful not to take verses out of context in order to exegete them properly.

**The translation is from the Scholar's Version, which appends this note to the verse:  "This may state the rhetoric of Jewish/Christian conflict that occasions this gospel--or one side of it--as much as the absolute claim it is usually taken to be.  Perhaps Jesus here speaks mainly positively, to reassure his followers, as v. 7 shows."  V. 7, by the way, reads:  "If you do recognize me, you will recognize my Father also.  From this moment on you know him and have seen him."  You have to go quite a ways from that to "And those who don't, burn in hell!"

Quotes from Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of John:  A Commentary, tr. G.R. Beasley-Murray, R.W.N. Hoare, and J.K. Riches.  The Westminster Press, 1971.

Wednesday, September 13, 2006

At last!

A chance to talk about religion and politics!


President Bush said yesterday that he senses a "Third Awakening" of religious devotion in the United States that has coincided with the nation's struggle with international terrorists, a war that he depicted as "a confrontation between good and evil."

Bush told a group of conservative journalists that he notices more open expressions of faith among people he meets during his travels, and he suggested that might signal a broader revival similar to other religious movements in history. Bush noted that some of Abraham Lincoln's strongest supporters were religious people "who saw life in terms of good and evil" and who believed that slavery was evil. Many of his own supporters, he said, see the current conflict in similar terms.
Atrios thinks this means Bush has "messianic delusions," but I don't think so. I think this is simply Bush trying to secure his place in history, even as that place slips rapidly away from him.

There is a lot of discussion in ecclesiological circles around a "new Reformation". It is usually centered on either the "success" (I am dubious, so I put it in quotes) of the American "mega-churches," or the equally dubious success of some new form of "more rational" theology (equally dubious). This latter claim is largely a post-Bultmannian one, resting more or less on Bultmann's concept of "demythologizing" (in a nutshell, that's what Shelby Spong is on about), or perhaps on "process theology" (one of the major proponents of that school, Shubert Ogden, is a student of Bultmann), or on the scholarship championed by the Jesus Seminar (Robert Funk, the founder of the JSeminar, is also a student of Bultmann, IIRC). Bultmann, ironically enough, did his best theological work in The Gospel of John, which is basically rea reading of the fourth gospel through the lens of Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, with Martin Heidegger (Bultmann and Heidegger were on staff together at the time) as sparring partner. Bultmann's scriptural work is basically an extension of the Germanic scholarship and philological work of the 19th century, so while it isn't far to label him as anachronistic, he doesn't exactly represent a "new thing."

Except to the laity who are still catching up with the scholarship of 200 years ago, and who may or may not be enthralled with any of these ideas. Depends on who you ask. Probably the "newest thing" going right now is either Matthew Fox (who has pretty much petered out as a dynamic force), or liberation theology, which more than one institution seems to have been determined to strangle in its crib. It is certainly not a potent force in theological circles at the moment, anyway.

So is there a new "Reformation" underway, or even a Third (or Fourth, depending on who's counting) Awakening? Frankly, I don't see it; and I see people looking for it as simply looking for a star to hitch their wagon to, or maybe a bandwagon they can jump onto. Little more than that, really. Certainly hoping for such a sweeping change in history is not to automatically place yourself at its head or to imagine yourself as its reason. In a sense, it's kind of akin to apocalypticism, to the idea that you have keen enough insight to see the end coming, or at least to be able to predict it. This is a common failing for the terminally pessimistic just as it is for the ludicrously religious, in which latter category I would put Bush, based on the quoted remarks. It's a seeking after order in what seems to be a chaotic present, a need to define, using the past as guide, what seems only to be senselessness in the present and coming from the future. Who, after all, can define the present except by looking back from an imagined future?

But we forget history when we do this. Luther, for example, meant to reform the Church of Rome, not create a church in oppsition to it (his opposition would have cost him his life if not for some powerful protectors). Most people who imagine being present at a time of such dramatic change also imagine the outcome is inevitable and predictable, because they imagine themselves seeing it from the projected future they are sure is arising from the madness of the present, that future when this present is past, and makes sense. In short, it is simply a desire to be identified with the winners of history, not the losers. Looking back, it is easy to see the benefits of the Reformation; but at the time, Luther was merely an irreverant upstart heretic who had violated his vows (he was an Augustinian monk when he nailed his 95 thesis to the Wittenberg church door).

