Sunday, October 05, 2025

Trump Is Simply Too Stupid To Understand The Legal System

Herself. The politician the DOJ relied on in court was: 
In this case, and unlike in Newsom II, Plaintiffs provide substantial evidence that the protests at the Portland ICE facility were not significantly violent or disruptive in the days—or even weeks—leading up to the President’s directive on September 27, 2025. The record evidence establishes that while disruption outside the Portland ICE facility peaked in June of 2025, federal and local law enforcement officers were able to “quell[] . . . the disorder.” Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1051 (quoting Sterling, 278 U.S. at 399–400). As of September 27, 2025, it had been months since there was any sustained level of violent or disruptive protest activity in Portland. During this time frame, there were sporadic events requiring either PPB monitoring or federal law enforcement intervention, but overall, the protests were small and uneventful.

Defendants’ declarants describe only four incidents of protesters clashing with federal officers in the month of September preceding the federalization order—on September 1st, 9th, 12th, and without further specification, the second week of September. Wamsley Decl., ECF 38 ¶¶ 16, 18; Cantu Decl., ECF 40 ¶ 15. The first involved protesters setting up a makeshift guillotine to intimidate federal officials; the second involved four people shining overpowered flashlights in the eyes of drivers; the third involved someone posting a photograph of an unmarked ICE vehicle online; and the last involved additional drivers having flashlights shone in their eyes. Cantu Decl., ECF 40 ¶ 15; Wamsley Decl., ECF 38 ¶¶ 16–18. These incidents are inexcusable, but they are nowhere near the type of incidents that cannot be handled by regular law enforcement forces. They also occurred at least two weeks before President Trump issued his directive. More broadly, these incidents are categorically different from the violent incidents as described in Newsom II that took place in Los Angeles when the President federalized the California National Guard on June 7, 2025. See 141 F.4th at 1052 (“[P]rotesters threw objects at ICE vehicles trying to complete a law enforcement operation, ‘pinned down’ several FPS officers defending federal property by throwing ‘concrete chunks, bottles of liquid, and other objects,’ and used ‘large rolling commercial dumpsters as a battering ram’ in an attempt to breach the parking garage of a federal building.”).

Plaintiffs provide all the PPB call logs in the month of September, which show that PPB worked in close coordination with FPS supervisors and regularly checked the status of the ICE facility. As detailed above, they also show that the protest activity in September generally did not involve violence against federal property or personnel. At the hearing, Defendants highlighted a September 19 entry relating to FPS reporting an assault by a known agitator against other protestors and a journalist. Hughes Decl., Ex. 19, ECF 46-19. This isolated assault, which did not target federal personnel, and which occurred a week before the federalization order, along with the other isolated September incidents, do not approach the level of disruption to federal functions in Los Angeles that Newsom II described as occurring “the day before” President Trump’s June 7, 2025 federalization of the California National Guard. 141 F.4th at 1052. Neither outside the Portland ICE facility nor elsewhere in the City of Portland was there unlawful activity akin to what was occurring in Los Angeles leading up to June 7, 2025. See id. at 1041 (describing the riotous activity).

Defendants also argue that strained FPS resources suffice to show that the President had a colorable basis to invoke Section 12406(3). Resp., ECF 35 at 20–21. But they demonstrate just the opposite, that federal law enforcement officers, unaided by any military forces, were capable of not only “quelling” the violence in June but also “preventi[ng]” it through September. Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1051 (quoting Sterling, 287 at 399–400). The Deputy Director of the Federal Protective Service Region that encompasses Oregon noted that to date, FPS has deployed 115 officers from other FPS Regions to Portland. Cantu Decl., ECF 40 ¶ 18. This deployment of additional federal law enforcement officers reduced the level of disorder between June and September to the point that in the immediate days leading up to the federalization order, around twenty or fewer protesters gathered outside the ICE Facility and “FPS indicated no issues or criminal reports.” Hughes Decl., Ex. 22, ECF 46-22 to Ex. 26, ECF 46-26. On September 26, the eve of the President’s directive, law enforcement “observed approximately 8–15 people at any given time out front of ICE. Mostly sitting in lawn chairs and walking around. Energy was low, minimal activity.” Hughes Decl., Ex. 26, ECF 46-26. It is clear that “the regular forces,” i.e. FPS and additional federal law enforcement, were able to execute the laws of the United States. Defendants’ argument that this diversion of federal law enforcement officers from out-of- state demonstrates that “the regular forces” were unable to execute the laws is not persuasive.

Defendants’ proposed test for Section 12406(3) would allow the President to call in the National Guard whenever one law enforcement office receives support from another office, which is a routine aspect of law enforcement activity. If the President could equate diversion of federal resources with his inability to execute federal law, then the President could send military troops virtually anywhere at any time.

In support of their opposition, Defendants also rely on occurrences of violence elsewhere in the country and the risk that peaceful protests in Portland might escalate into violence “at any moment.” Resp., ECF 35 at 13. But violence in a different state and the mere potential for future escalation do not provide a colorable basis to invoke Section 12406(3). To accept Defendants’ arguments would be to render meaningless the extraordinary requirements of 10 U.S.C. § 12406 by allowing the President to federalize one state’s National Guard based on events in a different state or mere speculation about future events. In other words, violence elsewhere cannot support troop deployments here, and concern about hypothetical future conduct does not demonstrate a present inability to execute the laws using nonmilitary federal law enforcement.

Finally, the President’s own statements regarding the deployment of federalized National Guardsmen further support that his determination was not “conceived in good faith” or “in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its continuance.” Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1051 (emphasis in original) (quoting Sterling, 287 U.S. at 399–400). Despite the “minimal activity” outside the Portland ICE facility in the days preceding September 27, 2025, Hughes Decl., Ex. 22, ECF 46-22 to Ex. 26, ECF 46-26, President Trump directed Secretary Hegseth “to provide all necessary Troops to protect War ravaged Portland, and any of our ICE Facilities under siege from attack by Antifa, and other domestic terrorists.” Marshall Decl., Ex. 12, ECF 9-12. Two days before that directive, the President claimed that Portland has “professional agitators” who are “paid a lot of money by rich people,” “anarchists,” and “crazy people” who try to “burn down buildings, including federal buildings.” See Marshall Decl., ECF 9 ¶ 26. Whatever the factual basis the President may have for these allegations, nothing in the record suggests that anything of this sort was occurring “every night” outside the Portland ICE building or in the City of Portland in the days or weeks leading up to his September 27 directive. Id.

In sum, the President is certainly entitled “a great level of deference,” Newsom II, 141 F.4th at 1048, in his determination that he “is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States.” 10 U.S.C. § 12406(3). But “a great level of deference” is not equivalent to ignoring the facts on the ground. As the Ninth Circuit articulated, courts must “review the President’s determination to ensure that it reflects a colorable assessment of the facts and law PAGE 22 – OPINION AND ORDER Case 3:25-cv-01756-IM Document 56 Filed 10/04/25 Page 23 of 31 within a ‘range of honest judgment.’” Id. at 1051 (quoting Sterling, 278 U.S. at 399). Here, this Court concludes that the President did not have a “colorable basis” to invoke § 12406(3) to federalize the National Guard because the situation on the ground belied an inability of federal law enforcement officers to execute federal law. Id. at 1051–52. The President’s determination was simply untethered to the facts.
I just have to point out here that this is the same problem Trump had in court in 2020: he simply couldn’t produce evidence in support of his claims. He had an extraordinary number of cases dismissed on that basis alone.

He lost this one on that basis, too. History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.
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