Frankly, what worries me is the simple dichotomy of "good v. evil," because that always means the person doing the identifying is good, and the people that person disagrees with or opposes, are "evil." And in that context I always remember the words of Jesus when the man approached him and said: "Good master, what must I do to have eternal life?", and Jesus immediately asked: "Why do you call me good? There is no one good but God alone."

If we're going to start awakening, let's start by awakening to that humbling truth. If there's something unfortunate about sweeping religious movements, it's that they almost never start there.

Monday, February 18, 2013

Prologue to getting underway....


I want to start this discussion, not with Bultmann, but with the Second Vatican Council.  Granted, that's not the safest place for me to start, because I know so little about "Vatican II," and what I know from Wikipedia (not a fount of scholarship, admittedly) is absolutely fascinating (though I have no way of knowing how accurate it is ):

Throughout the 1950s, theological and biblical studies of the Catholic Church had begun to sway away from the neo-scholasticism and biblical literalism that the reaction to Catholic modernism had enforced since the First Vatican Council.  This shift could be seen in theologians such as Karl Rahner, S.J., Michael Herbert, and John Courtney Murray, SJ who looked to integrate modern human experience with church principles based on Jesus Christ, as well as others such as Yves Congar, Joseph Ratzinger and Henri de Lubac who looked to an accurate understanding of scripture and the early Church Fathers as a source of renewal (or ressourcement).

At the same time the world's bishops faced tremendous challenges driven by political, social, economic, and technological change. Some of these bishops sought new ways of addressing those challenges. The First Vatican Council had been held nearly a century before but had been cut short when the Italian Army entered the city of Rome at the end of Italian unification. As a result, only deliberations on the role of the Papacy and the congruent relationship of faith and reason were completed, with examination of pastoral issues concerning the direction of the Church left unaddressed.

 First things first:  yes, that Joseph Ratzinger, then present as a "theological expert:"

All in all, we may say that Ratzinger belonged to the inner circle of theologians whose thinking prevailed at Vatican II.
I don't know if that would shock Ross Douthat, or confirm his deepest fears:

 The fact that the Second Vatican Council had left the church internally divided limited Catholic influence in some ways but magnified it in others.
In any discussion of the Roman church, it's a common bugaboo, at least among American conservatives, that with Vatican II, there the troubles began.  Douthat is more circumspect than most; he doesn't connect the dots so much as leave them in a clearly recognizable pattern, because Vatican II crops up in a discussion of recent history that leads to this conclusion:

 If this era is now passing, and Catholic ideas are becoming more marginal to our politics, it’s partially because institutional Christianity is weaker over all than a generation ago, and partially because Catholicism’s leaders have done their part, and then some, to hasten that de-Christianization.
Because any change from the way we did it when I was a kid (and I've seen this pattern repeat itself over and over and over again) is the path to ruination and damnation and destruction.  And when you are looking for the headwaters of "de-Christianization," you usually wind up, not with the German Biblical scholars who began treating Scripture as folktales and mythology and finding new insights in them thanks to the then new practices of philology (now splintered into linquistics, anthropology, and several other sciences), but with one German Biblical scholar in the mid-20th century:  Rudolf Bultmann.

I first heard of Bultmann critically, as the symbol and source of all that was wrong with "theologians" and "Biblical scholars" and the reason Biblical literalists and fundamentalists had to set things right.  It's amusing to think about it now, but the reason Bultmann gained this reputation is because he tried to step out of the rarified atmosphere of Biblical scholarship (quick:  name three major Biblical scholars.  I'll wait.  And "The Jesus Seminar" doesn't count.  They were serious scholars, but their Seminar was a publicity stunt.  If you can name them, tell me what they said.  Googling is cheating.) and actually published a book, taken from lectures he was giving about the time I was born (mid-20th century), in which he tried to explain his hermeneutic in plain language.  He even gave it a name, which soon became anathema (well, until Christianity became more concerned with the "Gospel of Getting Rich and Feeling Good" than with scriptural studies).  He called it "de-mythologizing."  And though he explained very carefully what he meant, and though he really meant little more than "integrate modern human experience with church principles based on Jesus Christ," as well as an accurate understanding of scripture [if not the early Church Fathers; Bultmann was a Lutheran] as a source of renewal," still he became the favorite chew toy of Francis Schaeffer and others who never really understood what he was about.

And understanding, mind, does not mean "agreeing with."

Anyway, I want to start there, and with this; rather than writing a really long-winded post that makes you lose track of the beginning by the time you get to the end.  Bultmann, we have to start with understanding, was not a theologian; nor (although he worked alongside Heidegger and makes much of existentialism in Jesus Christ and Mythology) was he a philosopher.  He was a Biblical scholar, and, despite the brickbats from the peanut gallery, a Christian believer.  And he pretty much set the tone for modern theological discussions, even among "conservatives" like Pope Benedict, soon to be Joseph Ratzinger again.  Oddly, that "tone" may still be more radical than most Christians would consider "conservative;" which is something else we'll need to consider.

Discussion of the book itself starts (hopefully) momentarily.


Friday, May 20, 2022

Who Can It Be Now?


What is quoted here is from two blog posts at Thought Criminal; they are linked separately below.  What follows is in no way a reference to anything TC has to say about these passages.  I'm just "stealing" his work insofar as he has transcribed this.  Otherwise, the faults are all mine, and the direction of my comments is toward the material quoted, and nothing else.

A Confused State of Scholarship

"Confused" is the key word there; because this analysis is too simple by half.

In a simple version of the culture war, hostile criticism would be pitted against belief, and each position would be located in the appropriate social settings.  Criticism would find its home in the academy, and belief in the Church.  But the reality is that the social locations of biblical scholarship are diverse,  and the question of its precise purpose very much an open one.   To properly locate the present situation, a rapid review of the development of critical scholarship within and outside the Church may be helpful. 

Start with that "simple version" of the culture war.  It is the simplistic version that the "culture war" proponents prefer, be they political warriors or ideological/intellectual ones.  The very concept of a "culture war" is itself a reductio ad absurdum that posits a simple culture (the "right" one) against another simple culture, but one more nefarious and tentacled like an octopus (always a metaphor for evil), one that must be fought by striking at the head, not the many nasty, insidisous arms.  Yes, the simplistic version of any analysis of religion in the West today is dominated by the cretinous dichotomy that criticism is housed and welcome in the Academy (although not among the pointy-head elites!) and mere belief ("believin' what you know ain't so!"), i.e., credulousness, is lodged firmly in the church.  Flapdoodle.

Are the "social locations of biblical scholarship" diverse?  Yes,  But they are primarily located in the Academy, and carried out by criticism as rigorous as any scientific analysis is (well above the standard of the pop science and pseudo science of people like Dawkins and  Pinker, or the paltry philosophizing of Dennett, which is all as rigorous as "belief" is usually defined to be).  But you won't get that here.

Before the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century, biblical scholarship was carried out exclusively in service of the Christian faith, within its framework in the canon (the official collection of biblical writings)  the teaching authority of the church, and the creed.  Much of patristic and monastic interpretation in fact, took the form of homilies to be delivered at worship.  Even when the medieval universities developed out of monastic schools as independent centers of learning, biblical scholarship was done within the framework of theology the "queen of the sciences," and the threefold norm of church, canon and creed held sway.

Accurate so far as it goes, but it clouds the differences between groups, too.  Franciscans were hardly fans of the Thomistic scholars; Jesuit scholars took their own tack, and the Augustinians were as fundamentally important as the Thomists, but were no more in control than any other group.  This kind of fractiousness i often papered over; and the analysis of Protestantism that follows ignores the divisions between Calvinists, Zwinglists, and Lutherans, as well as the rise of the Quakers, the Methodists, the Mennonites, the Campbellites, and so on.  Too much for the brief sketch intended by Johnson?  Perhaps.  But sola scriptura and individual interpretation didn't give rise to anarchy in the churches in the 15th century. and weren't even the dominant ideas of Protestant movements.  For many churches control of the interpretation shifted from the monks and priests to the congregation.  Many Protestant churches in America were run by the elders of the church, who sat in the pews immediately before the pulpit, and critiqued the preacher and corrected him, later, on his doctrinal and scriptural views, the better to keep him in line. The "free for all" was tightly contained in some denominations, even as it led to an explosion of them across Protestantism.  But that was largely because the central control of the Pope and the church hierarchy which supports the Papacy was not recreated by Luther or any other non-Catholic, and therefore by definition, Protestant church.  Within the Catholic (i.e., "universal") church various sects thrived.  In Protestantism, each sect set up it's own denomination, even if that denomination was ultimately only a few scattered churches.

The Reformation, especially through the work of Martin Luther changed everything.  Luther opposed Catholicism's emphasis on tradition as norm for Scripture by elevating Scripture to the exclusive font of revelation (sola scriptura).  This made the key to right living dependent on the right reading of Scripture. The context of ecclesial interpretation was weakened further by the principle of individual interpretation,  for the first time made practical by translations from the original and above all the invention of printing, which made Bibles readily available to the laity.  Now the New Testament is not heard mostly in Latin within the liturgy and as expounded by clergy, but can be apprehended directly in one's native language and is open to private interpretation.  It was a combination filled with potential conflict.  Everything essential rested on the reading of a text, but that reading could be carried out by individuals!

So, yeah, a bit more complicated than that.  As is Luther, who is not just "a passionate lover of the texts," but an excommunicated Augustinian monk.  Augustine's works run through Luther's teachings like pure gold runs through a golden ring blended with other metals so it is strong enough to hold its shape, but can still be called "gold."  Luther didn't throw over the Roman church, he took much of it with him, including Augustine's emphasis on sin.  Yes, Calvin took that further than even Luther did, but the point is the "revolution" was in some ways fundamental, and in some ways just a continuation of what Christianity had been doing for a millenia at that point. 

As for that line "the recovery of original Christianity," that was the goal of the Reformed movement, which means primarily Calvin.  Luther wanted to reform the Catholic church, which is why Lutheran worship to this day is so nearly like Roman Catholic liturgies (the Anglican church, likewise, kept most of Catholicism's worship practices).  Calvin and his spiritual descendants discarded Roman liturgies, even Roman religious holidays, in their efforts to return to "original Christianity."  Again, Protestantism is more diverse and complicated than this summary is admitting.

As for the recovery of the original Greek texts, that was largely a factor of scholarship.  The Vulgate replaced the original texts and became the standard text in churches.  The Protestant churches couldn't adopt the Vulgate, which after all was a translation into the common tongue of its day (hence the name), so they had to make their own translations.  Where better to start than the original texts, which have only become more available and reliable thanks to centuries of Biblical scholarship.  Open the Nestle-Aland, the accepted standard Greek New Testament, and you'll find notes to almost every verse noting variant readings in "original" texts.  Those variants are known only because of Biblical scholarship.

Then again, until recently many Protestant churches thought the KJV was the standard text for worship.  Most people still recite the "Our Father" (most Protestants, anyway) in the KJV, or a slightly updated RSV (not the newer translation, the NRSV), and who recites Psalm 23 in any version but the 400 year old KJV translation?  If you know it at all, I guarantee that's the one you know. The Vulgate persisted longer because there were fewer resources for printing other translations, and less interest in doing so.  Bibles became popular in common tongues because of Gutenberg.  Luther translated the scriptures into the German of his day (I have a copy, a 40 year old or so printing, on my bookshelves).  But the history of that change is another fraught with complexity and, sadly, soaked in blood.  Again, it wasn't a straightforward move from the 95 theses to Tyndale's English translation.  And Tyndale's reliance on the Hebrew and Greek scriptures was more a rejection of Catholicism than it was an urge at "purification" and "reform."  Even the Puritans were less defined by their "purity" than by their animosity toward anything they thought "Papist" or just not in agreement with their ideals.

Luther was from beginning to end not only an interpreter of the Bible but a passionate lover of the texts and of the One to whom those pointed.  Nevertheless, his approach to the New Testament (which was to prove overwhelmingly influential in the development of critical scholarship) was deeply if unconsciously affected by the intellectual climate of the Renaissance.  This can be seen not only in his preference for the recovered Greek text over the Latin Vulgate proclaimed in the Church (note here the implicit authority of the Greek reading scholar over the latin dependent clergy).  The recovery of the original text was the key to the recovery of original Christianity.  Just as Renaissance scholars, once classical texts were recovered, could measure the inadequacy of late-medieval society against the grandeur of Greece and Rome, so could the theologian measure the inadequacy of medieval Christianity against the norm of the primitive church, or even better, the figure of Jesus, himself.

The "grandeur of Greece and Rome" is a Renaissance notion, not an absolute historical one.  There is much to criticize about medieval Europe; there is equally as much to criticize about the "grandeur of Greece and Rome," especially as Greece included everything from the city state of Athens, where only male Greek citizens had any political or legal power (and young boys were subject to pederastry the better to prove the men were above their "animal desires".  That's where the Greek love of reason went, in part.), to the military barbarism of Sparta.  And the "grandeur" of Rome included the gladiatorial games around the empire and in the eternal city itself.  Blood sports in which slaves and gladiators (who were slaves, too) died for the entertainment of the masses.  Panem et circenses.  It's not a phrase that calls up a governin, or even social, ideal.  There is a great deal to admire about Greek and Roman culture; and a great deal to criticize.

And "the figure of Jesus himself."  Pray, tell, who is that?  The tall handsome white man with flowing chestnut hair I grew up seeing pictures of in my Sunday School classes? (Somehow Jesus always had long hair and the disciples all had shorter hair.  Never did figure out why they went to the barber on the regular and Jesus didn't.)  The Jesus of Calvin, who waits to judge us all as damned, save for the small number of the elect which none of may know until it's too late?  The Jesus of compassion versus the "God of the Old Testament" bloodthirsty warrior?  But isn't Jesus God, and God Jesus?  How does that work?  Is Jesus the guy who can't stop talking in John's gospel, but can't say much that is clear because you either "get it," or you don't?  Or is he the teacher who explains his parables to his disciples, in Matthew?  Jesus has been the central focus of Christology since the earliest days of the church, literally since the letters of Paul (which focus far more on the nature of the Christ than on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth).  What is this "figure of Jesus," after all?

This seems to be where Johnson is going with this:

Two important assumptions remain implicit in this commitment.  The first is that the recovery of origins means the recovery of essence; the first realization of Christianity is naturally the best.  It follows from this premise that any "development" of Christianity must be seen as a decline.  The second assumption is that history can act as a theological norm for the reform of the church; the recovery of "original Christianity" made available through the recovery of the "original Scripture" should naturally serve as measure and critique for all subsequent forms of Christianity.

So widely are precisely these assumptions held - and taken for granted - that it is perhaps necessary to pause in order to assert that they are, in fact, assumptions rather than necessary truths.  Only a little thought is required to realize the problematic character of the first premise.  Indeed, in most matters, we now assume that earlier forms are perfected by later development. Likewise, it is by no means our automatic instinct in other matters to measure the adequacy or integrity of present behavior against the norm of earlier behavior. Rather, we tend to measure adequacy and integrity in terms of other criteria. 

Which is sound, as far as it goes; well, the first paragraph, anyway.  What he's critiquing is strands of Protestantism, whole denominations in Protestantism, in fact, which think "original" Xianity was more pure and therefore both more virtuous and more authentic.  Think of the Puritans in all their overzealous glory.  I know a number of contemporary (as in, still around, though mostly grounded in the 19th century where they had their origins) Protestant denominations which claim to be the "purer" expression of "true" Xianity.  MO Synod and WI Synod Lutherans, who in that order think themselves more pure than ELCA and any other "Lutherans" and therefore closer to the "truth."  It's a good way to keep people out of your church.*

That's an idea among lay people and the pastors who lead them, however,  It has bugger all to do with Biblical scholarship.  Recovering "original scriptures" is the same nonsense, with the same application to scholarship.

As I mentioned, the Nestle-Aland Greek New Testament lists every available variant  to the words of the canonical gospels and letters.  You can even find these kinds of notes in many annotated translations, where a footnote will direct you to "other sources" which have the word (or words)..... at that point in the scriptures.  I'm literally at a loss to know which "original scriptures" Johnson is referring to, since scholars don't recognize such a chimera.

His second paragraph is an insult to the scholarship of Dom Crossan or Rudolf Bultmann, or even Raymond E. Brown.  Brown is a Catholic priest and scholar whose work is closely in line with traditional Biblical exegesis; but his scholarship is quite modern and impeccable  He has, in other words, points where I disagree with him, but I do so with respect because his work is solid and if I think he has blind spots, it only reminds me I have my own I don't see.  Neither Crossan nor Bultmann are truly in the German historical/critical school from the 19th century, which is another problem for me.  Johnson is writing in the 21st century, and I assume the bone he has to pick is with Crossan and the Jesus Seminar.  Of the members of that group known to the public or who became familiar (briefly) for their popular works. Crossan is by far the most scholarly.  Bultmann is the German scholar without peer; his works are so densely packed with information it's like reading three books at once just to read one.  None of this means these scholars are without error; but you don't take them on with vague and glittering generalities and a few vague sentences explaining that "it's all like this!"

I've seen enough of that "school" of analysis on the internet and in recent Supreme Court opinions (draft and published).  I don't need any more of it.

Let's take up historical criticism for a moment.  It's pretty much the founding "school" of modern Biblical criticism.  As such, it is too prone to dismiss the work of saints and scholars before them (much as the Renaissance declared the time before it the "Dark Ages".  Nice work when you get to determine the definitions, isn't it?).  But historical criticism was trying to clear away millenia of mythology and mistake in order to read Scripture with fresh eyes in the 19th century.  That century must be remembered as the era of "God's Funeral," as Edmund Wilson put it at the end of the 20th century.  Historical criticism was not trying to return Xianity to its "pure" form; it was trying to find a way to understand scripture in what were then "modern times."  When I was young the vogue was to translate the scriptures (or just update the RSV) into more contemporary language.  There were the "Cottonpatch" gospels," and "Good News For Modern Man," and I think some versions in what was then called "Black English." Yeah, these all sound painfully condescending and clueless 60 years later; but this was partly due to the focus, frankly, on sola scriptura.  What was missing was a new focus on interpretation, which was the purpose of historical criticism in the 19th century.  When that school of analysis (and others; so many others) finally began to penetrate into the pews in the 1960's, it prompted people like Francis Schaeffer to explode in outrage.  Literally the first time I heard of Rudolf Bultmann was in a diatribe by Schaeffer (I tell a lie; I first encountered Bultmann in Robert Short's two books on the Christianity in "Peanuts."  He referenced Bultmann and Barth liberally.  Schaeffer got me interested in reading Bultmann; if he was so against him, Bultmann must be on to something.  Alas, it was seminary decades later before I finally started that reading.)  I've frankly forgotten the many schools of criticism that came out of German scholarship in the 19th century. Formalism was another; the analysis of stories to find "structures" in them (Structuralism came out of French anthropology in the 20th century, not coincidentaly because formalism became a tool of anthropology, folklore studies, and literary studies and criticism.).  So today even English teachers identify a fable, a parable, and a tale based on certain elements including length of story, complexity, and types of characters (talking animals, for example; or the realism of a Gospel parable).  After Jung, there is archetypal criticism; and so on.  There are several schools I learned something about in seminary, but never used for exegesis, so frankly I've forgotten them.  Picking on historical criticms now is only because the Jesus Seminar championed a new version of it late in the last century.

The Jesus Seminar was actually a fairly loose collection of Biblical scholars with one unifying principle:  to provide grounds for rejecting as much of Biblical literalism as they could.  It's a bit of an ambitious goal because ideas are both invisible and bulletproof, as well as being damned near immortal.  Consider Augustine's concept of original sin, one Paul himself probably wouldn't recognize. But more people recognize Augustine's framework (even if they don't know Augustine by name) than even know of Stendahl's work, so...there you are.  Still, the JS wrote and worked in opposition to literalism that tried to establish every word of the Gospels (especially, but also the words they liked from the Hebrew Scriptures. Literalists and fundamentalists tend to be a lot more selective about which words of the Law Matthew's Jesus says he came to fulfill, actually need to be fulfilled.) as true and meant just as they are written (i.e., translated) and especially as they are interpreted by modern fundamentalists and literalists.

This is where I say, now:  "Fine, fundies and literalists; you read it your way and I'll read it mine." And so I appreciate the tools scholars like the JS have given me.  But they are only tools.  Interpretation is, as ever, the contentious matter.

So the Jesus Seminar set itself a particular goal.  The infamous "red text" version they came up with, for example.  The Seminar publicized its practice of meeting to vote on the words of Jesus in the gospels:  red for historically accurate, gray for possibly the words of Jesus of Nazareth, black for words invented by a community or the gospel writer (the consensus among scholars is that the four canonicals are the products of a community of believers, not one scribe working feverishly under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit or just the need to make a record as a modern journalist or even diarist would today.  One hand may have written, but undoubtedly many voices had a say in the final product.).  My NT professor proudly regaled us with tales of being among the "skeptics" who dropped a black marble (that's really how they did it; colored marbles in a bowl, which were then counted) for almost all the words of Jesus in all four gospels.

Were they right?  Were they historically more accurate?  That depends on what you make of their arguments.  I would argue you have to go to those sources for that discussion, and not take the third-hand report of Mr. Johnson, who wasn't at the table and has his own axe to grind.  It's really a rather simple principle of scholarship:  to examine a subject and critique it, you have to start with the subject itself, and get as close to the original or accurate form as possible.  If you're understanding of historical criticism is drawn from Mr. Johnson's diatribe, I contend you don't understand the subject at all.  Which doesn't mean you have to agree with me, or disagree with Mr. Johnson.  But honestly, his generalizations bear very little relationship to reality, in this case.

As for the aims of the Jesus Seminar:  they didn't really alter the trajectory of fundamentalism or Biblical literalism in America.  They published their Scholars Version (which I still admire), and then the band broke up.  It had pretty much stopped functioning by the time I was in seminary, and it's just another footnote now, if that. I understand now that, in academic circles and seminaries, it's already old news and considered quaint, at best.

So it goes.

Now, is Johnson wrong?  I just think his argumentsa aren't very good.  I have my critiques of Crossan.  He started out using literary critical tools and some tools from anthropology (formalism, mostly) to analyze the parables.  His The Dark Interval was especially important to me the first time I read it.  But Crossan was never of the majesty of Bultmann, whose The Gospel of John I could study for years, even as I disagree with much of it (Bultmann is dismissive of the canonicals.  I find Luke the most theologically subtle and humanly engaging of the four.  Go and please the world.)  Crossan abandoned biblical exegesis in favor of historical analysis, and not the stuff that came out of Germany in the 19th century.  This pursuit pulled him deeper and deeper into both Biblical historical studies and anthropology, and frankly he almost didn't come out the other side.  Both of those disciplines are deeply complex and not for dilettantes to play with (think Dawkins, with no genetics training at all, teaching the world about the "selfish gene," an idea no geneticist would touch with a club).  Crossan wasn't as shallow as Dawkins, but I always wondered what anthropologists and archaeologists thought of his work on the historical Jesus and the early church.  He teamed up with an archaeologist for Excavating Jesus and In Search of Paul, and I think those books are the better for it.  His books on Jesus and the early church are quite rigorous, but I'd welcome the support of an archaeologist or two (as well as an anthropologist) to be able to assess their rigor.  I don't, by contrast, doubt the rigor of Bultmann's scholarship; but he stays firmly in the realm within which he did all of his work.  Indeed, Bultmann's more "famous" work on "demythologizing" is, I think, his weakest, because he's almost literally out of his field (and treading on anthropology, psychology, and even sociology.

Historical criticism began as an attempt to understand scriptures and the "Biblical world" as we understand the rest of human history and historical experience.  It is a tool for exegesis; nothing more.  It does not determine the validity of interpretation, it provides another set of understandings and methods for interpretation.  Subsequent schools of scholarship, as they came along in the 19th and 20th, and now 21st centuries, have primarily the same goal.  Fundamentalism is literally a reaction to historical criticism, as is literalism (at least in its contemporary form). I don't mind having the tools to refute them; at least for my own satisfaction.  There are many ways of exegeting scripture; there is no one "right" way.  Mr. Johnson is quite right to have his own opinions about the validity of methods, even of outcomes.

But jeebus, dude, know what you're talkin' about, huh?  You're embarassing the rest of us.  Yes, we do "measure adequacy and integrity in terms of other criteria."  But those criteria exist in reference to other criteria.  You are free to disagree with the latter, but you first have to give them their due.  Lazy denunciations based on faulty representations don't feed the bulldog.


*The first church I pastored was literally next door (i.e., on the same lot with no road between us) to a MO Synod church. I was told not to introduce myself there as I would not be welcome, despite the fact the UCC has historical roots in the Lutheran branch of Protestantism.  MO Synod remains "pure" by not associating with any other churches.  WI Synod remains pure by not associating with MO Synod, whom they think aren't "authentic" enough.)